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ABSTRACT 
 This project examines the social, political, and economic transformations that 
shaped Choctaw nationhood following Indian Removal in the 1830s.  Specifically, I 
argue that, unlike the other Five Tribes, the Choctaw Nation formed a more coherent 
sense of nationalism which included local education, commercial development, and 
political consensus which allowed them to remain a united people during the Civil War 
and Reconstruction.  Whereas previous historians contend that a Confederate alliance 
was thrust upon hapless Choctaws who then joined lockstep with the Southern effort out 
of their shared interest in slavery, this dissertation demonstrates that Choctaws did not 
simply co-opt the Confederate cause.  Rather, they selectively participated based on 
their own pragmatic national interests.  I use the life of Choctaw Robert M. Jones as an 
interpretative lens to illuminate these various developments in the Choctaw Nation 
during the broader Civil War era.  Jones, the wealthiest slave-owner in Indian Territory, 
owned six plantations, more than twenty trading stores, and as many as 500 slaves in 
the antebellum period.  Despite his selective embrace of Southern cultural tenets, he 
remained an ardent Choctaw nationalist throughout his life.  His experiences highlight 
the process of indigenous nation-building that transformed the Choctaw Nation during 
the broader antebellum and reconstruction eras.  With this study, I reveal the importance 
of Native American agency and political sovereignty to the history of the Civil War 
west of the Mississippi and the broader narrative of Southern history.
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
“What will the rising generation think and say of us?  They will say that we were no 
patriots, a timid, stupid, money loving worshiping set of beings, scarcely deserving the 
name of men….Let the Choctaws act like men for once, and not part with their dearest 
right for filthy money, that white man’s God, and if the US will force us into measures 
be it so.  And let it be handed down in history to future generations, and prove that the 
Choctaws are true men, and prefer to live and die in poverty, but cannot be bought.” 
 
--Robert M. Jones to Peter Pitchlynn regarding the proposed sale of Choctaw lands, 
August 1, 1855
1
 
 
 
“No culture…retains its identity in isolation; identity is attained in contact, in contrast, 
in breakthrough” 
 
--Carlos Fuentes
2
 
 
This dissertation began as an exploration of an anomalous person and morphed 
into a new understanding of indigenous national development and identity.  During the 
nineteenth century, Choctaw millionaire Robert M. Jones became one of the richest men 
in the American Southwest.  After attending the Choctaw Academy in the late 1820s 
under the direction of Richard M. Johnson, the future vice president and self-proclaimed 
Tecumseh killer, Jones and his Choctaw brethren relocated to Indian Territory as part of 
federal Indian removal.  Between the 1830s and the 1860s, he acquired between four 
and seven plantations, as many as 500 African slaves, multiple mansions, and a fleet of 
steamships which transported his cotton to markets throughout the United States.  Other 
than these notable facts, historians know very little about Jones.  While his name has 
appeared in nearly every iteration of Choctaw and Five Tribes history as a brief 
                                                 
1
 Robert M. Jones to Peter Pitchlynn, August 1, 1855, Folder 999, Peter Pitchlynn Manuscript 
Collection, Gilcrease Museum, Tulsa, Oklahoma.  
2
 Carlos Fuentes, Myself with Others: Selected Essays, Reprinted (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 
12. 
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paragraph or footnote, his life experiences, identity, and status within the Choctaw 
Nation has received minimal exploration and analysis.
3
  
Jones’ affluence makes him a necessary footnote, but also elicits prejudicial 
assumptions about his identity.  His truly remarkable life contradicts popular 
stereotypes of Native Americans as an impoverished, uneducated, and backwards race.  
This has led many scholars to characterize him as an atypical Indian representing a 
small “mixed-blood” contingency who over-embraced their American connections and 
used the tools of the colonial oppressors for personal advancement.  Some classify 
members of this cohort as “go-betweens” for American and Indian societies because 
they shared connections with both cultures and navigated between them while never 
fully fitting into either.  Less flattering portrayals describe them as the advanced guard 
of the American colonial system—men who disavowed indigenous traits, 
accommodated outside oppressors, seized power, and unwittingly invited American 
takeover of indigenous nations.
4
   
                                                 
3
 Similar accounts of Robert M. Jones appear in all of the following histories: Valerie Lambert, 
The Choctaw Nation: A Story of American Indian Resurgence (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2007), 42-43; Clara Sue Kidwell, The Choctaws in Oklahoma: From Tribe to Nation, 1855-1970 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 77-79; Donna Akers, Living in the Land of Death: The 
Choctaw Nation, 1830-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 2004); Jesse McKee and Jon 
Schlenker, The Choctaws: Cultural Evolution of a Native American Tribe (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1980), 120; Daniel Littlefield, The Chickasaw Freedmen: A People Without a Country 
(Westport, Greenwood Press, 1980), 61; Angie Debo, The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), 60. 
4
 This dissertation uses terms like “mixed-blood,” “full-bloods,” “half-breed,” and “náhollo” 
only in quotations used by other authors or historical actors.  As explained throughout, these terms 
depend on racial generalities and blood-based determinism which rarely withstand scrutiny.  In their 
place, I use the term “traditional” to characterize those who preferred a more conservative Choctaw life 
and “progressive” for men and women who embraced education, national governance, and a commercial 
ethos.  Neither term is intended to connote a value judgment.  Even these terms are limited in that they 
describe a pure binary which fit very few Choctaws.  My usage of “progressive” does not coincide with 
the later Choctaw “Progressive Party.”  For studies on go-betweens, see James Merrell, Into the American 
Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: Norton, 1999); Frederick Hoxie, This 
Indian Country: American Indian Political Activists and the Place They Made (New York: Penguin Press, 
2012). 
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Upon briefly scratching the surface, I found ample fodder to classify Jones as 
the archetypal “mixed-blood” Indian.  He converted to Christianity and maintained 
close relations with missionaries throughout his life.  Missionaries rarely minced words 
about their desire to reshape Indian societies to the evolving American social and 
economic order through Christianity and education.  Jones whole-heartedly fought for 
expanding American-style education throughout the Choctaw Nation.  Further, he 
embraced racial slaveholding and many traditions characteristic of the white planter 
class in the American South.  He did not look or act the part of a Choctaw—he dressed 
in New Orleans fashions, wore his hair short, went by his Welsh birth name even 
among Choctaws, and was an officer in the Freemasons.  In addition to slave wealth, he 
partnered with American and French-Canadian investors to open stores throughout the 
Choctaw Nation and in Texas and Louisiana.  As the Civil War approached, it was 
Jones who marched into the Choctaw General Council, intimidated Principal Chief 
George Hudson into abandoning plans for neutrality, and threatened to hang those who 
disagreed with a Confederate alliance.  All the telltale signs—education, 
Christianization, racial slaveholding, and individual commercial wealth—indicated that 
Jones internalized colonial practices that threatened Choctaw cultural identity and 
political sovereignty.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Several variations of Jones’ wording circulated throughout the Choctaw Nation, but all contain 
the same basic threat of capital punishment against those in opposition.  According to some, Jones 
concluded his fiery speech with “Anyone who opposed secession ought to be hung.”  See Annie Heloise 
Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist: An Omitted Chapter in the Diplomatic 
History of the Southern Confederacy (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1915), 77, Angie Debo, 
The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), 81; The 
variation used in the text was cited by missionary John Edwards who missed the meeting but spoke to 
several who were present. See John Edwards, “An Account of my Escape from the South in 1861,” 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 43 (Winter 1965), 59. 
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Yet, as I delved further into research on Jones’ life, I found numerous 
anomalies.  For instance, while Jones conversed with missionaries and advocated Euro-
American education, he also fought to ensure that the Choctaws maintained control of 
the education system.  When missionaries and other educators attempted to exert 
authority, Jones worked to have them reprimanded or expelled.  He lived in affluence 
like a Southern planter, but also took in Choctaw orphans and petitioned the United 
States government for funds rightfully belonging to orphans.  Though he held a large 
number of African slaves as property, he was not alone as increasing numbers of 
racially diverse Choctaws adopted the practice of racial slaveholding.   Moreover, Jones 
believed that Choctaw land must remain as communal property and that Choctaws must 
protect their sovereign rights over that land.  When American trading firms abused 
Choctaw clients, Jones used his influence with the United States agent and the Choctaw 
General Council to have them removed and Choctaw run businesses put in their place.  
Finally, Jones frequently served as delegate in disputes between the Choctaws and 
Americans.  In this capacity, he consistently advocated Choctaw National interests 
against American colonial designs.  Each new detail I unearthed confirmed an important 
conclusion: despite certain cultural traits, Jones’ political identity stayed permanently 
tied to the Choctaw Nation throughout his life.  No matter how acculturated he seemed 
to Euro-American observers, he remained a Choctaw Nationalist.   
  My efforts to understand Robert M. Jones’ identity produced several questions 
which have guided this study.  How have Native Americans selectively embraced 
American federal policies and colonial practices aimed at eradicating indigeneity and 
instead used them to advance their own causes?  What is the relationship between 
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indigenous cultural and political identity and how have they transformed?  How have 
Indian nations developed and changed over time and how much agency have Native 
Americans had in building and protecting their own sovereign polities?  What impact 
did this unique national identity have on Choctaw actions during the American Civil 
War?  And finally, what can seemingly atypical Indians like Robert M. Jones reveal 
about the dynamic nature of indigenous identity?  
Addressing these queries has resulted in a study less about progressive outliers 
like Robert M. Jones and more about indigenous nationalism.  Choctaws that have been 
characterized as progressive and traditional Choctaws all modified tenets of the 
American colonialist system and selectively incorporated them into their own national 
identity.  These included literacy, education, formal national governmental bodies, 
racial ideology, integration into a capitalist system, and active political engagements in 
national affairs.  Rather than destroying Native American identity and stimulating 
American assimilation, competing and overlapping visions of Choctaw nationhood 
reinforced the primacy of Choctaw identity.  To American outsiders, this process looked 
like successful “civilization” of Indians but for Choctaws, this was merely continued 
adaptation to the outside world and the means to protect national sovereignty within a 
colonial system.  The life of Robert M. Jones highlights this process that shaped and 
reshaped the Choctaw Nation during the nineteenth century.   
As with any type of nation, Choctaw nationhood must be understood as a 
historical development, an ongoing process of changing political organization and 
identity over time.  Nations are fluid polities that are not easily defined and these 
definitions change over time.  Anthropologists have typically used a paradigm that 
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frames the history of indigenous groups as a hierarchical evolution in social 
organization from a band to a tribe and finally to a more advanced stage of nation.  This 
framework fails to adequately contextualize political, social, and historical changes 
among Native Americans and has increasingly been criticized by historians and 
ethnohistorians over the past several decades.  As anthropologist Raymond Fogelson 
explains, “In earlier eras, when American Indians were still regarded as possessing 
considerable autonomy, military power, and political might, the term ‘nation’ was 
frequently applied to Native American politics.”  Nevertheless, “When the balance of 
power shifted and Native Americans were considered as dependent nations or wards of 
the U.S. government, the term ‘tribe’ became more widespread.”6  Thus, defining an 
Indian polity as a tribe can and has been used undermine its sovereign status and imply 
inferiority.  In my discussion of Choctaw Nationalism, it is not my intention to imply 
that it developed from an earlier, less advanced, or racially inferior stage of political 
organization.   
In colonial Mississippi and Alabama, the Choctaws created what historians Greg 
O’Brien and Patricia Galloway consider more of a confederacy than a nation.  Like the 
Creeks and other Southern Indian polities, locality and clan (or iska) were the most 
central attributes of political identity. 
7
  In this period, as self-governing groups 
comprising a confederacy, Choctaws maintained an inherent sovereignty that predated 
                                                 
6
 Raymond D. Fogelson, “Perspectives on Native American Identity,” in Studying Native 
America: Problems and Prospects, ed. Russell Thornton, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 
51. 
7
 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2008); Patricia Galloway, Choctaw Genesis, 1500-1700 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995) 
Devon Mihesuah, Choctaw Crime and Punishment, 1884-1907 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2009), 15; Greg O’Brien, “The Conqueror meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on 
the Post-Revolutionary Frontier,” Journal of Southern History 61 (Feb 2001), 41-43; Clara Sue Kidwell, 
The Choctaws in Oklahoma, xvi. 
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the United States and constitutional government.  By the early nineteenth-century, 
however, Choctaws had to contend with the growing colonial power of the United 
States.  In response, to the political, economic, and diplomatic conditions of this period, 
Choctaws increasingly forged a collective political identity under a centralized, self-
governing body.  As noted scholars David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima 
explain, “A sovereign nation defines itself and its citizens, exercises self-government, 
and the right to treat with other nation, applies jurisdiction over the internal legal affairs 
of its citizens and subparts, claims political jurisdiction over the lands within its 
borders, and may define certain rights that inhere in its citizens (or others).”8  In a 
manner similar to how the United States declared itself an independent nation from the 
British Empire and then engaged in ongoing process of nation-building, Choctaws also 
defined themselves as members an independent and sovereign nation during the 
nineteenth-century and fulfilled of the criteria for nationhood outlined by Wilkins and 
Lomawaima.    
Choctaws developed a political identity around Choctaw nationhood in which 
they defined themselves as citizens of a sovereign Indian nation distinct and 
autonomous from the United States.  Indigenous political identity and cultural identity 
often overlap and intersect but should not be conflated.  As James Axtell explains 
culture is “a kind of code by which a people live and which gives meaning, direction, 
and order to their lives.  The code is an idealized construct, imagined” and “members of 
a society are only privy to certain parts of the total code.”9  While shared by members of 
                                                 
8
 David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty 
and Federal Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 4. 
9
 James Axtell “Ethnohistory”, Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. 
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a society, culture is always dynamic but never homogenous.  During the nineteenth 
century, Choctaw culture and cultural identities fluctuated and diversified but citizens of 
the Choctaw Nation consistently forged a political identity centered on citizenship and 
nation.   
While Choctaw sovereignty is inherent, Choctaw nationhood did not develop in 
isolation.
10
   In fact, Choctaws and Euro-Americans simultaneously developed divergent 
national identities during the nineteenth century largely defined in relationship to one 
another and triangulated with the presence of African Americans in both nations.  Just 
as David Chang asserts in his study of the nineteenth-century Creek Nation, “The story 
of Creek notions of nationhood and struggles among black and white people over 
nationhood help us understand there are multiple kinds of nation in American history,” 
the same can be said of the Choctaws.
11
  This dissertation reveals the interconnected 
process of indigenous and American nation-building that shaped the geopolitical and 
social contours of the North American continent during the nineteenth century.  
Furthermore, it demonstrates that an interpretative framework of indigenous nationhood 
can reveal how and why Native Americans, including Robert M. Jones, who embrace 
cultural change, can also maintain an indigenous political identity within the United 
States. 
Chapter one explores the reorganization of Choctaw society under the auspices 
of self-preservation during the first few decades of the nineteenth century and the 
looming removal crisis.  By 1820s Choctaws had divided their polity into three districts, 
                                                 
10
 See Wilkins and Lomawaima, Uneven Ground, for further discussion on inherent, extra-
constitutional, and constitutional sovereignty of Native American nations.   
11
 David Chang, The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in 
Oklahoma, 1832-1929 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 6. 
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named for three living chiefs—Mushulatubbee, Apukshunnubbe, and Pushmataha—and 
each district had political autonomy within the structure.  Representatives of these three 
districts formed a national council to present a unified voice in foreign affairs.  District 
chiefs kept their local authority, but could not unilaterally make national decisions.   
They also invited missionaries to educate prominent youths who were poised to occupy 
leadership positions.  Reorganization temporarily paid dividends in stemming the tide of 
one-sided land cessions, but ultimately failed to prevent removal once Andrew Jackson 
took office.  Nonetheless, national reorganization allowed the Choctaws to present a 
unified front in negotiating removal.  This process had direct implications into the ways 
Choctaws restructured their society following the disasters of removal.
12
   
Chapter two examines the reestablishment of Choctaw institutions after removal 
as part of larger cultural changes in the Choctaw nation.  Specifically, it focuses on the 
embrace of American-style education and the creation of a Choctaw National school 
system as a political institution.  Upon arriving in Indian Territory, the Choctaws 
reestablished three autonomous districts and a general council empowered with national 
legislative authority.  Two of the three districts immediately invited missionaries to 
return and resume educating young Choctaws.  More schools appeared each year 
funded by annuity payments from treaties with the United States, American benevolent 
societies, and local Choctaw communities.  Church buildings doubled as Sabbath 
schools in which educated Choctaws taught whole families basic literacy.  Missionaries 
aspired to use education as a way to convert the masses and eliminate Choctaw identity.  
                                                 
12
 Arthur DeRosier, The Removal of the Choctaw Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1970); W. David Baird, Peter Pitchlynn: Chief of the Choctaws (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1972); Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change 
among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 121. 
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Careful oversight from the General Council and the involvement of local communities 
thwarted their efforts and protected Choctaw practices.  Men like Jones regularly 
audited each school and reported to the national council on student progress, teacher 
conduct, and ideas for improvement.  The school system became the pride of the nation 
and a truly national institution.  Multiple missionaries worked with educated Choctaws 
to produce a written Choctaw syllabary.  Though initially used to translate biblical 
passages, written Choctaw language appeared in courts, newspapers, business 
transaction, and journals preventing the destruction of the Choctaw language and 
fostering Choctaw literacy. 
Along with education, post-removal Choctaws engaged in commercial 
endeavors that connected them to the burgeoning American market economy, including 
the practice of racial slaveholding.  Chapter three examines these developments within 
the Choctaw Nation from the late 1830s through the 1850s.  Many Choctaws 
maintained basic subsistence by growing corn, wheat, and potatoes and raising 
livestock, but a growing number transitioned into cash crops and large-scale husbandry.  
Traditional and progressive Choctaws alike traded their surplus crops for cash payments 
or trade goods in the growing number of privately-run commercial businesses in 
Choctaw and American towns.  Jones mastered this system by placing stores in each 
town and gins on all of his properties, making him a prominent Choctaw 
businessman.  Towns like Doaksville, Skullyville, Boggy Depot, and Eagletown 
became booming commercial centers not only in the Choctaw Nation but in larger trade 
network along the Texas border.  The General Council regularly intervened to prevent 
conflicts sparked by trade disputes, established courts to resolve conflicts, and passed 
11 
 
laws regarding private and public property.  They licensed American traders, audited 
business ledgers to ensure fairness, and petitioned the United States to remove invaders 
who often peddled contraband whiskey.  Through these actions, the General Council 
solidified its role as an authority over economic activities in the Choctaw Nation.     
Rather than a drastic departure from traditional life, Choctaws still lived on 
communal lands and selectively negotiated their involvement with the market 
economy.  Though Choctaws began to settle disputes before courts instead of the clan 
system, the courts followed traditional understandings of property and conduct.  By the 
1840s, American agents boasted that the Choctaws had become an educated, 
commercial, civilized people who differed from Euro-Americans racially but not 
behaviorally.  Beneath the surface, these agents missed that Choctaws had only 
selectively incorporated Euro-American practices into a dynamic indigenous culture 
and nationalized these institutions strategically to help preserve political sovereignty.  In 
doing so, men like Robert M. Jones fully embraced a Choctaw National identity while 
appearing to outsiders as less than fully Choctaw. 
The Civil War accentuated wide-spread levels of national unity despite internal 
political debates over the nature of Choctaw nationhood.  Chapter four illuminates 
competing visions of Choctaw Nationalism during the 1850s in order to showcase 
Choctaw political participation and highlight the developments leading to the Choctaw 
alliance with the Confederacy at the close of the decade.  Contrary to previous 
interpretations, a self-interested “mixed-blood” minority did not drag the majority to a 
Confederate alliance, nor did the Choctaws wholeheartedly rally behind the Confederate 
cause.  Instead, Jones and others negotiated an incredibly favorable alliance treaty with 
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the Confederacy, which protected Choctaw National autonomy and addressed 
longstanding grievances against the United States.   
Chapter five provides a narrative of Choctaw involvement in the Civil War and 
explores the reasons why Choctaws remained a united and autonomous nation 
throughout the conflict. At large meetings, Choctaw leaders justified the necessity of the 
Confederate alliance to the protection of Choctaw autonomy and called for widespread 
Choctaw national support.  Unlike Creeks and Cherokees, who divided over the Civil 
War, Choctaws remained united in order to defend their own nation against outside 
threats from the Union and the Confederacy.  The alliance treaty even ensured the right 
of Choctaws to refuse to leave Indian Territory, a right which they regularly exercised 
much to the chagrin of Confederate commanders.   
For the Choctaws, the Civil War both highlighted national unity and 
foreshadowed the vulnerability of its political sovereignty.  Chapter six demonstrates 
how the weakened but resilient Choctaw Nation attempted to once again reconstruct and 
protect itself through a process of nation-building but became increasingly fractured by 
external pressure.   The United States negotiated a Reconstruction treaty that 
implemented measures designed to punish the Choctaw Nation even more harshly than 
secessionist states and to diminish their sovereign power.  This included stripping 
Choctaws of the authority to decide the terms of citizenship in their nation by forcibly 
requiring the adoption of their freedmen.  Choctaws resisted heightened Euro-American 
efforts to dispossess them of land, eradicate their Native American cultural practices, 
and dissolve tribal sovereignty.  For instance, Robert M. Jones issued a passionate letter 
read before the United State Congress explaining that the Choctaws aligned with the 
13 
 
Confederacy as the means of preserving independence, and condemned the failure of 
the United States to honor their treaty obligations and resume amicable relations.  
Despite increasing resistance towards American colonial expansion, the Choctaws 
increasingly divided as the federal policy makers and social reformers made efforts to 
dissolve their nation. 
This dissertation uses Jones’ life and identity as a narrative thread to highlight 
the deliberate transformations that reshaped the Choctaw Nation over a period of 
several decades.  It is not, however, a biography of Jones.  For over forty-years he was 
intimately involved in most areas of Choctaw National development and his 
experiences reflect broader patterns and events that affected the lives of all Choctaw 
citizens.  In House on Diamond Hill, Tiya Miles uses Cherokee slave owner James 
Vann to showcase plantation life for slaves and Cherokee women.  Similarly, I use 
Jones to illuminate the world around him.  Instead of providing a case study of a single 
plantation, however, my manuscript uses Jones to reflect much broader developments in 
the Choctaw Nation as a whole.  For this reason, Jones opens and closes each chapter 
while the voices of diverse Choctaws fill the pages in between.
13
    
Following Jones’ life allows me to engage the diverse historiography on race, 
slaveholding, and wealth among Native Americans.  As a nationalist who also happened 
to be of mixed Choctaw and Euro-American heritage, Jones’ life helps bridge the gap 
between the collective works of Theda Perdue and Claudio Saunt on Native racial 
identity.  Jones and his cohort clearly benefitted from connections to multiple cultures, 
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but these connections did not dictate action or identity.  Blood did not determine Jones’ 
and other Choctaws’ embrace of some Euro-American practices —mixed bloods” often 
led traditional Choctaw lives and “full-bloods” went to schools and acquired wealth.  
Having both American and Choctaw kinship connections, however, served as an 
advantage in making social, economic, and political connections.  In essence, “mixed 
blood” Choctaw Nationalists like Jones confirm Saunt’s assertion race played an 
important role in Southern Indian societies.  Nevertheless, by highlighting the ways in 
which Jones’ blood quantum failed to dictate Jones’ identity and actions confirms 
Theda Perdue’s argument that the use of the term “mixed blood” to denote people of 
mixed Anglo and Native American descent has been falsely constructed and used to 
inaccurately connote acculturation and increased civilization.
14
   
In Rich Indians, Alexandra Harmon argues that because “prosperous Indians 
have defied the expectations of contemporary historians” as presumed “rarities or 
anomalies,” they need to be reinterpreted.15   Jones’ affluence makes him a perfect case 
study to evaluate and expand on Harmon’s model.  As my work shows, outsiders 
constantly felt the need to qualify or explain Jones’ wealth in terms of blood, education, 
or exposure to white society.  Choctaws, on the other hand, saw little conflict between 
affluence and Choctaw identity.  When placed within the broader context of Indians 
who have acquired large of amounts of material wealth throughout American history, 
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Jones becomes less anomalous and more indicative of Native Americans’ negotiated 
status within a system of market capitalism and continued defiance of indigenous 
stereotypes created by the structures of settler colonialism.
16
   
Moreover, this study draws upon cutting-edge research in Barbara Krauthamer’s 
Black Slaves, Indian Masters, Christina Snyder’s Slavery in Indian Country, and Fay 
Yarbrough’s Race in the Cherokee Nation, to demonstrate the impact of race and 
slaveholding in the Choctaw Nation.  Snyder argues that by 1830 Choctaws and other 
Southern Indians had developed a unique form of racial slavery that combined racial 
ideology with traditional forms of Native American captivity.  By examining Jones and 
the role of race and slavery in the nineteenth century Choctaw Nation, my work 
demonstrates the growing divide between Choctaws who continued to practice 
traditional captivity versus those who favored the more brutal American peculiar 
institution.  Moreover, my evaluation of codification of race and slavery complements 
observations made by Fay Yarbrough regarding race in the Cherokee Nation during the 
same period.  Barbara Krauthammer’s recent study also provides an important 
foundation for examining the experiences of slaves and the nature of slaveholding 
within the Choctaw Nation.  Rather than examining the Choctaw slave and freedmen 
experience separately, however, I integrate their history into the larger narrative of the 
Choctaw Nation during the nineteenth century.
17
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A handful of historians have provided tribal histories of the Choctaw Nation for 
various periods during the nineteenth century, but they have largely focused on cultural 
divides rather than the formation of a national political identity.  Early historians 
including Grant Foreman and Angie Debo distill internal conflict to genetic makeup by 
asserting that “mixed-bloods” tried to force assimilation and acculturation, while “full-
bloods” isolated themselves and largely disappeared.  On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, Donna Akers dismisses the prominence of racial categorization and attributes 
internal divides to Choctaws who lived as whites and attacked traditional institutions.  
By simply dividing Choctaws into two categories, however, this analysis fails to 
recognize the flexibility of Choctaw culture and the simultaneous emergence of political 
identities predicated on protecting sovereignty and autonomy.  In contrast, my work 
focuses on Choctaws who do not easily fit blood-based stereotypes or progressive 
versus traditional dichotomies but participate in the process of Choctaw nation-
building.
18
 
My focus on Choctaw nationhood highlights the continued power of Indians in 
the American South in the 1800s, despite the continued threat of American colonialism.  
Thus, it contributes to a number of recent studies that examine the Five Tribes within 
the broader context of nineteenth-century American state expansion while highlighting 
the continued political sovereignty of these Indian nations.  Historians have yet to fully 
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examine the process of Choctaw nation-building within this framework.
19
  Whereas 
Clara Sue Kidwell’s The Choctaws in Oklahoma: From Tribe to Nation, 1855-1970 
offers the most comprehensive tribal history, this dissertation specifically highlights the 
role of the nineteenth century Choctaw Nation within the larger narrative of American 
history and explores how Choctaws turned the tables on the colonial system through 
selective adaptation.
20
   
My study also contributes to the historiography on the Civil War and 
Reconstruction by merging the narratives of Native American history and American 
history for these periods.  Currently, only a handful of studies consider the role of the 
Five Tribes in the Civil War and the impact of Reconstruction on these nations.  Most 
narratives of the Civil War limit their attention to a brief footnote on famous Indian 
individuals including Ely Parker, Stand Watie, and John Ross, but fail to provide further 
analysis of the involvement of sovereign Indian nations in the conflict.  The Choctaws 
appear to be an easy case to understand—slaveholding Indians dragging their traditional 
brethren into a reckless, self-serving alliance.  There is much more to the story.  I 
highlight the agency of Choctaw individuals and the power of the Choctaw Nation in 
negotiating an advantageous alliance with the Confederacy to best protect their national 
interests and autonomy.  When the course of the war turned, Choctaws clearly 
demonstrated that their alliance with the Confederacy was predicated upon their own 
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national interests, preventing the tremendous damage inflicted upon other Native 
nations.
 21
   
After avoiding civil war during the Civil War, the Reconstruction era expanded 
Choctaw’s internal divides, preventing them from successful defending their nation 
from American colonial policies.  Though national schools sluggishly resumed 
operation and Americans agreed to resume most previous treaty rights, the national 
consensus disintegrated.  Failure to reach a consensus on critical issues—corrupt 
railroad companies who owned the US government, allotment, white invaders 
exploiting their resources, the status of freedmen—combined with untimely political 
corruption, led to internal Choctaw violence at levels previously unseen in the 
nineteenth century.  In 1872, Robert M. Jones believed he had taken steps to break 
down Choctaw factionalism and mount a defense against outside threats.  By 1873, he 
realized he had failed.  Only months later, he died suddenly. 
In life and death, Jones can be used to understand the broader contours of 
Choctaw nationhood in the nineteenth-century.  In light of his financial success, 
education, and “mixed-blood,” colonial agents attempted to use Jones’ life to promote a 
historical narrative of an advanced few Indians dragging primitive traditionalists 
towards a regretful, but inevitable, assimilation with white Americans.  This narrative 
paints Choctaws into one of two corners—embracing “progress” while abandoning their 
national identity or keeping their identity only by forsaking outside institutions.  This, 
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of course, was predicated upon the notion that a true Choctaw National identity was 
either permanently static or permanently lost.  Within the backdrop of allotment, 
statehood, and termination, this narrative gained a tacit acceptance among the Choctaw 
and American societies.   
20 
 
CHAPTER ONE: “LET US NEVER DESPAIR”: CHOCTAWS IN THE AGE OF 
REMOVAL 
In October, 1808, Robert M. Jones entered the world at a critical period in 
Choctaw history.  The collapse of imperial contestation in the American South left the 
Choctaws unable to make European powers compete amongst themselves for favorable 
trade conditions and political alliances.  Instead, they now had to contend with an 
aggressively expanding United States.  In order to survive this crisis, they creatively 
adapted to the influence and intrusion of white Americans into their land and society by 
creating a more centralized national political organization and selectively embracing 
various aspects of Euro-American culture.  Thus, a changing and chaotic world shaped 
Jones’ early experiences.1   
Historians know very little about Jones’ childhood.  During his youth he lived 
along a military road constructed by the United States through Choctaw lands— quite 
literally on the crossroads between Choctaw and American worlds.  As a young boy, he 
witnessed his Choctaw brethren victoriously returning from the Battle of New Orleans 
alongside Andrew Jackson’s regulars.  He grew up speaking both English and Choctaw 
but his familial connections are somewhat less clear—in fact, historians and 
genealogists for generations have tried in vain to definitively prove either the name of 
his mother or father.  All that is conclusively known about his father is that he was a 
white man who traded with the Choctaws.  Jones believed that his family had 
connections to the Jennings line in colonial Virginia and kept a wedding certificate as 
proof.  Jones’ mother’s connections are almost as confusing.  She was of mixed 
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Choctaw and European descent from a prominent family, linked to chiefs 
Apukshunnubbe and Franchimastubbee, as well to traders Thomas James and Benjamin 
James.
2
  Her last name was McDonald, but her first name has faded from historical 
record.  At least two of her five sisters (or half-sisters) also married prominent traders 
and farmers who lived among the Choctaws.
3
  Despite the lack of documentary sources 
relating directly to Jones’ early life, the transformations occurring within Choctaw 
society at the time of his birth are well documented.  
Jones grew up amidst profound cultural, political, and economic changes, which 
permeated society as certain Choctaws adopted some Euro-American cultural practices.  
Though they did this primarily as a defense mechanism, they did so on their own terms.  
Jones fit the mold of what American presidents ranging from George Washington to 
Andrew Jackson sought to create with the “civilization program.”  He was proficient in 
English, as well as several other languages, including Latin.  As a child, he received a 
basic education at missionary schools within the Choctaw Nation.  He then attended 
Choctaw Academy in Blue Springs, Kentucky, where he specialized in business and 
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religion.  His educational prowess drew the attention of future United States vice 
president Richard M. Johnson, who served as the proprietor of the school.  He also 
converted to Christianity, joined the Freemasons, and cultivated key relationships with 
missionaries living among the Choctaws.   Furthermore, Jones heavily engaged in the 
market economy, developed tracts of land as a farmer and rancher, and owned African 
slaves.
4
   
***** 
Although he seemed to fulfill every criterion for “civilization” desired by the 
U.S. government, Jones simultaneously represented a new type of Choctaw citizen 
viewed by many in his society as the best defense against the United States.  He was not 
alone.  By the 1820s, many young Choctaws began to successfully integrate aspects of 
Euro-American culture into the political, economic, and social structure of the dynamic 
Choctaw Nation.  Peter Pitchlynn, James McDonald, Greenwood Leflore, David 
Folsom, and George Hudson, among many others, with maternal connections to 
powerful Choctaw families rapidly ascended to leadership positions.  By the time of 
removal, Jones found himself among this increasingly-powerful cohort of young men 
who served as cultural brokers between two polities: the United States and Choctaw 
Nation.    
The Choctaw drive for education, market connections, and political reform 
corresponded with similar trends in the United States.  Many historians frame this 
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phenomenon in terms of Native polities defensively degrading their cultural mores to 
better withstand Euro-American expansion.
5
  Though this certainly is part of the story, 
this chapter examines Choctaw political and social change more accurately in terms of 
ongoing national development rather than cultural degradation.  Moreover, while 
removal is typically identified as the impetus for major societal change among the 
Choctaws, this chapter demonstrates that Choctaw nationhood began to develop in 
tandem with the early period of American nation-building during the pre-removal era.  
The removal crisis of the 1830s then tested Choctaws’ newly-defined political cohesion 
and solidified the integration of several Euro-American culture trends into Choctaw 
National identity.   
As early as the late eighteenth century, power relations and political 
organization among Choctaws began to drastically change as a result of the collapse of 
imperial contestation in North America and new trade and diplomatic relations with the 
United States.
6
  Historian Greg O’Brien argues that this constituted “a revolutionary 
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age” among Choctaws, as well as among Americans. The earliest Indian policies of the 
American republic were inconsistent, but in the Southeast, George Washington largely 
advocated a “civilization program” to Christianize, educate, and train Indians in yeoman 
farming.  Thomas Jefferson then integrated Indian “civilization” policy into his larger 
imperial vision of the American nation.  According to historian Peter Onuf, Jefferson 
projected a bold experiment in republicanism, in which Americans were a united people, 
“conscious of themselves as a nation with a crucial role to play in world history.”  In 
order to fit within his national vision of the continent as “a single country, the future 
home of one great people,” Indians had to become “civilized” or face removal and 
extinction.
7
   
As Jefferson argued in his famous Notes on the State of Virginia, once Indian 
men became the main farmers and women tended the home, then “the natural progress 
of things” would induce Natives to become “citizens of the United States,” a process 
“better to promote than retard.”   Ideally, this would happen gradually as settlers moved 
further west, “where our settlements and theirs meet and blend together.”  To advance 
this goal and smooth the transition, he believed the U.S. should purchase Choctaw land 
under fair treaties in exchange for tools to advance ideas of “civilization.”8  As was true 
with numerous aspects of Jefferson’s life, his political and personal actions often fell 
short of his lofty stated ideals.  A critical tenet of Jefferson’s “Revolution of 1800” 
included the expansion yeoman farmers onto available land—land belonging to Native 
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Americans. Vocal opposition to Indian landholding in Mississippi began in 1803 after 
Napoleon abruptly decided to sell the entire territory to the Americans.  Pressured, 
Jefferson advocated encouraging Indians to fall into deep levels of debt to private firms 
to force land cessions.  This strategy worked especially well with Choctaw chiefs like 
Franchimastabé who were attempting to solidify their position in society through 
monopolizing access to trade goods.  Three such treaties took place during Jefferson’s 
administration.  Stipulations in these treaties included the cession of over 7.5 million 
acres of land mostly in exchange for debt forgiveness and farm implements.  One of 
these treaties was so unbalanced that Jefferson refused to submit to the Senate for two 
years until he felt that he needed additional political clout with Southwestern voters.
9
 
 The implementation of the “civilization” policy corresponded with drastic 
changes in both the Choctaw Nation and the United States.  The 1793 patent of Eli 
Whitney’s cotton gin transformed cotton from a cumbersome crop into white gold.  To 
meet the insatiable worldwide demand for cotton, Americans in the South began to 
agitate for the expansion of the plantation system and African slavery into territory 
occupied by Native Americans.  Simultaneously, the Choctaws adapted to their own 
increased demand for Euro-American trade by overhunting and depleting the deer 
populations west and east of the Mississippi River.  This created a crisis, throwing the 
Choctaws deep into debt with traders and causing a reevaluation in critical cultural 
tenets.  Subsequently, Choctaws began to embrace tenets of the “civilization” policy 
that they could use to their advantage.  As the U.S. nation-state made plans to expand its 
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imperial domain across the entire North American continent, the Choctaws along with 
other Southern polities creatively adapted to their new relationship with the United 
States by participating and competing in the burgeoning market economy.
10
 
Choctaws changed their power structure so that chiefs who could control trade 
with Euro-Americans would fill leadership roles.  By slightly altering their political 
organization at the turn of the nineteenth, they managed to live in dependence upon 
trade goods while avoiding full dependency even after the playoff system ended.  Even 
with burgeoning economic transitions, Choctaw chiefs respected the autonomy of other 
districts in domestic and foreign affairs.  Each district chief selected lower chiefs and 
captains, or local leaders, whose authority never went beyond the district.  Robert M. 
Jones, for instance, became a captain in the Western district slightly before removal—a 
position which carried no authority in other districts.  Under this system, the Choctaws 
much more closely resembled a confederacy than a nation.  Yet, the divergent roles of 
two prominent chiefs, the very traditional Taboca and the more progressive 
Franchimastabé, demonstrate the nature of the changes in Choctaw society.  
Franchimastabé’s successful leadership of war parties and Taboca’s ability to maintain 
peace between internal and external factions made them both powerful leaders.  In the 
1780s, Taboca continued to follow a traditional path, performing several elaborate 
rituals, including the Eagle Tail Dance, to make delegates of the United States fictive 
kin to the Choctaws at the Hopewell Conference in 1785.  But Franchimastabé modified 
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traditional trends by augmenting and solidifying his power through dictating diplomacy 
and warfare on the basis of securing consistent personal control over trade goods.
11
 
When Franchimastabé became unable to control Choctaw hunting and trading 
practices via traditional channels, he instead controlled trade by “figuratively and 
literally” adopting Euro-American traders who lived in Choctaw villages.  This had 
long-term ramifications for the Choctaws because these men frequently married the 
daughters of prominent families and produced offspring who had access to both 
developing Choctaw and American nations.  As overhunting led to scarcity of deer 
populations, Franchimastabé continued to skillfully manipulate the geopolitical realities 
of the Southeast by playing American traders against remaining Spanish authorities.  To 
an extent Franchimastabé’s actions resembled earlier practices in which chiefs 
controlled the flow of all trade to ensure fair access to those in need.  Where his action 
differed, however, was that he made decisions of war and peace based on access to 
trade goods.  He also began to distribute trade goods primarily to his supporters, which 
elevated their status in society.  Thus, material wealth began to play an increasingly 
significant role in dictating one’s prestige and rank in Choctaw society.  Stratification 
was not a new feature of Choctaw society, but by the turn of the nineteenth century, 
property accumulation began to compete with kinship relations for shaping the social 
structure.
12
  When Franchimastabé declared in 1800 that “the time of hunting and living 
by the gun was near its end”, this was not a concession of degradation or dependency.  
Rather, as a leader who had mastered trade relations, he heralded change and believed 
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that it could benefit the Choctaws.  Thus, after 1800, most Choctaw chiefs much more 
closely resembled Franchimastabé’s style of chiefly power through economic authority 
than Taboca’s spiritual power.13 
Economic changes coincided with these political fluctuations in the three 
Choctaw districts and the surrounding states.  Members of indigenous polities in the 
South and Euro-American citizens in the nascent United States simultaneously began 
transitioning from subsistence to a market based economy.  This “market revolution,” 
studied extensively by historians of the Early American Republic, created class 
stratification, undermined the importance of family and communal life, and drastically 
altered gendered labor roles.
14
  Subsistence agricultural persisted among most Choctaw 
families, but a growing class of elite Choctaws who accumulated material wealth 
diversified the Choctaw economy.  As the deer trade waned, Choctaws particularly 
embraced free-range and controlled cattle ranching as a viable replacement. They 
owned impressive numbers of cattle, pigs, and horses throughout the nineteenth century.  
As early as 1828, “the cattle herd numbered over 43,000 head, a ratio of 2.07 cows per 
person.”  Notably, the Choctaws also held upwards of 85,000 swine in and around their 
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farms along with upwards of 15,000 horses.  Together, the value of Choctaw ranching 
comprised well over $1,000,000.
15
   
Increased dependence upon commercial cattle ranching also created conflict in 
Choctaw gender roles.  Men became the primary caretakers for cattle because their 
traditional labor roles required they provide food from animal sources.  However, 
tending fields and producing food at home fell within the realm of women’s sacred 
power.  To resolve this issue, some Choctaws began to categorize domestic cattle as 
part of the women’s responsibilities but free range cattle as part of the men’s.  For 
instance, one word for cattle was alhpoa, or, literally meaning “fruit trees such as are 
cultivated,” implying that the domestic cattle fit under the same category as local fauna 
that women had always tended.  Using such language meant that women’s special role 
in extracting valuable food—whether it be corn from stalks, fruit from trees, or milk 
from cows—remained intact following the rise in cattle ranching.  Conversely, the new 
masculine word wakatubbee, meaning “cow-killer”, connected men who became 
ranchers to the acceptable masculine role of hunting.
16
   
By the first few decades of the nineteenth century, all three districts had chiefs 
who strategically embraced the integration of Euro-American market-oriented culture 
into more traditional areas of Choctaw culture.  They selectively incorporated African 
slavery into more traditional indigenous forms of captivity.  Many younger chiefs 
formed direct ties with the growing market economy, and two of the three—
Mushulatubbee and Pushmataha—held African slaves.  During the seventeenth and 
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eighteenth centuries, Choctaws systematically captured war captives as a mechanism 
for population stability.  Many of these captive were adopted into a clan and enjoyed 
full inclusion in society while un-adopted captives fell into a social category considered 
to be less than fully human.  While this type of captivity could last throughout an 
individual’s lifetime, the Choctaws did not practice hereditary captivity, meaning that 
the children of captives were born free. As Christina Snyder has demonstrated, the loose 
spectrum of captivity practices shifted to a more rigid form of racial slaveholding with 
the Choctaw entry into the American market economy.  Simultaneously, Choctaws 
began “grafting notions of race and polygenesis onto older captivity practices.”  By the 
early nineteenth century, nearly all captives were African American or Afro-Choctaw 
and considered to be an important source of exploitable labor.
17
 
Traditional spiritual practices and clan-based law enforcement also remained a 
significant aspect of Choctaw identity even among those most accepting of Euro-
American lifestyles.  As late as the 1820s, for instance, a Choctaw named Oakatibbé, 
went against traditional Choctaw gender roles by working in the fields and picking 
cotton.  He claimed to love “whites,” and even “love their laws better than my own.”  
One evening Oakatibbé fatally stabbed another Choctaw named Lobolly Jack—a crime 
which obligated Lobolly Jack’s clan to avenge the death.  Oakatibbé reluctantly took the 
advice of American missionary friends and fled on horseback during the night, only to 
return the next day to voluntarily face execution.  He explained that despite his love for 
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Euro-American practices, he could not betray the Choctaw system of clan-based 
spiritual justice in favor of American, Christian-based justice.
18
 
 Despite their Christian imperative, missionaries living among the Choctaws 
quickly discovered only a minority had an interest in conversion but a majority seemed 
to take an interest in schooling.  Young missionaries including Methodists Cyrus 
Kingsbury and Cyrus Byington were among the first to answer the call to Christianize 
and educate the Choctaws in the early 1820s.  Kingsbury, Byington and others made it 
their life missions to fill this role as educators.  In Kingsbury’s own words, he intended 
to “make our graves with them.”19  As the desire for schools among Choctaws 
increased, missionaries assumed a role as educators and in many instance worked to 
preserve rather than eradicate Choctaw culture.  The zeal for education among 
Choctaws led to some unanticipated results.  For instance, several missionaries worked 
with Christian Choctaws to translate the Bible from the original Greek into Choctaw 
language, creating a Choctaw syllabary in the process.  Though the missionaries 
intended to use a written Choctaw language for conversion purposes, in the decades to 
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come Choctaws employed their written language for writing laws, constitutions, songs, 
newspapers, commercial records, and court proceedings which could be widely read.
20
  
As many Choctaws began to selectively integrate Euro-American cultural 
practices with more traditional aspects of Choctaw society in the first few decades of 
the nineteenth-century, they also began to construct a collective national identity.  
Although Choctaws remained tied to town and district associations, these largely 
autonomous units pragmatically started to form a more cooperative political apparatus 
in response to external threats.  This process is clearly demonstrated by several political 
actions and diplomatic decisions of the Choctaws during the overlapping War of 1812, 
Red Stick War, and Tecumseh’s War.  
 Despite several manipulative treaties, Choctaw leaders felt that it was sensible 
for them to remain closely aligned with the United States in the early republic period.  
Shawnee Sachem Tecumseh ventured into Choctaw villages attempting to recruit 
Choctaws to join a pan-Indian war against the expanding United States.  Though they 
traditionally made autonomous political decisions, the three district chiefs understood 
the need to speak with one voice when it came to a potential continental war.  
Therefore, they held a council at the home of Chief Mushulatubbee and publicly 
debated whether or not to join Tecumseh’s forces.  Pushmataha, known for his wartime 
prowess and oratorical skills, voiced the opinion of the chiefs against joining Tecumseh.  
The other chiefs agreed and politely requested Tecumseh leave their territory once the 
decision had been made.  Although a few Choctaw families disregarded the will of the 
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chiefs and joined Tecumseh, the majority of Choctaws from all three districts united 
behind Pushmataha’s rejection of Tecumseh’s call to arms against Americans.21  
Rather than seek neutrality, Choctaw warriors openly offered their services to 
the United States after the burning of Fort Mims by Red Stick Creeks.  Approximately 
600 Choctaws took up arms and marched into Upper Creek territory.  They fought 
alongside United States regulars, militia, Cherokees, and Lower Creeks under the 
command of General Andrew Jackson at the famous Battle of Horseshoe Bend, which 
broke the back of Red Stick Creek resistance to the United States.  In 1815, they again 
joined the side of General Jackson in defeating the British in the final battle of the war 
at New Orleans.
22
 
 The Choctaws believed they had cause to celebrate with their American allies.  
Their shared victory at New Orleans was far and away the most impressive American 
military campaign in a comedy of errors that was the war against the British.  
Mississippi’s territorial government repeatedly and publically lauded the Choctaws for 
their brave and loyal wartime contributions.  Moreover, Choctaws closely watched as 
the United States exacted harsh punishments against the Creek Nation as a whole, rather 
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than what remained of the disloyal Red Stick element.
23
  Such a fate would likely have 
befallen the Choctaws had they divided their loyalties like the Creeks.   
Their shared victory only emboldened Americans to expand further west with 
limited threat of backlash from Natives polities and the weakened Spanish empire.  An 
ongoing American transportation revolution in which long turnpike roads, canals, 
steamships, and trains extended the possible markets for trade goods also encouraged 
western settlement.  The prices for cotton and other staple crops exploded, making the 
land occupied by the Choctaws incredibly valuable if used for large-scale plantation 
farming.  All of these trends corresponded with a surge of post-war nationalism 
heralded as “the era of good feelings,” in which the United States defended 
independence, defeated partisan politics, and believed expansion to be inevitable.
24
   
Subsequently, in 1820 Secretary of War, Calhoun heeded numerous calls from 
the citizens and representatives of Mississippi who demanded the federal government 
free up Choctaw land for white settlement.  Mississippi Governor George Poindexter 
requested Calhoun settle the matter by offering the Choctaws “a small consideration” to 
trade their lands in Mississippi for lands in Arkansas.  Before negotiations even began, 
editors at the Arkansas Gazette agreed that “it is no doubt good policy in the states to 
get rid of all the Indians within their limits as soon as possible” but feared retaliation 
from Choctaws sent within their borders.  The Mississippi Gazette assured the citizens 
of Arkansas Territory that “the Indians must be removed from her soil” once they 
receive statehood, regardless of the claims in the proposed treaty.  Both sides ignored 
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the obvious irony when arguing that the Choctaws—the people they believed must be 
removed based on their inability to become civilized—were no threat to Arkansans 
because they were already “civilized and well-mannered.”25  They also viewed it as a 
foregone conclusion that the Choctaws would be forced to relocate regardless of their 
sovereign rights, level of acculturation, or previous treaty stipulations. 
 Initially, Choctaw leaders refused Calhoun’s overtures to meet for a new treaty 
because they recognized that the United States would demand additional land cessions.  
They only consented when their former commander, General Andrew Jackson, joined 
the delegation.  This proved to be a fateful error as Andrew Jackson privately stated his 
intention of “doing away with the farce of treating with Indian tribes” because they 
were “standing in the way of progress.”  The resulting negotiations and Treaty of 
Doak’s Stand triggered a series of crises within the Choctaw community and imparted 
the fear that removal policies might become inevitable.
26
 
At the Doak’s Stand treaty negotiations Pushmataha from the Six Towns 
District, Mushulatubbee from the Northwest District, and Apukshunnubbe from the 
Western district represented the Choctaw people.
27
  Each of these three men had 
considerable experience in negotiating with U.S. officials.  Furthermore, both 
Pushmataha and Mushulatubbee had donned American uniforms and taken up arms 
beside General Andrew Jackson during the War of 1812.  Expecting a reasonable 
negotiation with their former ally, the chiefs instead received a blunt ultimatum.  
Disregarding numerous prosperous farms and budding cattle ranches, Jackson 
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announced: “You have more land than you can cultivate…it is useless to yourselves.”  
Continuing in a paternalistic manner, he added that “the President expects no difficulty 
with his Choctaw children” in agreeing to removal.  Failure to acquiesce, he insisted, 
would mean that the president “can no longer look upon you as friends and brothers, 
and as deserving his fatherly protection…If you suffer any injury…none but yourselves 
will be to blame.”  Jackson offered only one other option—remain in Mississippi while 
forfeiting claims to both land and sovereignty and accepting the laws of the state of 
Mississippi.
28
   
Negotiations became heated on both sides.  Jackson threatened the Choctaws 
with national destruction and openly stated that he would find Choctaws who would 
submit to his proposals if the chiefs would not.  A legendary story that circulated for 
several decades reported that Jackson cried out “I wish you to understand that I am 
Andrew Jackson, and, by the Eternal, you shall sign that treaty as I prepared it.”  To 
which, Pushmataha replied “I know very well who you are, but I wish you to 
understand that I am Pushmataha…and, by the eternal, I will not sign that treaty.”  
Finally, after Apuckshunubbee left the treaty grounds, Jackson slightly modified the 
treaty proposal to grant the Choctaws the proceeds from the sale of 34,000 acres out of 
nearly 5,000,000 acres in total to be ceded which would fund education and a tribal 
police force called the “Light Horsemen.”29  The Choctaws also received nearly 
13,000,000 acres in what is now Arkansas and Oklahoma. Jackson left Doak’s Stand 
feeling satisfied that “at least two-thirds of the nation” would remove west and save 
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their deteriorating culture while the remaining one-third, primarily the more cultured 
“half-breeds” who created mischief and robbed the tribes of annuities, would submit to 
federal and state authority.  Faced with men like Jackson, the Choctaws realized that 
they could only survive with a drastic change in tactics.
30
   
Following the treaty at Doak’s Stand, Choctaw leaders acknowledged that 
despite their unified and pragmatic diplomacy, the United States had no interest in 
equitable relations.  Rising American politicians viewed Native Americans, regardless 
of levels of acculturation, as obstacles to Western expansion—obstacles that would 
have to be removed.  The idealistic assimilationist vision espoused by Washington and 
Jefferson had clearly eroded into one of aggressive racism and imperial force.  As a 
result, Choctaw leaders started to conceptualize a better knowledge of the intricacies of 
American culture and politics as the best available hope to safeguard the future of the 
Choctaw people.  They needed Choctaws who spoke both languages fluently, received 
an American-style education,  understood the minutiae of critical legal issues including 
citizenship and sovereignty from multiple perspectives, and who would continue to 
serve Choctaw society.   
By design, a rising cadre of young male Choctaws rose to the task at hand.  
Members of this cohort not only served as cultural brokers between the Choctaw people 
and United States officials, they also reshaped the parameters of Choctaw identity.
31
  
They increasingly fashioned an indigenous identity rooted in constructions of 
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autonomous and progressive Choctaw nationhood.  Several prominent leaders, 
including Peter Pitchlynn, David Folsom, James McDonald, and Robert M. Jones, 
emerged as the mold of what the Choctaws needed in order to secure their claims to 
land and sovereignty.  
 Peter Pitchlynn was the grandson of British trader and agent Isaac Pitchlynn, 
who had entered the Choctaw Nation in the mid-eighteenth century.  Isaac died 
suddenly in 1774, leaving the care of his seventeen-year-old son John Pitchlynn to the 
Choctaws.  John Pitchlynn quickly learned the Choctaw language and expanded his 
father’s financial operation to include cattle ranching and the cultivation of cotton and 
corn.  After the American Revolution, the nascent United States recognized the 
importance of exerting their influence among distant Native groups and placed John 
Pitchlynn on retainer as an interpreter for $300 a year.  John Pitchlynn proved his value 
by interpreting every major treaty between the United States and Choctaws through 
1830, while openly advocating friendly relations between Americans and Choctaws.
32
 
Peter Perkins Pitchlynn, the oldest child from John Pitchlynn’s second marriage, 
grew up in his mother’s and father’s worlds. In accord with tradition, Peter’s mother, a 
niece of Mushulatubbee named Sophia Folsom, primarily raised Peter in a manner that 
mirrored other Choctaw children.  This changed in 1820 when Peter reached age 
fourteen and his father insisted that he receive a traditional Euro-American education.  
Peter attended various schools throughout Tennessee where he studied philosophy, 
civics, poetry, and medicine and claimed to have graduated from University of 
Nashville.  He later used tribal funds to fund multiple brief stints at law schools in the 
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United States.  Unlike the previous two generations of Pitchlynns, Peter had a Choctaw 
name (hat-choo-tuck-nee or “snapping turtle”) and self-identified as Choctaw, while 
still embracing the advantages that came with a white father.  This unique trait placed 
him in a position to better serve both the Choctaw interests and his own personal 
interests.
33
 
In addition to Peter Pitchlynn, several members of the Folsom line emerged as 
potential leaders after 1820.  Trade prospects brought Scots-Irish traders Nathaniel, 
Ebenezer, and Edmund Folsom from North Carolina into the Choctaw territory where 
they married prominent Choctaw women and fathered large families.  Of Nathaniel’s 
twenty-four children, David Folsom distinguished himself from the others with his drive 
for temperance, Christianity, and education.  Like Peter Pitchlynn, David Folsom spent 
several months studying in Tennessee and continued the family business of commerce 
and agriculture upon his return to the Choctaw Nation in 1810.  His experiences 
convinced him that the Choctaws must focus on expanding local education and 
advocacy of Christianity in order to survive.  To this end, Folsom personally extended 
invitations to missionaries to come to the Choctaw Nation and establish schools in 
1819.  In 1822, Folsom addressed one such school about the importance of education 
for the Choctaws: “Your situation is rapidly becoming different from the situation of 
those who have gone before you.  The white people were once at so great a 
distance…but now the white people are settled around you in every direction.  It is 
therefore indispensably necessary that the rising generation shall be educated.”  Clearly, 
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Folsom believed in the necessity of education as a method of defending the Choctaw 
Nation, a zeal that he brought to his various leadership positions.
34
  
 In addition to the Pitchlynns and Folsoms, Greenwood Leflore may well have 
been the most influential multi-cultural Choctaw in the pre-removal period.  Born in 
1800, he was the son of French trader Louis Leflore and Pushmataha’s niece Rebecca 
Cravatt.  As was typical for chiefs of that generation, Pushmataha attempted to use 
Louis Leflore’s connections at the firm of Panton, Leslie, and Co. to augment his own 
position as chief.  The marriage of Rebecca solidified the bonds between Pushmataha 
and Louis Leflore’s trading connections.  Their first son, Greenwood Leflore, was born 
with every possible advantage in Choctaw society—he had paternal connections to the 
surrounding imperial worlds and hereditary maternal connections to Choctaw 
leadership.  Like other prominent multi-cultural Choctaws, Leflore received an 
American-style education in the United States.  He spent five years in Nashville with an 
affluent American family, closely observing the art of commerce and market-oriented 
enterprises.  When he returned to the Choctaws in 1819, he joined with both culturally 
progressive and traditional leaders in a desire to transform the Choctaw economy and 
education system.  For instance, he answered criticisms that education cost too much by 
asserting that “although it is probable that we could get our children taught something 
{for} cheaper yet we do not wish to put out their education to the lowest bidder and if 
we were to do it we do not know that we should profit by it.”35   
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Though Leflore may have exerted the most influence in the pre-removal period, 
James L. McDonald, the maternal cousin of Robert M. Jones, was undoubtedly the most 
connected with Euro-Americans.  McDonald’s father was likely a trader residing in the 
nation who maintained limited contact with his son, leaving his upbringing to his 
mother, Mary McDonald.  Mary sent her son to a Quaker school for primary education.  
Next, James moved to Washington D.C. and lived with Thomas L. McKenney, the 
future superintendent of Indian affairs.  McKenney sought to use McDonald as an 
example to the war department of the potential within all Native Americans to achieve 
civilization, justifying the Jeffersonian principals of the Civilization program.  After a 
brief meeting with John C. Calhoun, the war department approved funds to send 
McDonald to Georgetown Academy.  McDonald so impressed his teachers with his 
work ethic and ability to grasp advanced concepts in “Latin,” “Greek,” and 
“mathematics” that McKenney and John C. Calhoun appropriated additional funds for 
McDonald to receive legal training from Ohio Congressmen John McLean.  McKenney 
observed that “in about one-half the time ordinarily occupied by the most talented 
young men of our race, he had gone the rounds of his studies, and was qualified for the 
bar.”  While many Natives received a Euro-American education, none before him had 
become a bar-certified lawyer.  Many had diplomatic experience with United States 
officials, but none had lived with and been guided by the two most direct 
representatives of United States Indian policy.
36
 
 Despite McDonald’s success in Euro-American society, he remained proud of 
his Choctaw heritage and sought to both share and preserve it.  He claimed that “there 
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is…much more force and precision in the Choctaw language, than in the English; or do 
I only think so, because it is my mother tongue?  It may not be so varied, so rich as the 
English language…but as far as it goes, is it not stronger?”  He attempted to capture 
Choctaw stories, or “hog stories”—important allegorical stories recited by Choctaws to 
this day which he believed nine-tenths of Choctaws could readily recite—into written 
form.  Though the English translation robbed the stories of their passion and 
presentation, McDonald felt it necessary to preserve as much of the Choctaw culture as 
possible.  McDonald’s close friend and maternal cousin, Robert M. Jones, shared both 
his acumen in Euro-American society and affinity for his own culture.  Arguably more 
so than any others, these two men straddled the fence of embracing both Euro-American 
and Choctaw cultures.
37
 
This cohort, joined by Robert M. Jones and several others, has been frequently 
portrayed by historians and contemporary Americans as inherently disconnected from 
other “pure-blood” Choctaws.  Entire dissertations have been devoted to exploring so-
called “mixed-blood” Choctaws and their overarching influence.  Previous historians, 
honing their analysis on blood/behavior behavioral explanation, have at best produced 
misleading histories and at worst actively damaged contemporary concepts of Native 
identity and notions of “indianness.”38  Embracing latent biological determinism to cast 
“mixed-bloods” like Pitchlynn, Jones, and others as somehow less Indian or 
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irreconcilably different can be traced, ironically, to Andrew Jackson.  His viewpoints on 
blood variables among natives influenced his policies, something that few historians 
champion as enlightened.  As historian James Taylor Carson charged, “by casting their 
interpretations…in terms that echo Andrew Jackson’s own cramped worldview… 
historians have imported early-nineteenth-century notions of blood and behavior” into 
their analyses.  At the same time, most historians concede that bicultural Choctaws, 
frequently labeled as “mixed-bloods”, rose to disproportionate levels of prominence and 
succeeded in navigating through barriers between cultures.  This fact certainly gives 
credence to the idea that blood influenced status, but nevertheless blood-based 
determinism crumbles under limited scrutiny.
39
 
A blood-based dichotomy mistakenly implies that all Choctaws with similar 
blood-profiles acted in unison regarding changes in Choctaw society.  Many “full 
blood” Indians grew quite wealthy from the market economy, including the powerful 
Choctaw Chiefs Mushulatubbee and Pushmataha who both owned African slaves.  
Some “full-blood” Choctaws entered the market economy with equal enthusiasm to 
their mixed-brethren while segments of both resisted societal change.  Meanwhile, 
dozens of “mixed-blood” Choctaw families did not so readily adopt the newer 
materialistic values in the pre-removal period.  Similar patterns exist in evaluating zeal 
for education.
40
  Subsequent political conflicts in Choctaw society, including the 
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Removal crisis, rarely split along lines of blood-quantum.  Arguing otherwise gives the 
implication of a self-interested mixed-blood aristocracy attempting to destroy traditional 
Native societies for their own benefit—a reality in the eyes only of Andrew Jackson and 
those attempting to justify their own machinations.
41
   
Following the disastrous 1820 Treaty at Doak’s Stand, Choctaw leaders 
recognized the need for a cohort who could negotiate with the United States.  The 
strategy paid dividends in 1824 when Choctaw leaders opted to forgo dealing with 
agents and air their grievances directly in Washington, D.C.  The three district chiefs 
took along with them James L. McDonald and David Folsom.  Unfortunately, while en 
route, eighty-five year-old Chief Apukshunnubbe fell off of either a hotel balcony or a 
large cliff (reports differ) and died days later.  His death created an opening for this 
young cohort to utilize their skills in his absence.  Pushmataha formally served as the 
main negotiator in opposition to Secretary of War and Vice President-elect John C. 
Calhoun and Secretary of Indian Affairs Thomas McKenney, but McDonald also played 
an influential role.
42
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Pushmataha’s oratory and McDonald’s understanding of American law proved 
to be the perfect one-two punch in the negotiations.  Calhoun had envisioned a simple 
land cession facilitated by the usual gifts of trade goods and whiskey.  He had received 
congressional approval for a $3 per day whiskey stipend per delegate, as well as $1,000 
worth of clothing and $400 in prized jewelry.  Contrary to American expectations, the 
delegation somehow exceeded the whiskey allowance and refused to make concessions 
on land east of the Mississippi River.
43
  Instead, they requested $450,000, mostly for 
educational annuities, as well as the immediate payment of overdue funds from 
previous treaties and to settle a boundary dispute on Arkansas lands.  Pushmataha, 
claiming that he was simply negotiating like Jackson at Doak’s Stand, refused to budge.  
Eventually the delegation settled on $216,000, a middle-of-the-road sum that both sides 
could agree was fair, most of which was designated for national education.
44
  
 In addition to helping to secure reasonable compensation, the young members of 
the delegation proved their value in safeguarding Choctaw interest through carefully 
monitoring the precise language within the agreement.  For instance, the Choctaws’ 
delegation discovered that United States negotiators attempted to slip language into the 
treaty which implied that the Choctaws were merely temporary residents of the state of 
Mississippi.  Such a proposal held huge legal ramifications for Choctaw sovereignty.  
James McDonald understood these implications and demanded their removal.  
Ultimately, a combination of shrewd legal skills and a united front allowed the 
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Choctaws to win a concession that the state of Mississippi had to receive the Choctaws’ 
consent prior to any change in their legal status.
45
   
Viewed as a success for the Choctaws, the Treaty of 1825 effectively refuted the 
heavy-handed, adversarial tactics emblematic of Andrew Jackson at Doak’s Stand.  
Pushmataha was unable to gloat, having succumbed to a case of croup on Christmas 
Eve, 1824.  To comply with Pushmataha’s death-bed request, Jackson arranged for him 
to receive a mile-long military funeral with full honors in the Congressional Cemetery 
in Washington, D.C.  Multiple Washington elites attended and spoke at his funeral 
service, including Jackson and John Randolph of Virginia.  Choctaw delegate David 
Folsom blamed Pushmataha for his own death, claiming “he was completely burned 
out, by hard drinking,” but could not help acknowledge the “honor paid to our departed 
friend toward us” including personal visits from General Jackson.46    
 These negotiations revealed that the Choctaws had effectively adapted to the 
tactics of the United States with the assistance of an educated cohort.  The United States 
and Choctaws made offers in writing, allowed each district to be represented, and 
utilized the knowledge from those best educated in the American legal and political 
jargon to ensure a fair deal.  U. S. agents, including Thomas McKenney, failed in their 
attempts to use their influence with the young cohort to divide the Choctaw delegation 
and convince the Choctaws to accept a low-ball offer.  Undeterred, American 
negotiators traveled to the Choctaw Nation the next year to again attempt to extract land 
                                                 
45
 In Thomas McKenney’s memoirs, he gives the following account of McDonald in the 
negotiations: “I found him so skilled in the business of his mission…as to make it more of an up-hill 
business than I had ever before experience in negotiating with Indians.  I believe Mr. Calhoun thought so 
too.”  Thomas L. McKenney, Memoirs, Official and Personal with Sketches of Travels among the 
Northern and Southern Indians; Embracing a War Excursion, and Descriptions of Scenes along the 
Western Borders (New York: Paine and Burgess, 1846) Vol. II, 116; Hoxie, The Indian Country, 76-78. 
46
 David Folsom to Cyrus Byington, Box 1, Folder 9, MC; Lincecum, Pushmataha, 99-100. 
47 
 
concession.  Again, discouraged representatives found their threats ineffective when 
their one Choctaw supporter “was accordingly silenced by the order of the council” led 
by James McDonald.  The negotiations proved that at least in the short-term, the 
Choctaws could use an educated leadership and political unity to defend themselves 
against the encroachments of the United States and the state of Mississippi.  Moreover, 
it showed that the distinct districts could formulate unified diplomatic policies, which 
simultaneously fostered a more collective political identity.
47
 
Unfortunately, as quickly as the Choctaws demonstrated the effectiveness of 
diplomatic unity and inter-generational cooperation, they delved into deep internal 
conflict.  Power struggles and multiple factions created general chaos with the constant 
potential for violence.  The inability to effectively replace two dead district chiefs and 
agree on a course of action allowed the United States to successfully implement their 
removal policy with only limited struggle.  Ultimately, the post-1825 Choctaw leaders 
hastened the removal process much in opposition to the wishes of their constituents. 
The Treaty of 1825 itself did not cause spark the political crises among the three 
districts.  Rather, it resulted from the deaths of Pushmataha and Apukshunnubbe, two 
long-serving and trusted chiefs.  Their deaths signaled that the older generation of 
leadership was fading and could be replaced by the young cohort of multicultural 
Choctaws.  For instance, an 1826 council in the Northeastern district deposed 
Mushulatubbee in favor of David Folsom, based on his “intemperance, tyrannical 
disposition” and rumored support for selling the remaining Choctaw lands.  In reality, 
Mushulatubbee had overreached in committing the full value of an annuity payment to a 
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single school without consulting other leaders, convincing others that he may try to do 
the same with Choctaw land.  Simultaneously, Greenwood Leflore deposed Robert 
Cole, Leflore’s uncle and the successor of Apukshunnubbe, in favor of himself.  This 
left Nitakachi, Pushmataha’s ultimate replacement, as the only remaining culturally-
traditional chief.
48
 
 Once in leadership positions, in 1826, Greenwood Leflore and David Folsom, 
with the assistance of Peter Pitchlynn and others proceeded with drafting a constitution 
aimed at thwarting United States schemes for forced removal and codifying the 
parameters for national government.  They did not intend this to be a radical shift in 
political structure, but instead the best strategy for long-term defense.  Most tenets of 
existing societal and governmental structures remained fully intact; however, “the 
constitution,” formally connected the districts in a manner which slightly restricting 
district autonomy—a step many Choctaws resisted.49   
Progressive Choctaws knew that internal divides were inevitable and that the 
United States could exploit schisms if they were not contained, as much they began by 
acknowledging “those of us here continue to not be of one mind, and we are 
ineffective.”  Rather than traditional consensus, leaders bound themselves to a codified 
document and coordinated their actions to protect Choctaws as members of a single 
nation.  Examining the laws included in the Constitution of 1826 reveals that the new 
leadership cohort not only attempted to bind the Choctaw Nation together, it also aimed 
to regulate civil and personal behavior traditionally left to individual clans.  Essentially, 
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the document attempted to strengthen national sovereignty while subtly altering 
traditional habits and customs.
50
  
In regards to land and money, one set of articles reduced the power of individual 
district and chiefs to negotiate land sales and distribute annuity funds.  For instance, one 
article codified that “the land where we reside belongs to all who are called Choctaw 
people.  If any district wants to sell its land, and the other two districts do not agree, the 
single district cannot sell its land.”  Additionally, “the district allotment cannot be used 
to pay for personal debts of the leader.”  Both of these provisions targeted traditional 
chiefs—specifically Mushulatubbee.  United States agents, including General Jackson, 
made numerous overtures towards negotiating a removal settlement when word spread 
that Mushulatubbee was open to removal.  Moreover, using funds from treaties for 
personal debts frequently occurred with chiefs looking to augment their own power, like 
Mushulatubbee had done in 1805.  Banning these practices while making each district 
subject to the other two, reduced the chances that the United States could divide and 
conquer remaining Choctaw lands.
51
 
Of equal importance, the constitution made several clear assertions of Choctaw 
National sovereignty.  They reserved the right to determine who qualified as a citizen 
and who did not, including “white American citizens.”  As a sovereign nation, they 
proposed that “a house shall be constructed at an established place” for the passages and 
upholding of laws.  The Choctaws had traditionally only held councils to address 
specific issues, like Tecumseh’s 1811 request for an alliance, but not as a regular 
standing, governing body aimed at “passing a few general laws for the government of 
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the whole nation.”  This directly refuted the U.S. demand that Choctaws either abandon 
their homelands or surrender to the authority of United States and Mississippi laws.  
With constant threats from both the state of Mississippi and federal authorities, it was 
important to reiterate to both bodies that they defined themselves as an equal sovereign 
nation, and constructing a house obviously indicated that they had no intention of 
leaving.
52
 
  In addition to a national council, districts with new multi-cultural Choctaw 
district chiefs immediately held councils in which they passed laws for their districts.  
Peter Pitchlynn, who transcribed the proceedings for the Northwestern district in the 
newly-established written Choctaw language, carefully noted that “in the past, our 
forefathers always had laws for all concerns,” but the new system represented a unique 
way of codifying and enforcing the laws.  Traditionally, Choctaws judged 
transgressions based on the standards of family and social constraints.  Starting in 1824, 
the new Choctaw police force, the “Light Horsemen,” largely assumed the role of 
enforcing laws.
 53
   
The new district laws augmented the Light Horsemen’s role into affairs 
previously handled by clans, further demonstrating the impact of a more centralized 
Choctaw governing body.  For instance, the Light Horsemen were responsible for 
doling out a set number of lashes in matters of animal theft, but left to their own 
discretion regarding punishment for other thefts.  Eye-gouging or scratching carried 
very specific punishments.  Murder, something traditionally handled by kin-based blood 
law, also now fell under the jurisdiction of the Light Horsemen.  An 1826 law 
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specifically states that “if someone kills...and flees…his siblings, his wife, his family, 
and his kinsmen…shall not be harmed in any oppressive or ruinous way.”  In practice, 
therefore, the new constitution and laws banned the traditional blood law by redefining 
retaliation as willful murder.
54
 
 Moreover, new laws attempted to redefine the relationship between husband, 
wife, and children to be more in line with American cultural mores and patriarchal 
traditions.  Choctaw women possessed important rights in Choctaw society primarily 
reserved for men in American society, such as primary land ownership, primary 
parenthood, and “producers of new clan members.”  Laws passed in 1829 frequently 
threatened these rights.  For instance, traditionally Choctaws had permitted the practice 
of infanticide under certain circumstances.  The restrictions/details on this practice are 
unclear—it may have been tied to blood vengeance, population control, or fears of 
wasting resources on a sick child—but women undoubtedly held this right.  Choctaw 
district leaders curbed this practice by mandating that any deliberate infanticide be 
punished by thirty-five lashes to the mother’s bare back.  A similar statute punished not 
only the mother, but also the father for failing to stop the mother.  This shift implies that 
Choctaw men, via statute, gained authority over their children which they had never 
before possessed.
55
    
 New statutes also threatened Choctaw women’s property and marriage rights.  
Traditionally, women maintained their property and passed it to their children, as did 
the maternal uncles of children.  New statutes prescribed that “when a man dies without 
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having made a will, his wife and his children shall come to inherit all his livestock and 
estate” and likewise, “when a woman should die, the man shall in the same way” 
inherent a portion of her property.  The one exception to this law was that a woman “has 
a right to their (mutual) property” if she married a white man.  Laws of this nature made 
clear that men would be the primary holders of the growing types of private property, so 
long as they were Choctaw men.
56
 
Moving to a constitutional system, though an obvious change from earlier 
methods of governance, aimed to blend traditional Choctaw laws and practices with 
basic codes intended to safeguard the nation against removal.  Though several 
provisions undermined district autonomy, most left districts to govern themselves.  In 
this respect, the Choctaw Constitution of 1826 was rather moderate in terms of political 
reform.  Conversely, the Cherokees drafted an elaborate new constitution in 1827 
modeled theirs directly on the United States, marking a dramatic departure from more 
traditional Cherokee laws and governance.  Like the U.S. Constitution, the Cherokees 
implemented three branches of government (executive, judicial, legislative) and a 
bicameral legislature.  Both Choctaw and Cherokee advocates attempted to flaunt their 
constitutional governments to the American public as evidence of their level of 
acculturation and worthiness keep their land.  Yet, the Choctaws designed a 
constitutional government much more in line with their traditional forms of 
governance.
57
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United States citizens and political leaders ignored this political reform and 
continued to espouse Indian removal as inevitable in the process of manifest destiny.  
Removal was unpopular in northeastern United States mostly because Indians stood as a 
perceived buffer against the spread of slavery.  Still, neither political party (Democrat or 
National-Republican/Whig) was willing to risk clout among Western and Southern 
states in order to stop expansion.  Consequently, in the fall of 1829, Jackson’s first year 
in office, he sent a message to the Choctaws saying “you must submit—there is no 
alternative…Old men! Lead your children to a land of promise and of peace before the 
Great Spirit shall call you to die.  Young chiefs! Preserve your people and nation.”  
Mississippi further pressed the issue in January of 1830 when they unilaterally extended 
their laws over all persons and property within their state and outlawed tribal 
governments.
58
  
Escalated threats from the United States caused deep divides among Choctaw 
leaders and citizens.  New laws and infringements on traditional rights combined with 
external threats to landholdings drove the Choctaws nearly to civil war.  Two clear 
political factions emerged: the Republicans under Mushulatubbee and Nitakeche (also 
called the “Heathen Party”) and the Christian Party (“Despotic Party” to their 
opponents) under David Folsom and Greenwood Leflore.  The Republican Party, 
frustrated with their decreasing tribal influence, publicly welcomed the prospect of 
removal while the Christian Party publicly dismissed any prospect of land cessions.  
These divides neither stemmed from a simple traditional versus progressive dichotomy 
nor a “full-blood” versus “mixed-blood” dichotomy.  For instance, Peter Pitchlynn 
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joined Mushulatubbee and Nitakeche while Robert M. Jones aligned with Folsom and 
Leflore.  James McDonald attempted to remain neutral, claiming that he supported the 
Choctaw cause and was therefore friends to both factions.  Both sides altered their 
platforms to fit changing political climates and popular demands—Mushulatubbee 
declared that he would stay and run for Congress in Mississippi while Leflore contacted 
United States agents and privately conceded the inevitability of removal.
59
     
Choctaws narrowly avoided bloody confrontations on several different 
occasions.  Nonetheless, like earlier generations, leading Choctaws’ ability to restrain 
conflict and form a consensus prevented a civil war.  For instance, in 1828, Leflore and 
David Folsom, along with a substantial group of armed followers confronted 
Mushulatubbee, Nitakeche, and their own armed supporters.  According to Folsom’s 
likely self-serving account:  
“By the time I approached within thirty steps of the chief, I resolved to 
offer him my hand, in evidence of my desire for a reconciliation.  If 
accepted, I hoped a compromise might be arrived at.  If refused, I knew 
that in five minutes both of us would die.  His countenance was 
forbidding and scowling, his lip compressed, a dark cloud resting on his 
brow.  I extended my hand; a smile like sunshine softened his 
expression, and he promptly and warmly grasped it, while each of us said 
Bar-ba-she-la (friend).”  
 
Though the two groups did not fully reconcile, they agreed to settle their differences 
civilly rather than violently.  A similar instance occurred when Robert M. Jones 
happened upon a group of Mushulatubbee’s followers who were angry about recent 
tribal proceedings.  Jones had been engaged in traveling throughout the nation in 
attempts to limit confusion and prevent conflict.  Armed with clubs, the group accused 
Leflore and his followers, including Jones, of privately selling out other Choctaws.  
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Jones debated these men in “a candid manner”, after which they “lowered their clubs” 
and “requested his pardon.”60  As threats of internal violence dissipated, the Choctaws 
approached removal as one political entity rather than a divided society.   
When the Choctaw leaders gathered at their new tribal meetinghouse on March 
15, 1830, they decided that absolute resistance was impractical.  Jackson had repeatedly 
demonstrated that he honored no laws or obligations which contradicted his own 
desires.  The man who famously rammed a bill through Congress granting himself 
military authority to assert federal rights over states’ rights in South Carolina, 
hypocritically claimed that the federal government could not stop state governments 
from abrogating the treaties between Natives and the United States.  Under such 
circumstances, progressive Choctaws decided that offering yet another compromise 
could mitigate the worst excesses of inevitable intrusions.  Moreover, since members of 
the Republican / “Heathen” Party expressed a willingness to forfeit their land, the 
United States would undoubtedly find someone—qualified or not—to sign a removal 
treaty as eventually occurred with the Cherokees.
61
 
 Under such circumstance, the Council authorized Greenwood Leflore’s 
suggestion to offer to sell their remaining lands in Mississippi to the United States.  The 
proposed treaty ceded all remaining Choctaw land to the state of Mississippi for fifty 
million dollars, plus removal expenses and educational/vocational annuities.  Leflore 
loathed his options, but wrote a reconciliatory letter to Mushulatubbee rhetorically 
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asking “can any person do better for the people than this?”  President Jackson and the 
United States Senate refused the proposal on the basis that the cost was far too high, but 
instead sent negotiators to settle the matter at Dancing Rabbit Creek in September of 
1830.
62
 
On September 18
th
, 1830 U.S. delegates, Choctaw delegates, and a crowd of 
over 6,000 Choctaws gathered to commence official treaty negotiations.  The attire of 
the attendees and seating arrangements illustrated the diverse cultural practices and 
changing power relations among the tribe.  The three district chiefs, Mushulatubbee, 
Greenwood Leflore, and Nitakeche, sat at the center of the negotiators.  Mushulatubbee 
wore a United States uniform that he had received, ironically, from Andrew Jackson.  
Leflore wore a plain cotton suit, “A circumstance that aroused some suspicion…he was 
in collusion with the United States.”  Finally, Nitakeche wore a traditional Choctaw 
warrior’s outfit.63  Sixty lower tribal leaders—chiefs and captains—and prominent 
members, James L. McDonald, Peter Pitchlynn, and Robert M. Jones among them, 
surrounded them on one side.  Like McDonald had done in 1825, these men served as 
primary advisors for the chiefs.  On another side, an audience of thousands of Choctaws 
actively interested in each offer and counteroffer watched the negotiations.  The 
majority of these people vehemently opposed any notion of further land cessions or 
forced removal.  On the opposing side, American government commissioners, agents, 
and interpreters attempted to appease the crowds with vast amounts of subsidized 
alcohol and gambling.  Seven elder Choctaw women, likely the elders of the most 
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powerful towns, sat opposite of the crowd.  The women’s prominent position indicated 
their interest in and right to keep the land that they had traditionally worked and owned 
for centuries.  Their presence was not simply symbolic—while a young councilor 
delivered a speech on behalf of a compromise treaty, one of the elder women rose and 
waved a butcher knife under his nose and threatened, “I could cut you open with this 
knife.”  Referring to his white father and Indian mother, she deducted that the man had 
“two hearts.”64  Realizing the continued authority of these women, one translator 
assured them that he would forfeit his life if he failed to properly translate any part of a 
document. 
 As had occurred at the negotiations of the 1820 Doak’s Stand treaty, the 
“negotiations” consisted of a series of threats and ultimatums rather than compromises 
and discussions.  The Choctaws rejected the United States’ initial offer, which 
drastically reduced the amount the United States was willing to pay and vested the 
entire sum into the cost of removal, future schools, and agricultural implements.  
Commissioners John Eaton and John Coffee responded to Leflore’s rejection with 
Jacksonian anger and aggression, threatening that the United States Army could wipe 
out Choctaw resistance to removal in a matter of weeks and that keeping lands within 
the state of Mississippi was not negotiable.  However, Eaton and Coffee proposed a 
supplemental treaty which increased land incentives for prominent members who 
agreed to the terms of removal.  While the majority of Choctaw citizens left the treaty 
grounds, leading Choctaws, including Peter Pitchlynn, Mushulatubbee, Greenwood 
Leflore, David Folsom, and James McDonald, accepted the agreement.  Everyone in 
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this cohort signed except for Robert M. Jones who refused.  He did, however, secure 
significant land concessions for himself and his orphaned maternal cousins.
65
 
Choctaw negotiators understood that a large contingent of Choctaws would not 
submit to removal under any circumstances.  To appease this faction, they insisted on 
Article 14 of the treaty which gave each Choctaw the right to stay in Mississippi so long 
as they accepted state citizenship.  This group would receive 640 acres of land for each 
male head of household with an additional 320 acres for each unmarried child over ten 
and 160 acres for each under ten.  Pushmataha biographer Gideon Lincecum attended 
the negotiations and claimed, “I am entirely confident that no treaty could have been 
made but for the solemn assurances…that all might stay and keep their homes who did 
not wish to go, and the Indians distinctly understood that this was put down as part of 
the treaty.”66  Choctaw leaders understood that this action would divide the tribe among 
those who stayed and those who removed, but without this clause the nation might be 
destroyed.  
Divergent conceptions of identity, land, and nation determined who conceded to 
the removal policy and who resisted.  For some traditional Choctaws, their existence as 
a people was inextricably linked to the specific land surrounding the sacred mound 
Niniah Waya.  Choctaws who elected to stay were less threatened by the concept of 
forfeiting their ties to a sovereign Choctaw governmental body than losing their ties to 
the land.  Their identity as a people and individuals was not tied to formal governmental 
structures, but rather the land itself, something that in theory could be maintained under 
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Article 14 of the treaty.  According to historian Donna Akers, this was their Eden—the 
land from which they had been given life and to which they held sacred obligations to 
the bones of their ancestors.  Kinship could and would continue to connect and define 
them in the traditional sense, preserving their identities as Choctaws.  Therefore, they 
chose to forfeit their political sovereignty over a distant, meaningless land in order to 
maintain connections to their sacred site.
67
  
Much of the new generation of Choctaw leadership felt that their identity was 
tied to the maintenance of sovereign self-governance and their continued survival as an 
independent nation.  The treaty separated them from traditional lands, but allowed them 
“permanent” sovereignty over a new set of lands and the opportunity to continue to 
develop as a nation.  This was not an abandonment of traditional spiritual life, but an 
integration of cultural and cosmological beliefs with their developing national identity.    
George Harkins, successor for Greenwood Leflore, summarized this sentiment in a 
famous “Farewell Letter to the American People,” stating “We were hedged in by two 
evils, and we chose that which we thought the least. Yet we could not recognize the 
right that the state of Mississippi had assumed, to legislate for us…We as Choctaws 
rather chose to suffer and be free, than live under the degrading influence of (state) 
laws.”  To this cohort, removal presented the best chance to remain an independent 
indigenous nation, even if that meant leaving some kin behind in their traditional lands.  
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Of course, this system relied upon the ludicrous pretense that the United States’ would 
fulfil its end of the treaty and allow Choctaws to decide if they wanted to stay.
68
 
This promise turned into a cruel farce indicative of the priorities behind federal 
colonial policies.  Decades after removal, Robert M. Jones recalled that “all of this in a 
great measure failed…and when the white people commenced to move onto, and settle 
the country, they paid no regard to the rights of the Indians, and the Choctaws were in a 
great measure forced off from their reservations.”69  Indian Agent William Ward, a 
hostile drunkard eager to use his powers to force removal, vehemently opposed the 
provisions of Article 14 for any who would not instantly assimilate into American 
society.  Of course, those wishing to remain in Mississippi needed to register with Ward 
within six months of the treaty.  Ward refused to register any except a token few, 
including members of the Jones family and a few others who fit his conception of 
“civilized” Indians.  One Choctaw testified to the following treatment once Ward 
agreed to meet with those wishing to remain: 
In the month of January, 1831, being within six months after the ratification of 
said treaty, a large body of Choctaw Indians attended at a council house to have 
their named registered for the purpose of obtaining citizenship and acquiring 
reservations…Unacquainted with the English language, they presented the agent 
a number of sticks of various lengths, indicating how many were presented, and 
the quantities of land to which they were severally entitled, but the agent threw 
down the sticks.  Then they selected two or three head men to speak for them, 
and these head men by means of an interpreter, told the agent their numbers, 
ages, and names, and demanded registration; but the agent would not register 
them and told them that there were too many—that they must go beyond the 
Mississippi.  Many of these Indians ignorantly despairing of the justice of the 
United States, have reluctantly removed beyond the Mississippi.
70
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Other agents registered various Choctaws wishing to stay, but Ward destroyed the 
records to prevent them from remaining.  Though Ward was officially chastised, he was 
not relieved of his duty until 1833, and this was only because of the limited number of 
Choctaws remaining in Mississippi.  The actions of Ward and others demonstrate that 
United States officials entertained no real pretense of allowing more than few Choctaws 
to remain.
71
 
 James McDonald made several attempts to mitigate the loss of rights for 
Choctaws choosing to remain in Mississippi.  He wrote to Peter Pitchlynn and Thomas 
McKenney reporting his intention to run for the Mississippi legislature.  Though 
tempted to attach his “fortunes with the Choctaws and go West,” he felt a sense of 
responsibility towards those remaining in Mississippi, asking “is not this the very crises 
in which my services would be useful to my countrymen?”  He also appealed to office 
of Indian affairs to expedite the process of granting claims to those entitled under the 
treaty, including his maternal kin and their orphaned children.
72
   
These efforts proved futile.  He encouraged Peter Pitchlynn and Robert M. Jones 
to remain positive, reminding them of his favorite motto, “nil desperandum—let us 
never despair.”   By 1831, McDonald realized that Article 14, which he and Jones 
insisted upon placing in the treaty, would not be honored, nor would his dream of using 
overlapping tribal and state citizenships to protect Indian rights.  It is not difficult to 
imagine the despair a person of McDonald’s genius would have felt as he watched his 
hopes for education, tribal government, and state citizenship evaporate before the 
American colonial forces.  He slipped into a deep depression and took his own life in 
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September of 1831, depriving the Choctaws of their most educated representative and 
defender.
73
  Of the approximately 6,000 who had originally intended to stay on 
Choctaw land, less than 3,000 remained for an extended period.   
The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek and the subsequent removal to Indian 
Territory marked a turning point in Choctaw history.  During the removal crisis, the 
Choctaws came close to dividing over the issue, as did the Cherokees and the Creeks, 
whose pro and anti-removal factions entered into violent and divisive conflict that 
persisted well after removal.  The Choctaws, however, never reached this point of 
violent civil conflict and drew upon recent trends of collective Choctaw diplomacy to 
remain united during removal negotiations. Although Choctaws had competing ideas 
about the Choctaw Nation, they addressed these divides and reconciled them with little 
internal violence.  Eventually, Choctaw leaders forged a treaty that meant to appease 
both factions—those wishing to stay in Mississippi and those willing to emigrate to 
keep Choctaw National sovereignty.  This helped foster rather than hinder the 
construction of sovereign Choctaw nationhood that they carried with them to the West.  
While the process of removal caused devastating consequences to Choctaw society, 
politically they remained a united and self-governing group devoid of the deep political 
factions that emerged in the Creek and Cherokee and continued to deeply divide them in 
Indian Territory. 
Over the course of three years, approximately 14,000 Choctaws were removed 
while approximately 2,500 died en route.  Federal officials officially oversaw three 
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separate waves of Choctaw removal, each subsequently more disastrous than the earlier 
wave.  Even United States agents were amazed at the level of suffering the Choctaws 
endured along their journey.  An officer in Arkansas wrote his superiors claiming that 
“the food supply was pitifully inadequate.”  More importantly, 1831 had been an 
uncharacteristically cold winter which he predicted, “must produce much human 
suffering.  Our poor emigrants, many of them quite naked” with few blankets, shoes, or 
tents suffered greatly through the winter.  Promises of supplies were met with 
incompetent good intentions or horrifying indifference.  Subsequent waves repeated and 
intensified earlier mistakes.  Most Choctaws were forced to walk the majority of the 
trip, which included wading through thirty miles of floodwaters and swamps between 
Row Rock and Little Rock.  When the first wagons arrived in Little Rock, a reporter 
from the Arkansas Gazette interviewed an unnamed Choctaw chief who described the 
journey as “a trail of tears and death.”  The term was later revived and became part of 
American vernacular during the Cherokee Removal.
74
 
By chance, French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville witnessed part of the 
first wave of Choctaw removal.  He later recorded the following observation: 
“At the end of the year 1831, I was on the left bank of the Mississippi, at 
the place the Europeans call Memphis.  While was there a numerous 
band of Choctaws (or Chactas) arrived; these savages were leaving their 
country and seeking to pass over the right bank of the Mississippi, where 
they hoped to find an asylum promised to them by the American 
government.  It was then the depths of winter, and that year the cold was 
exceptionally severe...huge masses of ice drifted on the river.  The 
Indians brought their families with them; there were among them the 
wounded, the sick, newborn babies, and the old men on the point of 
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death…I saw them embark to cross the great river, and the sight will 
never fade from my memory…Their afflictions were of long standing, 
and they felt them to be irremediable.”75 
 
Despite witnessing but a single scene in the long and painful removal process, 
de Tocqueville clearly believed that it was morally reprehensible and potentially 
devastating to the Choctaws.  His words captured the shocking realities of 
Indian Removal policy and the harsh conditions that the Choctaw people 
survived. 
***** 
For Robert M. Jones, the decision to emigrate or remain in Mississippi must 
have been difficult.  His remaining family members were among the first to receive 
approval to remain, selecting land in Greene County, near Epes, Alabama, currently 
known as “Jones bluff.”  Though he did not own his own land, Jones operated a thriving 
trading outpost and was eligible for 920 acres under the treaty.  He also served as 
primary guardian for his orphaned second-nephew James Trahern, as well as financial 
supporter of widowed half aunts Peggy and Delilah.  He could easily assimilate into 
American culture and live a prominent life among the growing cotton farmers in the 
state of Mississippi.  Nevertheless, Jones did not wish to become an American citizen.  
He was a Choctaw, and believed in the need to advance and protect the growing 
Choctaw Nation by maintaining its sovereign status.
76
   
He married Judith Walker, a woman of mixed Choctaw and European descent, 
in December of 1830, her family chose to remove to Indian Territory along with Jones.  
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At the time of Removal, Jones felt a sense of duty to his people.  Before his suicide, 
Jones’ cousin James McDonald expressed a desire to use his education, intellect, and 
experiences to assist the Choctaws through the tumultuous years.  Jones shared a similar 
drive and stood poised to assume a position of political, economic, and social 
prominence in the new Choctaw Nation.   
Jones, therefore, refused Mississippi citizenship and took on a position as 
Captain of a party of fifty-nine Choctaws and hundreds of livestock in the first wave of 
immigration to Indian Territory.  His wife, Judith Walker, and a child, most likely a 
maternal cousin, accompanied them on the trip.  He repeatedly petitioned for additional 
funds and supplies for removal to no avail.  In a desperate move, Jones took out a note 
for basic supplies expecting reimbursement from the government only to find that his 
non-itemized receipt was deemed insufficient.  By the time he had reached Indian 
Territory, approximately half of the livestock had died from exposure or starvation, as 
well as one of his five slaves.
77
   
Jones’ decision to remove with the Choctaws did not go unnoticed.  A member 
of Choctaw Peter Pitchlynn’s party wrote a poem regarding the entire situation in which 
he declared “On my way to Arkansaw, (sic) G-d D-n the white mans laws.”  Regarding 
the chief who instigated the removal treaty, the writer exclaimed “Greenwood Leflore is 
chief no more…he was a man that took a bride from Uncle Sam’s little scribe.” He 
called Thomas McKenney, the architect of “civilization” policy “a very good talker, 
hard at work while our Indians are at slaughter.”  Finally, he concluded discussing Jones 
and two other members of the Removal party.  He exclaimed “Robert Jones is of our 
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crew, [as smart a man as we ever knew] This is a man that is true.”78  The writer clearly 
believed that the Choctaws had been cheated by the United States government, but 
under the leadership of men like Jones, Pitchlynn, and others, it would survive removal 
and rise to prominence. 
Though the Choctaws lost their traditional lands and thousands of 
citizens, removal failed to destroy the Choctaw Nation.  In fact, the Choctaws 
arrived in their new home lands united in their destitution and eager to rebuild 
the infrastructure of their nation similar to how it existed in Mississippi.
79
  Their 
unity was partially due to the fact that they scapegoated Greenwood Leflore for 
precipitating removal, augmenting his own authority, calling himself “Principal 
Chief,” and signing the removal treaty.  Leflore remained in Mississippi on large 
tracts of land appropriated to him, allowing the Choctaws who emigrated to 
quickly move beyond blame and focus on the task of rebuilding a nation.
80
  
Even more importantly, leaders continued to build the institutions put in place 
before removal, including a constitutional system, a standing council, and 
sustained district autonomy.  They also continued to selectively adapt Euro-
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American cultural traits, including Christianity, education, commerce, and racial 
slavery, to advance Choctaw National interests. 
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CHAPTER TWO: “IGNORANCE IS OUR GREATEST ENEMY”: CHOCTAW 
NATIONAL SCHOOLS 
Formal education and connections to Christian missionaries became integral 
parts of Robert M. Jones’ life at the same time schools became a central feature of 
Choctaw National life.  Unlike his cousin James McDonald, Jones most likely received 
his primary education inside the Choctaw Nation from a local missionary.  Based on his 
family’s location, it is possible that Jones was among the first students at Mayhew 
Mission School where he learned to read and write in both English and Choctaw in 
1820.
1
  At the age of eighteen, a district chief selected Jones to attend the first Indian 
boarding school for advanced education, the Choctaw Academy in Blue Springs, 
Kentucky.   
This proved to be a transformative event in his life, as well as in the 
development of the Choctaw Nation.  While in attendance, Jones forged a personal 
relationship with American political leaders, including future United States vice 
president Richard M. Johnson and future Arkansas senator Robert Ward Johnson, 
among several others.  In early 1830 when Jones left the Academy, he received a 
printed diploma as well as a personalized letter of recommendation from Johnson.  
Johnson wrote: 
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In addition to the certificate, we should neither do justice to ourselves 
nor to Robert M. Jones without further stating to the public that our long 
acquaintance with and particular knowledge of Mr. Jones justify us to the 
full extent in stating that he is a young man of sterling worth, strictly 
honest and just in all his dealings with mankind; of a fine mind, well 
cultivated and improved; entertaining a high and dignified sense of 
honor; well qualified with a good english education for any ordinary 
business and in whom the utmost confidence may be placed as to 
integrity and ability on his part to discharge faithfully any duty he would 
undertake.   
 
Jones later drew on these powerful connections to help him start his first business and 
gain temporary employment with the United States government immediately following 
removal.  He also converted to Christianity while at the Academy.  Based on the tenets 
of the American “civilization program,” he epitomized what the federal government 
thought Choctaws should become.
2
  
Nevertheless, Jones played an essential role in wrestling control of the Choctaw 
Academy from American hands.  While at the school, he engaged in several successful 
letter-writing campaigns aimed at improving conditions for the students.  Following 
removal, Jones and other Choctaws knew that a school bearing their name belonged 
within their national boundaries and under the exclusive control of the Council.  Jones 
used his position on the Council’s education committee to audit the school and 
pressured U.S. agent William Armstrong to exert some influence over proceedings at 
the school.  He simultaneously worked towards constructing the school’s replacement—
Spencer Academy—within the confines of the Choctaw Nation.   Jones understood 
education did not void Choctaw identity as long as citizens of the Choctaw Nation 
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controlled the process.  Though missionaries and federal officials played a critical role 
in establishing a foundation for the Choctaw education system, Jones and others battled 
to ensure that the school system served Choctaw National interests. 
***** 
 Early education endeavors began in the pre-removal period from 1820-1831, 
when Choctaws made a considerable effort to establish schools.  Only a select number 
of elite Choctaws, however, attended school before removal, most often through their 
families’ financial and cultural connections.  As the threat of removal loomed, 
education increasingly became a national priority.  Choctaw chiefs expressed this 
sentiment in many letters to newspapers and government officials in the United States, 
including one which asserted that “We wish our children education…we are 
anxious...that our rising generation should acquire a knowledge of literature and the 
arts, and learn to tread in those paths which have conducted your people, by regular 
generations, to the present summit of wealth and greatness.”3  Removal temporarily 
halted these efforts, crushing the fledgling school system but deepening the desire for a 
national education system. 
Shifting to a Euro-American model of education became a critical tool for 
redefining the Choctaw Nation in the post-removal period.  While the Choctaws made 
some limited advances towards formal schooling prior to removal, leaders in the post-
removal Choctaw Nation expanded upon these early efforts to develop an elaborate 
school system to meet the nation’s growing desire to provide education for children and 
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adults.   Though some American leaders hoped that education and concurrent 
Christianization would eradicate Native “savagery” to solve the “Indian problem,” 
Choctaws embraced education and made it a distinctly Choctaw institution used to defy 
Anglo-American perceptions of Indianness.  In James Axtell’s terms, they employed 
education as both “adaptive” and “reactive” to the changing world around them.  
Neither education nor Christianity per se endangered Choctaw identity.  Rather these 
became integrated into local communities which then reshaped the schools into 
distinctly Choctaw social institutions.  Together, schools and missions bound 
communities together in old and new ways, reinforced cultural traits, allowed for 
selective incorporation of Christianity, and prepared Choctaws to better resist and adjust 
to the encroaching United States.
4
 
The Choctaws learned valuable lessons in their initial attempts at school 
formation which they carried into the post-removal schools system.  First, education had 
to be a wide-spread initiative and not the realm of the select few.  Second, in order for 
education to be a national project, schools and missions had to be fixtures in local 
community life.  Finally, schools had to be decisively under Choctaw control with only 
selective involvement of missionaries and U.S. officials. This chapter examines the 
early efforts at establishing education in the pre-removal period, and then explores the 
ways in which education became a national system in the post-removal period. 
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 Missionaries played a critical role in establishing the earliest schools among 
Choctaws.  Some historians have argued that missionary-led education systems, and 
missionaries themselves, resulted in cultural genocide as men and women concerned 
solely with spreading the Christian gospel at the cost of “heathen” Indian cultures 
succeeded.  Publications from the missionaries and American-based mission societies 
support this as a stated objective.  Despite their Christian imperative, missionaries living 
among the Choctaws quickly discovered only a minority had an interest in conversion.  
Instead, they desired small-scale steps to educate a select group of potential future 
leaders who could better combat American expansion on American terms.  They 
understood that having at least a select minority adept at American-style negotiating 
tactics and familiar with the American legal system was necessary for defense of the 
nation.  As the desire for schools within the Choctaw Nation increased, missionaries 
accepted their role as educators and in many instances worked to preserve rather than 
eradicate Choctaw culture.
5
  
For instance, after establishing Elliot Station Mission, in 1819, Cyrus  
Kingsbury soon lamented that the Choctaws had little interest in Christian conversion 
and that his mission would likely end if he did not place a primary interest on secular 
concerns.  He reported to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
(ABCFM) that “we wish we could say that as much as been done to enlighten & save 
the souls of these perishing people as to make preparations for the instructions of their 
children.”  To attract Choctaw support, Kingsbury yielded to the Choctaws’ request to 
make his mission primarily a school.  Though most Choctaws refused to travel great 
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distance for religious advice, the first class of students traveled over 160 miles on the 
promise of an education.  Kingsbury and his staff began accepting scholars before a 
school house could even be completed out of his fear that failing to do so would further 
alienate neighboring families and district leaders.  Though he insisted that the Elliot 
Station could only support a maximum of 20 students, he finished the year with 60 
youths, 16 of these allegedly fully-literate by the years’ end, measured by their 
understanding of Bible passages.  By its second year, several sons of prominent captains 
and chiefs, including Pushmataha’s and Mushulatubbee’s sons, attended the school.6   
By late 1820, David Folsom informed American missionaries that “the 
Choctaws are throughout the whole nation…anxious for schools.” Yet, they relied upon 
cooperation with neighboring Euro-Americans to provide suitable educators.  If they 
officially requested that the United States take-charge of sending educators and building 
schools on Choctaw land, they ran the risk of forfeiting control to a government hell-
bent on taking their land.  Instead, Choctaw leaders borrowed the paternalistic rhetoric 
of the civilization program, requesting assistance from missionaries and benevolence 
societies while simultaneously using schools as a potential defensive bulwark for their 
national sovereignty.  To fund this project, Choctaws arranged for a portion of the 
proceeds from treaties in 1820 and 1825 to go towards building and maintaining schools 
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while at the same time extending invitations to American missionary societies to 
provide financial aid and suitable educators.
7
   
Though missionaries traditionally receive the bulk of the credit for the pre-
removal Choctaw school system, a closer examination reveals that Choctaw 
communities played a significant role in constructing and maintaining early schools.  
For instance, when Cyrus Kingsbury complained that his missions suffered from lack of 
food and money, a local council appropriated initially $700 from their share of annuity 
payments for lands sales, and later the district increased this amount to $2,000 per year.  
Local Choctaw families surrounding the institution also donated eighty-five cows and 
calves with the promise of subsequent corn upon harvest.  Moreover, a local community 
containing Choctaws “of all levels of acculturation” along the Natchez Trace, including 
the paternal family of Robert M. Jones, volunteered to furnish the buildings, labor, 
cooking, cleaning, and land for a school when approached by missionary Loring 
Williams in 1824.  Despite only small-scale success, the zeal for education among 
Choctaw youths spread, sparking an additional mission in each district.  By 1827, a 
combination of funds from the ABCFM, Choctaw annuities, and United States 
government funds went towards the creation and maintenance of eight official mission 
and day schools.
8
   
Chiefs and captains actively vied to convince missionaries and councils to put 
the next schools where their youths could take advantage.  In the Sixtowns District, 
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local Captain Hwoolatahoomah proclaimed that “I want the good people to send men 
and women to set up a school in my district.  I want them to do it quick.  I am growing 
old.  I know not how long I shall live.  I want to see the good work before I die.”  He 
further explained that he and other captains had insisted on laws banning whiskey 
consumption, indolence among the men, and infanticide among women all as a way to 
sway the missionaries to “assist us in getting our children educated.”  District chiefs, let 
alone captains, rarely exercised this type of authority over individual’s action, instead 
leaving the matters for clan to police, which further demonstrates that interest in 
education extended well beyond a small cohort.  Although many leading men vied for 
missionary schools in their communities, Choctaws took careful pains to dictate the 
parameters of education and control the actions of missionaries.  For instance, Robert 
Cole, nephew to Apukshunnubbe and heir to leadership in the Western district, 
threatened to pull his nephews out of Kingsbury’s school if he did not change the 
curriculum from a focus on agricultural work to mechanical work.  Kingsbury knew that 
he had to accommodate Cole’s and other Choctaw requests, but Cole still withdrew 
twelve students, citing health concerns and dissatisfaction with the progress of the 
schools.  In addition, many missionaries recorded frequent visits by boarding students’ 
families to inspect the schools and see what was being taught to their kin.  When 
dissatisfied families found unfavorable conditions, they simply returned the children 
back to their parents’ care.9 
                                                 
9
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 Missionaries had far greater impact on secular Choctaw society than spiritual 
practices.  In addition to schools, missionaries helped create a written Choctaw 
language.  Cyrus Byington, along with missionary Allen Wright and Christian Choctaw 
Israel Folsom, produced a written lexicon of the Choctaw language.  By late 1825, this 
cohort had assembled a working variation of the Roman alphabet for the Choctaw 
language with modified accents and diphthong vowels, along with a basic dictionary of 
hundreds of common words.  Undoubtedly, the written Choctaw language did assist 
missionaries in their efforts to spread Christianity, but it also facilitated Choctaw 
education.  Though U.S. officials feared that teaching literacy in Native American 
languages might retard the “civilization” process, missionaries of all denominations 
discarded their critiques and hastily worked to translate books of both a religious and 
secular nature into the Choctaw language.  As Presbyterian preacher Alexander Talley 
proclaimed, “books [for] the Choctaw, and teachers of the Choctaws” should all be in 
the Choctaw language.
10
 
Literacy not only transformed the worldviews of individual Choctaws, it also 
helped foster a collective national identity.  In 1826, only months after the written 
language had been completed, leaders used it to draft the first Choctaw constitution, 
which provided the foundation for Choctaws’ system of national governance throughout 
the remainder of the nineteenth century.  What Byington saw as “an 
instrument…communicating a knowledge…of salvation,” David Folsom and other 
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Choctaws saw as a way to “introduce laws” and extend civil governance to the Choctaw 
people.
11
 
By the mid-1820s, education and literacy had become a priority of the fledgling 
Choctaw Nation.  A select few, including James McDonald, George Harkins, Israel 
Folsom, and Peter Pitchlynn received substantial endowments from Choctaw funds to 
attend the best American universities and boarding schools, but leaders desired more 
local control over the education of Choctaw youths.  Moreover, Choctaw leaders feared 
that sending children to live among Anglo-Americans would disconnect them from their 
families and society.  That said, many also feared that if these select students lived too 
closely among other Choctaws, they would be tempted to abandon their studies.  In 
order to resolve this dilemma, they collaborated with the federal government to create 
the Choctaw Academy in 1825.
12
  
 Congressman Richard Mentor Johnson jumped at the opportunity to take part in 
educating a select group of Choctaws and other Native American youths and made a 
personal appeal to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun.  Johnson had gained national 
notoriety following the 1815 Battle of Thames when he claimed to have personally slain 
Shawnee sachem Tecumseh and parlayed his fame into a Kentucky Senate seat in 1819.  
By 1825, Johnson had presidential aspirations and sought to endear himself to the 
American electorate by taking an active role in the education of Native American 
youths and advancing the “civilization program” as a solution to the “Indian problem.” 
The Senator volunteered his land in Blue Springs, Kentucky, informing Secretary of 
                                                 
11
 Kidwell, Choctaws and Missionaries, 77 
12
 W. David Baird, Peter Pitchlynn: Chief of the Choctaws (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1972), 19-21; Czarina C. Conlan, “David Folsom” Chronicles of Oklahoma 4 (Winter 1926), 341; 
Frederick Hoxie, This Indian Country: American Indian Activist and the Place they Made (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2012). 
78 
 
War John C Calhoun that he had “a house with 3 rooms, 20 x 30 feet which I shall 
appropriate exclusively to their accommodation.  I have another house with four Rooms 
20 feet square which will do for the Teacher to live in & one room for the last school—
the whole establishment will be within my own fences so that no time shall be lost.”  
Johnson selected his friend Thomas Henderson as the acting superintendent and daily 
headmaster, endorsing him as having “uncommon merit—a scientific character…a 
preacher of the gospel, of industrious habits and dignified manners.”13   
The War Department accepted this bid and in October of 1825 the school 
officially opened.  Twenty-one Choctaws boys aged 13 to 20 travelled to Kentucky 
under the charge of Peter Pitchlynn to form the first class. The Blue Springs school, a 
high profile experiment, gained immediate attention from the American public, 
Choctaw citizens, and other Native American polities.  Newspapers like the Public 
Advertiser in Louisville noted that Choctaws had arrived at Blue Springs.  Other 
national newspapers reported the progress of quarterly student evaluations.  Greenwood 
Leflore, Mushulatubbee, and James McDonald made visits to the Academy and 
reported back on its progress to local authorities.  Even the Creek Nation, which was 
notoriously suspicious of missionary efforts at education, enrolled thirteen youths in 
1826 after a favorable report from Chief Opothleyahola.
14
   
Funding the school proved a point of contention for the Choctaws, the federal 
government, and Richard M. Johnson.  Several poor investments in the 1820s left 
Johnson in considerable financial distress.  As historian Ella Wells Drake noted, “any 
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benevolence Johnson extended to the boys flowed through his desire to perpetuate his 
profit.”  Johnson openly stated his goal of receiving $12,000 a year for boarding Native 
youths, noting that “the more scholars I have the more profit.”15  After failing to 
convince the War Department to divert all funding from local mission schools to the 
Choctaw Academy, Johnson recruited other Native polities to send their youths and 
requested a cash payment per student regardless of actual costs.  Seeing as Johnson used 
his own slave labor to construct and maintain the school buildings, he knew that he 
could make a significant profit from the Choctaw Academy.  He attempted to downplay 
talk of his financial exploits, warning Henderson that “you know what a disadvantage it 
would be to me to have people believe I was making a great deal of money.”16   
 Given the school’s distance from the Choctaw Nation, educators Thomas 
Henderson and Richard Johnson believed that they would have full control over the 
proceedings at the school.  Johnson implored Henderson that “it is in your power to do 
more to enlighten the Indians by encouraging this school than any man in the world—
lose not the opportunity.”17  As a method of keeping Choctaw authorities appeased and 
at a distance, Johnson also recommended that Henderson encourage students to write 
letters home with reports from the school.  Henderson could then censor out the letters 
which did not convey the most positive reports.  In the inaugural class of 1825, 
Henderson complied by having “those capable of dictating and writing letters have 
written to the chief and to their friends expressing great obligation for sending them to 
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this school.”18  Johnson and Henderson also sent some of these letters to benevolent 
societies to court them for additional financial support.  For instance, The American 
Baptist Magazine received and reprinted letters credited to Choctaw Academy students.  
In one letter, Pierre Juzan claimed to “we have a Teacher who would do honour [sic] to 
any literary institution” and that following his tutelage “leads in the paths of virtue and 
happiness.”19 
Henderson assured American officials that “the children…are removed so far 
beyond either the control or protection of their parents or friends, that I have become a 
kind of parent to them all, and they naturally look up to me for protection, as a child 
does his father.”  He anticipated no problems from Choctaw students, who he addressed 
as “sons,” especially since local white children had joined their ranks and inspired them 
with a zeal for learning.  As Henderson and Johnson quickly realized, however, this 
paternalistic goal rarely became a reality.  In fact, the Choctaw students remained tied to 
their society and kin networks.  Choctaw youths and leaders astutely observed that 
Henderson and Johnson relied upon public opinion in both the Choctaw and American 
nations in order to keep a constant flow of funding.  Thus, both Choctaw youths and 
leaders engaged in frequent letter-writing campaigns of their own in order to address 
grievances and exercise control over the proceedings at the school.
20
   
For instance, Johnson and Henderson ignored Peter Pitchlynn’s concerns about 
the school’s condition—in fact, they reported that after a visit Pitchlynn was “highly 
pleased.”  Johnson assumed that his personal friendship with Pitchlynn, his 
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recommendation that Pitchlynn receive funds to study law, and the fraternal masonic 
bonds between them would keep Pitchlynn from publically voicing his concerns.  That 
changed in 1828 when Johnson received a copy of a scathing letter written by Pitchlynn 
to David Folsom and Secretary of War William Ward admonishing the Academy for a 
number of offenses, including poor food consisting of bacon fat and weak coffee, soiled 
linens, un-mended clothing, cramped room quarters, and students being served in the 
dining halls by some of Johnson’s “insolent negroes.”  Pitchlynn’s report was received 
and read before the General Council, sparking the first of many controversies at the 
Choctaw Academy.
21
  
 Johnson and Henderson’s level of response demonstrates their recognition of the 
Choctaws’ potential authority over the Academy.  Johnson hastily wrote letters to 
Choctaw and American allies vehemently denying each of the accusations.  Henderson 
also wrote letters to several politically prominent Choctaws refuting the charges.  He 
acknowledged complaints from students, but claimed both he and Johnson “have taken 
uncommon pains to remedy any evil immediately.”  In regards to the slaves, Henderson 
admitted to hearing of Johnson “whipping some negroes very severely for insolence to 
the students but these are not those who wait on the table.”  Henderson reminded the 
officials that they need not accept his word, but rather look to the numerous favorable 
reports from visiting clergymen, prominent white neighbors, and Choctaw officials.  He 
pointed to Greenwood Leflore’s glowing report and claimed that the food and shoes 
given to the students had actually improved since inspected by James McDonald and 
Charles Juzan.
22
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 Most importantly, Henderson recognized that he needed to address the concerns 
of current students if he could hope for any continued support.  Before sending off his 
letters, Henderson recruited six prominent Choctaws, including star pupil Robert M. 
Jones, to sign that they had read the statement and agreed with Henderson’s assessment 
of the institution.  Their support came with a cost.  Only a few months later, Henderson 
received word from Johnson that rising star in Indian Affairs, William Armstrong, had 
been “prejudiced” against the Choctaw Academy due to complaints lobbied by Robert 
M. Jones, Robert Nail, Pierre Juzan, and others—the same youths that Henderson used 
to vouch for the positive state of the school.  The letter, which Johnson firmly believed 
was written by Jones, was addressed to President John Quincy Adams and the General 
Council.  The letter made several complaints, including that little could be learned at the 
school because Johnson and Henderson refused to hire a sufficient number of teachers, 
instead maximizing profits by overextending the limited available staff.  Additionally, 
they echoed concerns voiced by Jones and James L. McDonald in 1827 that too many 
students were crowded into tight spaces.
23
  In taking these actions, Jones and other 
students boldly attempted to reform the school and protested the nature of their 
treatment and parameters of their education in the academy that bore their nation’s 
name.   
Neither Johnson nor Henderson understood that for Choctaw youths and leaders 
the Choctaw Academy represented a national institution.  One pupil exposed his 
national pride in a letter addressed to his “friends and countrymen” and boasted that 
“the Choctaws have taken the lead in establishing our Academy, amidst our white 
brethren, and we are under great obligation to our Nation for the honor and the 
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advantage of taking the first fruit of this noble institution.”  He further exhorted his 
fellow students to “let us honor our nation by a close attention to our studies.”  Several 
of these nationalistic tracts snuck into letters to benevolent societies and government 
officials on the surface praising the seemingly selfless work of Academy staff like 
Henderson while simultaneously advancing the Choctaw Academy as a Choctaw 
institution.
24
   
 Choctaw leaders also actively flaunted advancements with education and 
“civilization” as a way of resisting restrictive policies from both the United States and 
the state of Mississippi.  While negotiating in Washington D.C. in 1825, the Choctaw 
delegation issued the following address which appeared in national newspapers. They 
called for redress of both incursions against their sovereignty and their exclusion from 
the American justice system: 
“…in several of the southern states, we are denied privileges to which, as 
members of the human family, we are of right entitled.  However 
qualified by education we may be, we are neither permitted to hold 
offices, nor to give our testimony in courts of justice, although our 
dearest rights may be at stake.  Can this be a correct policy?  Is it just, is 
it humane?  When schools are multiplying among us; when we have 
made liberal appropriations of money for education of our children; 
when we are forsaking the chase, and turning our attention to agriculture, 
and are becoming an orderly and social people—does it comport with an 
enlightened and liberal policy to continue the imposition of those 
degrading restrictions upon us?”25 
 
Drawing on their recent success in schooling, Choctaws used their selective 
embrace of “civilization” policies to in turn critique the American colonial 
system.   
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So long as Choctaws occupied valuable lands, though, no amount of education, 
Christianization, and “civilization” could halt the American desire for Indian removal.  
Of course, federal officials, missionaries, and other white Americans’ thoughts on 
Native American proclivity for “civilization” were shaped by burgeoning racial 
ideologies.  Thus, they moved the goalposts for “civilization” in order to justify ongoing 
colonial policies.  Despite changes made by the Choctaws in their education, 
governmental structure, and diplomacy with the United States, shifts in policy by the 
Jackson administration meant that forced removal from their homes in Mississippi 
quickly became unstoppable.  Within the system of settler colonialism that defined the 
relationship between the American nation-state and Native Americans in the early 
nineteenth century, no amount of acculturation would have prevented their removal.
26
   
In part, Choctaws blamed missionaries for removal, leading to an unsteady 
relationship in the post-removal Nation.  Chief Mushulatubbee attempted to solidify his 
political base with calls for all missionaries to be permanently banned from the post-
removal Choctaw Nation to ensure that Choctaw money remained out of American 
hands.  This resonated with Choctaws who had been disillusioned by the march to 
“civilization” and sought to return to traditional ways of life.  Even some Choctaws who 
had embraced tenets of the “civilization” policy admitted that “we tried white men long 
enough, and we find the greatest member of them [Andrew Jackson] but a monkey in 
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the business.”  Many feared that continuing to collaborate with missionaries put the 
post-removal nation in danger of unrelenting American colonial policies.
27
 
Among the majority of Choctaw leaders, however, education remained a 
national priority and the desire for literacy continued to grow as the Choctaws 
attempted to rebuild their society.  Unfortunately, the Choctaws encountered every 
imaginable calamity during their first decade in Indian Territory.  These initial struggles 
for survival and stability overshadowed the education agenda.  By June 1833, hundreds 
of families had settled on the Arkansas River and planted crops to supply the final wave 
of Choctaw emigrants coming from the East.  A terrible flood, which swelled all forks 
of the Canadian River, washed away their crops, livestock, and homes.  The floods were 
followed by outbreaks of various deadly diseases.  Along the Red River, called by one 
the “stream of death,” land coveted for the fertile basin soil also brought malaria, 
whooping cough, and fevers which decimated the population, particularly the old and 
the young.  An outbreak of smallpox then killed over 700 Choctaws, including aged 
chief Mushulatubbee.  Surviving in what one Choctaw called “the land of death” took 
priority over reinstating the system of education immediately after removal.
28
         
Yet, the need to re-establish former institutions such as schools loomed among 
Choctaws with a growing sense that the political and social order had been uprooted.  
By 1834, the Choctaws possessed ample funding to open schools themselves, but post-
removal hardships and the lack of teachers within the nation hindered the process.  To 
assist these efforts, the General Council resumed the acceptance of missionary 
educators from American Christian benevolent societies that year.  Aware of past 
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mistakes and weary of losing control, leading Choctaws immediately set the precedent 
of Indian authority over schools.  Missionaries knew they were “compelled to deport 
themselves towards the Indians in a manner to conciliate their good will, and to render 
themselves useful to the Indians to be allowed to live among them.”  Accepting these 
terms, missionaries who had served among the Choctaws in Mississippi—including 
Cyrus Kingsbury, Cyrus Byington, Loring Williams, and Alfred Wade—worked to 
reestablish schools and missions in Indian Territory.  To avoid potential controversies, 
they formally requested that the General Council appoint committees and trustees to 
audit each school’s finances, attend annual examinations, clearly demonstrating that 
missionaries worked in Choctaw schools—not American schools.29  Following removal, 
the General Council immediately worked to create a system of oversight for the 
fledgling education system and keep control of schools in the hands of the Choctaw 
government rather than missionary societies or the federal government.   
Under the Council’s supervision, education began to expand and schools 
became a central component of rebuilding the Choctaw Nation in Indian Territory.  By 
1836, the General Council had constructed and opened five schools attended by over 
150 students.  The next year, the Council authorized the creation of three more schools, 
one in each district of the Choctaw Nation.  Petitions to fund and build subsequent 
schools flooded the General Council, in both the English and Choctaw languages, from 
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throughout the nation.  Local schools in the Choctaw Nation became permanent facets 
of Choctaw communities.
30
  
With the growing system of education in the post-removal nation, relocating 
Choctaw Academy within its sovereign bounds became a new national priority.  Even 
those who had once endorsed the academy reasoned that its location in Kentucky now 
made it too far to be of benefit to the Choctaws.  Moreover, many former students had 
become fervent nationalists and believed that an academy bearing their name and 
educating their children should be within the geographic limits of their nation.  
Relocating the academy to the Choctaw Nation would give the General Council and 
parents much more oversight than the American religious societies who contributed to 
the Academy in Kentucky and the War Department who felt it their duty to regulate it.  
Provisions of the treaties of 1825 and Dancing Rabbit Creek guaranteed that the War 
Department would apply Choctaw funds to the Choctaw Academy through 1840.  
Despite this setback, after removal Choctaw Nationalists aimed to take even greater 
control of the Academy by threatening to withdraw students and actively souring 
American public opinion.
31
 
Johnson and Henderson resorted to varying tactics in order to keep a maximum 
number of students at the Choctaw Academy.  In 1831, during the second wave of 
Choctaw removal, Johnson learned that the United States government had stalled 
paying Robert M. Jones for a section of land in Mississippi.  Johnson viewed this slight 
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against Jones as an opportunity to gain his favor.  He wrote to Henderson about Jones’ 
conundrum, saying that “as he is a deserving young man,” Johnson could pull some 
strings in the war department and personally collect the debt.  In return, he expected 
Jones to bring new Choctaw pupils to the Academy that he could trade for the money 
owed to him under the removal treaty.  This act of extortion apparently failed, although 
Jones did bring a small cohort as had previously been planned.
32
   
In 1834, when the General Council in Indian Territory did not send any students 
to the Academy, Johnson recruited Choctaw youths from families attempting to stay in 
Mississippi without the Council’s authorization.  At this point, the General Council 
drew the line.  They contacted William F. Armstrong--their new Indian agent known for 
his fairness to the Choctaws and opposition to forced removal--and demanded redress.  
In a letter signed by two district chiefs and other prominent Choctaws, including three 
members of the Leflore family, two members of the Folsom family, Chief Nitakache, 
and Robert M. Jones, they asked that the Secretary of War and President be informed 
that those at the Academy were sent without their consent.  They requested that 
Armstrong and Jones visit the Academy and withdraw all Choctaw youths “who will 
not or cannot learn,” and send them elsewhere to learn “good and useful trades, so that 
the money of the Nation may not be expended in vain.”  Armstrong promptly acted, 
advising the Secretary of War that “I am clearly of the opinion that the expenses of 
those boys cannot, and should not be chargeable to the school fund of the nation; and 
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that the council is entirely correct in saying they do not consider the nation liable or 
their expenses.”  He continued to say “it is unjust to the Choctaws who have met the 
views of the Government, in removing here.”  Though Choctaw students continued to 
attend the Academy, it was clear that with the Choctaws asserting control over the 
Academy and Armstrong pushing for justice that the major changes would be needed at 
the Academy.
33
  
A year later in 1835, Armstrong reported that two of the three Choctaw districts 
refused to send any youths to the Choctaw Academy, and the other district only sent 
four.  After some prodding, the other districts complied and sent a small complement.  
Armstrong issued a stern warning to the War department that “my duty requires me to 
frankly state, that unless something is done, they will refuse before long to send their 
children at all, because they consider the promises and arrangements heretofore made, 
with Colonel Johnson, have not been complied with.”  Moreover, Armstrong warned 
Johnson and Henderson that they serve first and foremost at the pleasure of the 
Choctaws, and since “the boys that return from the Academy…continue to give such 
awful accounts of it, that it must fail unless an effort is made to conciliate these people.”  
Armstrong issued a final warning to the Secretary of War that “These people have their 
prejudices, and they have their rights; and there are very many among them who know 
them; and will not be neglected.”34  Choctaw demands for control and oversight over 
the Academy finally found success.       
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 Johnson realized the academy could only survive by placating Choctaw 
demands, whether by reforming educational opportunities, loosening student discipline, 
or manipulating officials.   Because Choctaws constantly complained that students 
returned from the school with little practical knowledge, Johnson instructed Henderson 
to shift the curriculum to include more vocational training, with a focus on 
blacksmithing, wagon making, clobbering, tailoring, large-scale farming, and hands-on 
training in local shops.  Afraid that some youths would resent the changes, Henderson 
and a board of inspectors proscribed favorable policies, including guarantees that no 
student will be forced to work in any shop or field and that they could quit at any time.  
To further sweeten the pot, they guaranteed that all of the net profits from Choctaw 
students’ labors would go to the students themselves, allowing them to leave school 
with both practical skills and a financial incentive to speak favorably of the school.
35
   
Johnson and other officials believed that they had turned a corner by 1837 and 
would receive the blessing of a new group of Choctaw inspectors led by Jones, Pierre 
Juzan, and George Harkins.  The cadre inspected the academy while en route to a treaty 
negotiation with the Chickasaws and U.S. officials in Washington, DC.  According to 
George W. Clarke, a teacher at the academy, these three former students were “three of 
the most popular men in the nation…and whenever they chose, a storm can be raised 
among their people…and they can raise a great prejudice.”  Clarke claimed that he 
believed Jones would file a favorable report, unless he was instructed “by the nation” to 
return with a list of new grievances.  He encouraged Johnson, who filled the office of 
Vice President at the time, to give special attention to the Choctaw cohort when they 
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arrived in Washington D.C.  Clarke counted on a special relationship between the 
former students and Johnson ensuring a favorable report; he encouraged Johnson that 
“with proper management, you can wrap them around your finger.”  Clarke’s 
assessment proved to be overly optimistic as Jones and his cohort completed their treaty 
in 1837 and returned with a middling report that endorsed relocating the school to the 
Choctaw Nation.
36
 
 While visiting the school, Jones undoubtedly conversed with Adam Nail, a 
paternal cousin, who entered the Academy in March, 1832 while his family was in the 
midst of removal.  Trouble arose with Nail shortly after Jones’ visit.  Like Jones before 
him, Nail epitomized everything that the purveyors of the Academy wanted in a model 
student.  He quickly acquired the basic skills offered to Native youths and desired to 
transfer to a medical school.  Despite receiving a letter of recommendation from 
Johnson, Nail lacked either funding or admission to an American medical school.  
Rather than give up on his dream, Nail remained at the Choctaw Academy in an 
apprenticeship role under acting physician Dr. H.T. Benedict.  To an extent, 
Henderson’s reports attempted to blend an appreciation for his Choctaw heritage and 
white education using Nail as an example.  For instance, Henderson frequently lauded 
“Dr. A. Nail’s contribution…to the success of our Botanic remedies, (for we use no 
others) and the fostering care and protection of the War department.  His equal for 
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probity, sobriety, and assiduous application to his duties…we have seldom if ever 
witnessed.”37   
 To the shock of Henderson and Johnson, Nail wrote several accounts in 1838 
attacking “the true state of the school” and advocating its relocation to the Choctaw 
Nation.  Nail clearly knew which buttons to push in order to undermine the Choctaw 
Academy’s position among American benevolent societies and government.  For 
instance, he attacked the lack of true Christian moral values instilled at the Academy by 
noting that “the Sabbath days are not kept, the students go where they please, go 
hunting (and last summer they went a swimming) ramble over the woods and very 
seldom go to church.”  In addition, he asserted that “we have a young man here who has 
been a drunkard for two years…and belches out profaneness to its greatest extent.”  As 
far as education, Nail apologized for “our ungrammatical sentences, we do not learn 
much here,” but also conceded that “we do not believe anybody knows” how much has 
been learned because they have not had a proper inspection for years.  Nail challenged 
officials to look into what each student knew before coming to the school and test to see 
how little has been learned.  In one letter, Nail attacked every part of the civilization 
program.  Rather than producing sober, Christianized, hard-working, future leaders, 
according to Nail, the Academy in its current state created the very thing that white 
civilization feared—drunken, ignorant, heathen “savages” who abhorred hard labor.38 
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 Given the complaints from Nail, several other students, and Choctaw authorities, 
by 1839 Johnson realized that he had lost all control over the academy to the Choctaw 
Nation in Indian Territory.  Despite taking in as much as $474,754.61 in total tuition 
and donations for the school, Johnson could not afford to have the Choctaws stop 
sending students.  At the behest of the General Council and agent William Armstrong, 
Johnson appointed a Choctaw to be the superintendent of the school.  Although Robert 
M. Jones was a possible candidate, Peter Pitchlynn accepted the position on the basis of 
temporary appointment.  Johnson attempted to bribe Pitchlynn by reducing teachers’ 
salaries to funnel the money in his direction and ordering him a suit in hopes that 
Pitchlynn would keep the school functioning on Johnson’s land.  Pitchlynn took the 
increased superintendent salary, but in 1841 at the request of the General Council still 
insisted that Choctaw Nation cease sending students as soon as a replacement academy 
could be constructed in Indian Territory.  It had taken fifteen years, but through 
numerous measures on the part of Choctaw students and Choctaw leaders, Choctaw 
education finally fell under the authority of the General Council.  In December of 1842, 
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the General Council voted to sever all ties with the Choctaw Academy in Kentucky and 
move all students to a school within their nation.
39
  
Though the Council had made great strides towards establishing schools in the 
1830s, during the 1840s they double-downed on their efforts in order to create a truly 
national system of education equal to, if not superior, to that in the American South.  
Peter Pitchlynn initiated drastic measures in 1842 to put this system in motion.  As 
speaker of the Council, he passed a series of wide-reaching legislation, starting with 
“An Act Respecting Public Schools,” which redefined the Choctaws’ relationships with 
their schools in several ways.  First, it called for the creation of six academy schools 
within the Nation, equally divided between the districts.  Far more inclusive than the 
Choctaw Academy, these public schools required at least one-tenth of the student body 
of each school to consist of Choctaw orphans and limited attendance to only one child 
per family so that the affluent families would not dominate the schools.  In addition to 
boarding schools, the Council appropriated varying sums for Sabbath schools and 
neighborhood schools.  Second, subsequent acts empowered the Council and Light 
Horsemen with varying levels of authority over students and teachers.  For instance, 
each district elected a trustee to manage allotted education funds and report to a 
Superintendent of Trustees for the General Council. The Light Horsemen also reported 
to the trustees and had the power to retrieve any student “under the school 
appropriation” that left without permission.  The Council had final approval over all 
school regulations and policies within the nation.  This bureaucratic system redefined 
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education as a national institution among Choctaws—not simply the realm of the select 
few—and reinforced the national political authority of the General Council.40   
The reform agenda also included allocating significantly more funding towards 
schools.  In 1837, a Choctaw delegation—including Robert M. Jones, Peter Pitchlynn, 
Thomas Leflore, Israel Folsom, and others—had agreed to allow the removed 
Chickasaws to form a district within the Choctaw Nation for the sum of $537,000 over 
twenty years.  In 1842, the Council voted to use annual interest from the treaty, 
$18,000, in addition to their existing annual $12,000 to pay for the expansion of the 
Choctaw school system.  The Council also reallocated the “Forty Youth Fund,” a trust 
which subsidized the education of up to forty outstanding Choctaw male and female 
students in universities throughout the U.S. after completing their primary education in 
the Choctaw Nation.  For instance, with this scholarship Joseph P. Folsom attended 
Dartmouth University, Dr. T.J. Bond studied medicine in Louisville and Philadelphia, 
and dozens of other Choctaws learned at schools in all regions of the United States.  
Several of the students who received the support of the “Forty Youth Fund” returned to 
the Choctaw Nation and became prominent leaders.
41
   
Initially, some local communities opposed this financial allocation towards 
schools.   Previously, these funds had been divided in gold per capita to families at the 
Choctaw agency in Skullyville. Though American Agent William Armstrong lauded 
this change “hailed with much joy by those who desire the improvement and happiness 
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of mankind,” some Choctaws citizens were reluctant to forfeit anticipated money to 
finance this system.  Citizens of the Apukshunnubbe District, the district with the 
highest interest in education, sanctioned this move by voting their representative Peter 
Pitchlynn out of office with a vote of 1100 to 100 in the next election.  After the new 
system had been implemented and Choctaws in each district became satisfied with its 
flexibility and their power to choose whether or not they preferred boarding schools or 
neighborhood schools, they resoundingly voted Pitchlynn back into office for the next 
term.  Although officially under the guise of the national government, local 
communities still exercised a fair amount of control over the nature of schools in their 
districts.
42
   
Over the next few years, all three districts accepted schools and school funding 
to various degrees.  The desire for the education of Choctaw youths seemed to dominate 
national concerns.  As one missionary observed, “Schools! Schools! Sound on the ear 
wherever I go.  Inquiries are often made—‘When can you give us a school teacher.”  
Demands for schools grew to such a degree that the General Council formed a standing 
committee, which frequently included such prominent Choctaws as Robert M. Jones, 
Pitchlynn, George Harkins, and Israel Folsom, to review each request and make 
recommendations to the Council for appropriations.  One neighborhood made an appeal 
to the Council by stating, “we are very poor, yet we want schools.”43  Under national 
control, schools increasingly became more egalitarian and no longer catered to only 
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affluent and powerful Choctaw families as the pre-removal schools and Choctaw 
Academy had done.  
In only a few short years after the devastation of removal, Choctaws 
successfully asserted their sovereignty over education by establishing, funding, and 
controlling the new neighborhood schools. Agent William Wilson reported that “The 
neighborhood schools have been doing well, though I have received reports from none 
of the teachers, as they are not under my control, and are mostly native Choctaws.”44  In 
addition to representing national institutions, the newly established neighborhood 
schools also reinforced national identity by teaching Choctaw literacy along with the 
English language.  Literacy flourished and as one missionary observed “The number of 
Choctaws who read their own language is constantly increasing, there is an urgent call 
for more books.”  Between 1835 and 1843 alone, Park Hill Press in Tahlequah, 
Cherokee Nation, published over 950,000 pages in the Choctaw language and the 
number steadily increased in the years to follow.  The books included a reader, a 
spelling book, a hymnal, and an almanac.  As Choctaw children learned to read and 
write in local schools often under the instruction of Choctaw teachers, their educational 
experience reinforced rather than degraded their identity as citizens of the Choctaw 
Nation.
45
 
In addition to neighborhood schools, the General Council opened several 
boarding schools.  To replace the Choctaw Academy, the Council authorized the 
creation of the Spencer Academy within the boundaries of the Choctaw Nation.  A 
constant advocate for education, Robert M. Jones played an instrumental role in the 
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creation of Spencer Academy.  Along with Peter Pitchlynn, Thompson McKenney, and 
William Armstrong, Jones served on a committee that planned and coordinated 
construction plans and operating procedures at Spencer and several other academy 
schools, including Fort Coffee, Wheelock, and Armstrong Academy.  Spencer’s main 
building, a large hall with a grand fire place and decorations, was named “Jones Hall” 
in honor of his work.  In subsequent years, Jones remained a key benefactor of Spencer 
Academy and numerous other schools by making donations and “favors” from his 
stores in Doaksville and Skullyville.  For instance, in 1846, Jones used his interest in 
“Berthelet, Heald, and Co.” to supply $3,000 worth of needed supplies, including new 
beds, when promised supplies and funds from the American Board of Commission for 
Foreign Missions failed to arrive.
46
 
After the prolonged struggle to move Choctaw Academy within the bounds of 
the Choctaw Nation, its replacement instantly became an important Choctaw national 
institution and source of praise from Choctaws and missionaries.  As one school official 
remarked, it “would do credit to any in the States” by those who attended it.  The 
General Council delegated the day-to-day duties to the Presbyterian Mission Board.  
Some Choctaws, including David Folsom’s son Jacob Folsom, feared that “white 
people have been cheating us a long time…the superintendent [of the Spencer 
Academy] may cheat us too, that is, they may not do their duty.”  The Council, 
however, had learned valuable lessons from the Choctaw Academy and diligently 
                                                 
46
 Joseph P. Folsom, Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation, 81; Carolyn Foreman, “New 
Hope Seminary, 1844-1897,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 22 (Fall 1944), 278;  Morrison, Schools for the 
Choctaws, 99.  Both as a citizen and businessman, Jones and companies provided various supplies to the 
various academies, including renting slaves and mules for needed labor.  “Abstracts of Disbursements 
made by William Armstrong, Acting Superintendent, for the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 quarters of 1844” Disbursements 
for Indians, February 17, 1845, 28
th
 Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1845) 21; Annual Report, 1847, 355. 
99 
 
audited Spencer’s progress.  For instance, in 1849, the Council held missionary 
Alexander Reid accountable for limited progress made by students in that year.  Reid 
confessed that the results had been disappointing and caused by disputes among 
teachers which had since been resolved by dismissing the superintendent and staff.  He 
begged for a chance to “one year longer” to “prove” themselves worthy.  The Council 
consented and Spencer prospered for the next decade.
 47
  
Choctaws increasingly collaborated with missionaries to provide education in 
the nation.  In some cases, missionaries transitioned from advocates of education to 
advocates of the Choctaw Nation in order to dispel racial constructions of “savagery” 
that pervaded white society during the antebellum period.  One missionary reported that 
“it is frequently asserted that, do what you will for an Indian, he will be an Indian still; 
the meaning of which, I presume, is, that his condition can never be improved—he will 
still continue the degraded being he always was.  Experience falsifies such groundless 
assertion.”  He went on to report that Choctaws had a higher capacity for literary 
acquirements than white children and follow equal moral behaviors.  While extoling the 
Choctaw National effort towards education, another missionary rhetorically jested 
“Where are the schools and Churches in Arkansas and Texas?”48 
From the Choctaw perspective, selectively embracing Christianity held 
numerous advantages.  First, highlighting Christian connections served as a sign that 
their nation was advancing the same way that dominant white civilization had 
advanced.  Peter Pitchlynn outlined this view when reporting on the Choctaw Academy.  
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He noted that “a majority of the scholars professed religion and very much inclined to 
be pious, and though I am no professor of religion, yet I rejoice to see the boys…of my 
own nation so devoted to piety and religion for I am with many others of opinion that in 
all stages of civilization it is necessary that the gospel should proceed in the general 
march.”  Similarly, a member of the education committee in the General Council 
expressed his gratitude that “the religious influence they [missionaries] have exercised 
has been felt by all the people living in the sections where they have located to a degree 
which has been totally salutary and beneficial.”49  For their part, most missionaries 
determined that encouraging education in the Choctaw language and intermixing 
education with other cultural practices could be the most humane and effective way to 
introduce Choctaws to Christianity.  In the post-removal nation, missionaries often 
made concerted efforts to adapt to aspects of Choctaw cultural practices and even help 
preserve them.  At the same time, they hoped that if they could connect Christian ritual 
to Choctaw tradition, piece-meal conversions would follow.  
Choctaws often took it upon themselves to selectively integrate which aspects of 
Christianity and education they found most beneficial into their existing cultural 
practices and communities. For instance, many Choctaws began to hold their own 
Sabbath schools and Sunday schools where older Choctaws often learned to read and 
write.  Naturally the most common available texts in the Choctaw language were 
biblical chapters and hymns.  In the Kiamichi valley, near Robert M. Jones’ Rose Hill 
home, educated Choctaw men and women held Sabbath schools with minimal funding, 
“supported wholly by the people themselves” and taught mostly in the Choctaw 
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language.  Cyrus Byington specifically praised two teachers who were “young ladies of 
about eighteen years of age, native Choctaws.  They conduct the schools, and deserve 
great credit for their ability and exertions on behalf of their people.  They speak the 
Choctaw language, and have the entire confidence of the nation.”  Peter Pitchlynn also 
lauded these programs for their profound impact on spreading literacy among the adult 
populations who lacked fluency and literacy in the English language.
50
  
Many students practiced a syncretic form of worship that simply integrated 
Christianity with traditional Choctaw beliefs and cultural practices.  As a result, the 
missionary-run boarding schools became centers of both cultural change and 
persistence.  Despite the common perception that missionaries coerced students and 
imposed white cultural norms upon pupils, Choctaws made schools indigenized spaces 
that reflected considerable cultural flexibility.  For instance, missionary Alexander Reid 
encouraged his students to take part in ball-playing game called Ishtaboli—a sacred, 
brutal, spiritual act most Americans associated with primitive, heathen practices and 
likened to drunkenness in its deleterious effects.  Reid recognized that attempting to ban 
these practices, would serve only to alienate him from the Choctaw population.  After 
the church services that he led, Choctaws who had attended the Christian worship then 
held dances and passed pipes.
51
  Some missionaries did not follow Reid’s lead and 
attempted to ban traditional Choctaw practices, which students actively resisted.  At 
New Hope, for instance, Choctaw girls regularly took to singing hymns “in the dead of 
night.”  When it turned into “a low chant, and one by one the sleeping children…arouse 
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and joined until all roared forth the old war whoop of their tribe,” the missionaries 
threatened to whip the students if they did not cease.  Even under threat, the girls 
refused to stop.
52
  This demonstrates that when educated by missionaries, Choctaw 
students exerted agency in schools even when threatened with harsh discipline.   
Choctaws also resisted attempts by missionaries to prohibit the Choctaw 
language.  One former student remembered that one teacher made children take a 
teaspoon of hot peppers if caught speaking Choctaw.  In the post-removal nation, 
however, most missionaries recognized the persistence and importance of the Choctaw 
language and embraced a more flexible approach.  Missionary P.P. Brown admitted that 
an English-only policy would “encourage trickey [sic], and foster a deceitful 
disposition” because students would speak in Choctaw “when an opportunity presented 
itself.”53  They instead decided to use primarily English in the classroom and provide 
specific times and places for students to converse in their native tongue.  Cyrus 
Byington adopted a similar tactic, admitting in his annual report to Congress that “we 
find it the easiest, and cheapest, and most effectual to give the genuine Choctaws useful 
knowledge, to employ their mother tongue” and that “those who have no opportunity to 
learn English we must present truth in a language they can hear, and which they love.”  
Cyrus Kingsbury explained in an 1842 report that the “books which have been 
published in Choctaw have been of much use…to the real Choctaws, and they are 
engaged in teaching each other, and for this purpose meet on the Sabbath, in places 
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where there is no missionary.”54  In the various types of schools throughout the 
Choctaw Nation, students continuously asserted their Choctaw identity and accepted 
education on their own terms. 
In addition to Christian instruction, gendered curriculum also became a 
significant feature of the expanding education system.  The education of young women, 
in particular, became a priority in the post-removal Choctaw Nation.  Israel Folsom 
perhaps most boisterously insisted that female education was a necessary step in 
advancing national interests.  Like Jones, he had received an advanced education, 
owned slaves, and converted to Christianity.  He embraced the “civilization” program, 
but also had faith in the Choctaw Nation.  He questioned in his frequent correspondence 
with Choctaw leaders “why have we neglected the girls so much and spent all our 
money only on boys.  What a great error we have committed.”  He further opined that 
young men who had received an education often abandoned other principles of 
civilization.  Or worse yet, they embraced the flaws of both white and Choctaw society 
and squandered the time and money that went into educating them.  To stop this trend, 
Folsom proposed that “if we have our girls educated, civilized, Christianized, 
enlightened...when they are grown...they will put a stamp on society and add character 
to our nation.”55  The General Council agreed and opened several schools for girls and 
young women, often near schools for young men.   
First, they opened the New Hope Seminary for young women at the location of 
an existing school, around one mile from the city of Skullyville and a few miles from 
the boys’ school at Fort Coffee Academy.  By 1843, an average of 102 girls per year 
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attended and boarded at New Hope, while an additional 74 received an education with 
their “expenses borne by their parents” for room and board.  Within the next few years, 
the Wheelock Female Boarding School, Chuwala Female Seminary, and Iyamnobi 
Female Seminary, began accepting students.  In addition to formal academies, local day 
schools for women flourished in each district.  Still, agent William Armstrong reported 
in 1845 that “the nation is in want of a female school for the larger girls…not owing to 
a want of disposition in the Indians to educate their children, but rather to a withdrawal 
of some who had arrived to woman hood.”56  As this desire grew, most Choctaw 
neighborhoods offered some form of education for young women. 
  Gender segregated schools served to instill new, restrictive gender roles onto 
Choctaw youths.  Christian teachers expected the female students at New Hope, for 
instance, to knit the clothing for themselves and the male students at Fort Coffee, while 
they expected the boys at Fort Coffee to grow a surplus of crops that would partially 
feed the girls at New Hope.  Missionaries and progressive Choctaw leaders believed 
that teaching young men to grow crops and teaching young women domestic work 
including knitting and sewing would further foster “civilization” among the Choctaws.  
These gendered patterns of labor, however, remained contested.  They defied traditional 
gendered labor practices, in which women performed agricultural duties.  Local families 
and some officials frequently disapproved of radically altering traditional labor norms 
in the national schools and pressured missionary and Choctaw teachers to limit the 
agricultural work done by men in favor of more mechanical and literary education.
57
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While the curriculum at the boarding schools attempted to mold females 
according to white, Christian gender norms, their intellectual training opened up new 
opportunities for women in the Choctaw Nation.  Female students learned the same 
academic subjects as male students and used the same textbooks, including Goodrich 
Readers, Ray’s Arithmetic, Kirkham’s prose or poetry lessons, Mitchell’s Geography, 
and, Noah Webster’s dictionary.58  Choctaw women demonstrated their advanced 
literary skills by becoming teachers in the national schools after graduation.  Both 
Lavina and Sophia Pitchlynn, daughters of Peter Pitchlynn, followed this path.  They 
took part in educating Robert M. Jones’ daughter Mary, among hundreds of others, at 
the Wheelock Academy.  Other graduates took advantage of the limited opportunities 
available to receive a formal college education in the United States.  Janie Austin, 
eventual wife of post-Civil War Principal Chief Jackson McCurtin, was selected as part 
of the Choctaws’ “youth in states college fund” to attend a school in Lewicklez, 
Pennsylvania, only to return as a teacher in several Choctaw schools.
59
  In taking on 
these teaching roles, Choctaw women played an active role in the Choctaw Nation’s 
education system and reinforced the idea that schools benefitted all citizens.  
As the national school system expanded, more and more schools fell under the 
direction of Choctaw teachers, further reinforcing Choctaw control of the system at all 
levels.  At a missionary school near Robert M. Jones’ Rose Hill plantation in Kiamichi, 
a missionary teacher reported that “reading, writing, and arithmetic, mostly in the 
Choctaw language, are taught in these schools” by Choctaws.  Indian Agent William 
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Armstrong also noted this phenomenon when describing the progress of Spencer 
Academy: “other teachers, as they may be required, will be engaged, and can be readily 
found among the Choctaws.”  Likewise, Cyrus Byington noted that most of the Sabbath 
schools are taught by Choctaw citizens, often to children and adults, without any 
missionaries or officials present.  The growing number of Choctaw teachers gave 
credence to the notion that education was a national institution and not merely an 
extension of the American “civilization” program.60   
Choctaws from diverse generations and backgrounds who desired access to 
education for themselves and their children participated in the expanding national 
school system.
61
  Despite the tendency to associate education with elite Choctaw 
“mixed bloods,” the education project was more democratic than exclusive when it 
came to racial bounds.  In other words, “full blood” and “mixed blood” categorization 
did not determine or reflect a proclivity or an aptitude for education.  Despite 
differentiating between “mixed-bloods” who “were Choctaws by name, not being 
distinguishable from the whites by either color or conversation” and “real Choctaws,” 
missionaries reported that less than half of their “mixed-blood” students began school 
with any understanding of the English language.  Other missionaries reported that 
“Indian [behavioral] features” were equal between “full-bloods” and those who had 
“skin that was almost white,” and that their student body consisted mostly of “full-
bloods.”  Another reported that the majority of the “mixed-blood” students who 
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enrolled in school did not speak any English and learned it no faster than more “full-
blood” Choctaws.62  “Mixed-blood” students’ inability to speak English despite 
potential connections to white parents shows a preservation of matrilineal social order 
in which Choctaw women and their kin served as primary caregivers.   
Likewise, numerous so-called “full-bloods” became Christian pastors and 
teachers in the Sabbath schools.  At Fort Coffee Mission, Reverend William Graham 
spoke of a “full-blood” student who had lived at the mission and genuinely converted to 
Christianity when he died of a heart condition.  Honoring his wishes, Reverend Graham 
constructed him a wooden casket and buried him using a traditional Methodist 
ceremony.  These examples contradict the narrow interpretation of “full bloods” as 
racially inferior and culturally backwards.  Not only does this problematize the blood-
based determinism advanced by American “civilization” program, it also shows how 
preservation and adaptation of Choctaw culture intersected and coincided, complicating 
the cultural dichotomy of “traditional” versus “progressives” and discredits the racial 
binary of “full blood” versus “mixed blood.”63   
The schools themselves were multi-cultural spaces where white missionaries, 
Choctaws of various racial backgrounds, and African American slaves shared daily 
interactions.  Missionaries to the Choctaws almost universally disapproved of slavery 
but due to labor shortages, they came to rely on slave labor.  In some cases, slaves they 
rented or purchased from local Choctaw slave-owners, including Peter Pitchlynn, 
George Harkins, and Robert M. Jones, for work at the missions.  These slaves often 
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spoke the Choctaw language and “were acquainted with their peculiarities” which 
proved particularly useful at schools where the staff had only a passing understanding 
of the Choctaw language and people.  At New Hope, for instance, a 40 year-old slave 
named “Aunt Betty” served as the primary interpreter between young girls and 
missionaries.  Missionary William Graham regarded her as the most important person at 
the entire mission because of her ability to mediate between white and Choctaw culture.  
Having slaves in schools helped instill notions of race and normalized the institution of 
slavery—both of which also became increasingly central to national Choctaw life 
during this period.
64
   
The national school system became a source of pride and a national education 
discourse became prominent in a plethora of documents and speeches given in the 
General Council.  One Choctaw representative gave a history of education within the 
nation, starting with the formation of Elliot Academy in 1819, as “new important era in 
the history of our nation.”  He lamented that the efforts taken before removal were 
limited to too few people to be of national benefit, and that “there are no public funds 
belonging to the Choctaws which we should prize more highly than our school funds, 
and none which we should watch over with greater care.”  Another recounted that 
Choctaws felt “a mighty change among us” stemming from the wide advances in 
education, literacy, fading of “dark superstitions,” and “superior knowledge which we 
have borrowed from the whiteman.”  Many other Choctaws made note of the “great 
movement in the nation” towards education and literacy which had taken hold “even 
among the most unenlightened and indolent.”  The Council’s Board of Trustees 
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declared that “the Choctaws now stand in first of all the nations of red people in point of 
wealth, religion, morals, temperance, and laws”—all stemming from their embrace of 
education.  They proudly espoused that “knowledge is growing and spreading rapidly in 
every portion of our land and my great desire is that we may direct and manage our own 
schools, in a manner that the time may soon arrive when every Choctaw shall enjoy the 
blessings of education.”65  This political discourse of education dominated the political 
arena and became a tool for asserting national political sovereignty.  Choctaws ability to 
govern their own national school system and oversee its continued success highlighted 
the power and cohesion of their nation.   
Along with schools, this rhetoric became an important part of Choctaw public 
culture.  For instance, in one poignant public address Peter Pitchlynn repeatedly asked 
the audience “do you love your country” and if so, “fill the schoolhouses up with 
children.  It is an evil that there are not enough of them in the nation.  If we love our 
country, we will establish more and better schools in our nation.”  He concluded that 
“the prosperity and happiness of mankind is solely dependent upon schools and literary 
institutions and that no nation can become prosperous without them.”  Another 
particularly powerful address given in the General Council succinctly summarizes the 
connections between the Choctaw school system and Choctaw nationalism.  Likely 
written by Robert M. Jones, the address concluded by calling on Choctaws to “establish 
among us something which when we look upon we can be proud of, that our children 
will point to in other days, to come, and say there I received my education.  Make relics 
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of our love for our country.  In this, let us unite; in this, let us be ambitious.”  He 
continued to warn that “ignorance is our greatest enemy.  It has made us weak, 
darkened all our way, and rendered us poor and miserable.”66  Schooling represented 
the future – a future in which a united and autonomous Choctaw Nation could not only 
protect its sovereignty but also be heralded as an advanced and progressive nation.    
Discussions of the national education did not only fill the National Council 
House, but also dominated other public meetings throughout the nation.  In September 
of 1848, Choctaw citizens held a district meeting in which they debated their current 
education policy.  Despite the national $30,000 appropriation, they lamented that not all 
children were able to attend schools.  Together, local chiefs, captains, and other leading 
men made speeches urging citizens to support local neighborhood schools wherever 
possible, ensure that children make full usage of their education, and exercise the 
“absolute necessity of industry” so that teachers could be paid and more schools 
opened.
67
  Schools themselves also became public gathering spaces and highlighted the 
success of the national education agenda.   
Final examinations, in particular, served as important public ceremonies that 
also served to reinforce a shared national Choctaw identity.  In local communities, 
crowds would gather to watch students demonstrate the knowledge and skills they 
learned during each term.  Family members, neighbors, school officials, and other 
observers took great pride in both the success of the students and the national school 
system as a whole and turned the events into celebratory feasts similar to traditional 
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Choctaw festivals.  For instance, each quarter, students from New Hope and Fort Coffee 
met at one of the schools, along with local families, for a large feast and entertainment.  
Teachers conducted regular examinations before the school community as well as local 
families, most of whom “did not have girls in the school” but came for the camaraderie 
and feasting.  As one observer noted,   “Then came dinner, all wanted—of beef, pork, 
cakes, pies, and coffee.  Examination is a great gala-day, when mind and body both 
expect to be feasted.”  Examinations caught the attention of visitors to the Choctaw 
Nation, including Captain M.M. Grant, a resident of Texas who had moved from 
Pennsylvania.   He commended the Choctaw schools stating, ‘I have often attended 
examinations of high schools and academies in my native States, but I have never seen 
one that excelled this.”68 These important events served as occasions to bring Choctaws 
together and to highlight the success of the schools.   
In addition to public meetings and ceremonies, growing literacy among 
Choctaws also reinforced a sense of shared national identity.  In 1849 and 1850, two 
different Choctaw newspapers began circulating in the nation.  Printed in both English 
and Choctaw, the Choctaw Telegraph and Choctaw Intelligencer highlighted the 
progress made by the Choctaws in achieving a national literacy in multiple languages.  
Jones partially sponsored these initiatives by heavily advertising his stores and other 
services like blacksmithing in both English and Choctaw.  Both newspapers were short-
lived, but in 1855 Robert M. Jones began gathering support for an additional Choctaw 
newspaper, claiming “we must have more light in our nation.”  Political drama halted 
Jones’ efforts, but Choctaw literacy continued to increase through the writing of poetry, 
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hymns, bookkeeping, and official Council business all thriving in both English and 
Choctaw languages.
69
   
The tremendous efforts on the part of the Choctaw people towards advancing 
education and literacy did not go unnoticed.  U.S. agents, travelers, missionaries, and 
other Natives Americans repeatedly lauded the Choctaws for their accomplishments.  
Choctaw agent William Armstrong reported upon hearing the plans for a new national 
academy that “the plan is their own; the expenditures are in their own country; and the 
whole under the control and observation of intelligence.”  Another agent noted that “the 
Choctaws, from what has been stated, enjoy advantages in obtaining an education equal 
to most of the citizens in the neighboring states.”  Another remarked that the Choctaws 
“have sufficient funds to educate a large portion of their people” and are “mindful…of 
educating the rising generation, and they have, by these means, added to the general 
intelligence and standing of their nation.” 70  Even other Native American polities 
recognized the Choctaws’ tremendous accomplishments towards educating their youths.  
Famous Cherokee Joseph Vann, an advocate of Cherokee education, went so far as to 
formally request permission to have his only son educated among the Choctaws at the 
Spencer Academy, citing its superiority to schools in the Cherokee Nation.
71
 
***** 
Jones must have watched the rise of the national Choctaw education system with 
great pleasure and sense of accomplishment.  On-and-off for thirty-years, he worked 
towards advancing education among the Choctaws.  He played an integral role in taking 
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control of the Choctaw Academy from the inside, and then moving it into the Choctaw 
Nation.  As a perennial member of the General Council and Board of Trustees, he 
frequently audited schools and reported back to the Council with his findings.  He took 
pride in the national schools and constantly looked for new ways to secure funding. 
Privately, he provided funds for promising young-adults to get specialized training in 
American schools.  Though he had the money to send his children to any school in the 
United States, he chose to send them to Choctaw schools.   
Jones believed in the centrality of education to Choctaw National life and to the 
future of the Choctaw Nation.  Rather than simply being subjected to education as a tool 
of American colonialism, Jones and other Choctaws flipped “civilization” policy on its 
head and used it to their own advantage.  By forming a national education system and 
exercising careful control over neighborhood schools and missionary schools, Choctaw 
National officials asserted their indigenous sovereignty.  Building on the early attempts 
at education in the pre-removal period, Choctaws used education to redefine the Nation 
after the removal crisis and its national system continued to thrive for the remainder of 
the nineteenth-century.
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CHAPTER 3: “RISE TO EMINENCE”: EXCHANGE AND EXPLOITATION 
IN A RICH INDIAN NATION 
Discussions of commerce, property, and slavery within the Choctaw Nation 
naturally begin and end with Robert M. Jones.  He had been born into a family with 
several acres of improved land, but no exceptional amount of accumulated material 
wealth.  Yet, even before removal, at age nineteen, Jones had taken the skills he learned 
at the Choctaw Academy and put them to use, opening a store for Choctaws and settlers 
in Mississippi.  He courted and married a young woman named Judith Walker, quite 
possibly for her political and financial connections.  The “mixed-blood” daughter of 
Mary Riddle and John Walker, she had familial connections to prominent Choctaw 
chiefs like Mushulatubbee and Pushmataha, and financial connections to the 
surrounding American markets.  Jones and Walker married in December of 1830 in 
Green County, Alabama, near an area known as “Jones Bluff” named for Jones’ 
relatives.  Their marriage produced three children, all of whom died in infancy.
1
 
 Jones used the money that he made from land and improvements in Mississippi 
to purchase slaves that he knew would be needed to build a home and livelihood in 
Indian Territory.  These slaves accompanied him during removal and helped clear the 
land used for his plantations along the Red River basin.  He rented out some of these 
slaves to the federal government to assist in removal, while he took a contract as a 
translator.  Then he reinvested his profits in new slaves, eventually amassing between 
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250 and 500.
2
  Some of these slaves travelled with Jones along the Trail of Tears, while 
others he purchased from the slave markets in New Orleans. Others still, had been 
previously enslaved by Native Americans, including Chickasaws, Creeks, and 
Cherokees.  They toiled for Jones under the supervision of white overseers, planting 
cotton, corn, and other staple crops and raising livestock.
3
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Jones also opened as many as twenty-six trading posts throughout the Choctaw 
Nation and Southwest.  He partnered with American and French-Canadian investors 
who provided additional capital while he used political connections to secure his 
companies a large portion of the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade.  His steamboats 
transported his cotton and passengers around the United States where his agents traded 
his crops for various goods and additional slaves.  By 1840, he annually imported over 
$10,000 worth of goods while exporting nearly 1,000 pounds of his own cotton.  After 
his wife Judith died in September of 1836, possibly from smallpox, he married a 
Chickasaw woman named Susan Colbert in 1838.  A daughter of a Chickasaw Chief 
and trader Pittman Colbert, Susan brought her own wealth to the marriage.  Their 
marriage proved an advantageous pairing for both partners.  Susan used an attorney to 
get personal permission from President Andrew Jackson to sell land she was entitled to 
in the old Chickasaw Nation and join her new husband in the Choctaw Nation, along 
with an untold number of her own slaves.
4
   
Contemporaries and historians acknowledge that Jones was among the richest 
men in the Southwest.  While Jones’ exact level of affluence is difficult to determine 
because the Choctaws had only a limited system of taxation and sporadic censuses, he 
certainly fell squarely within the South’s planter class and classified by contemporaries 
as a millionaire—no small feat for his time.  On one occasion, the United States agents 
in Old Mayhew ran out of gold for annuity payment and borrowed $7,000 from Jones 
He used his growing fortune to construct multiple mansions in both the Choctaw Nation 
and Texas.  One mansion was on a 4,000 acre plantation called Lake West.  When the 
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“miasma” and malarial mosquitos from the nearby lake became a problem, he 
constructed an additional mansion for spring and summer named Rose Hill, near Hugo, 
Oklahoma, along the military road from Fort Towson into North Texas.  This elaborate 
two-story mansion included imported furniture, large portraits and paintings, marble 
steps, fine china, multiple fireplaces, “beautiful piano,” large portraits, and a secret 
staircase.
5
    
***** 
Some historians have asserted that Jones’ affluence, commercial connections, 
and slaveholding disqualify him from a Native identity.  They assert that his “mixed-
blood” combined with his economic endeavors, isolated him from Choctaw society.  
Attacks on Jones’ identity are indicative of a larger problem of understanding material 
wealth, slaveholding, and commercial ethos as uncharacteristic of Indian identity.  To 
some contemporary witnesses and historians, only those who returned to “traditional” 
ways and resisted change following removal remained Choctaws.  Others assert that 
Jones and other affluent “mixed blood” Choctaws became “more white than Choctaw” 
and thus are not representative a true Choctaw identity.
6
  As Alexandra Harmon argues 
in Rich Indians, “Historians’ neglect of prosperous Indians may be due in part to a 
common assumption that the self-interested pursuit and retention of wealth was not an 
indigenous value.”  In other words, wealthy Indians like Jones defy expectations of 
indigenous behavior that seem antithetical to the discourse of settler colonialism. Phil 
Deloria argues, however, “Expectations and anomalies are mutually constitutive – they 
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make each other.  To assert that a person or an event is anomalous cannot help but serve 
to create and reinforce other expectations.”7 We must shift the framework to look at the 
unexpected but altogether frequent ways in which Native Americans, including Jones 
seem to defy stereotypes of indigenous behaviors, while consistently asserting an 
indigenous identity.   
Robert M. Jones is a particularly useful case study for doing so because as 
Harmon suggests, “As presumed rarities and anomalies, prosperous Indians have defied 
expectations” but as she conclusively demonstrates, Indians have been acquiring wealth 
since the colonial period and have continued to do so into the twenty-first century.  
Jones, however, cannot simply be viewed as an individual example of “rich Indians” 
that have emerged over centuries.  Instead, he is representative of a rich Indian Nation.  
According to Harmon, “In the 1830s, when Jackson finally realized his dream of 
evicting Cherokees and other Indians from the South, American nationalists triumphed 
over tribal nationalists.  However, both species of nationalism grew from and nourished 
economic ambitions…the banishment of Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Creeks was a 
response to competition between peoples with comparable economic agendas and 
comparable enterprising classes.”8  After removal, Choctaw Nationalists continued to 
compete with Americans for wealth and resources as they pursued enterprising 
economic activities.  The Choctaw Nation continued to creatively adapt within the 
expanding American nation-state, and grew to an even more prosperous status than 
before removal.  Like in the American nation, this pursuit of economic gain resulted in 
cultural change with increasing ties to the burgeoning market economy, increased 
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stratification and conflict between socio-economic classes, and the exploitation of slave 
labor.  This chapter explores these economic changes in the post-removal Choctaw 
Nation to highlight the ways in which its members simultaneously defied expectations 
of indigenous behavior while reinforcing their status as members of a prosperous, 
“civilized” Indian Nation.   It also examines the effect of these national economic 
changes on the various strata of Choctaw society, including those who continued more 
traditional subsistence activities and African American slaves whose labor drove the 
economy. 
Prior to removal, Choctaws of various backgrounds developed a reliance upon 
commercial goods.  An ability to consistently procure outside trade goods augmented 
chiefly power and emerged as a new path to tribal prominence.  This trend accelerated 
in the post-removal period.  Men such as Thomas Leflore, Robert M. Jones, and Peter 
Pitchlynn used their business and political acumen and connections with the market 
economy to accumulate wealth and control over commerce.  While these men engaged 
in large-scale farming, many other Choctaws also transitioned from subsistence-based 
to market-based farming.  They continued to grow corn, but also incorporated wheat 
and cotton, which could translate into substantial market value.  Learning the lessons of 
the pre-removal period, the Choctaws attempted to guard access to Choctaw commerce 
by carefully prohibiting unlicensed traders and intruders.  The General Council began to 
exercise control over the affairs private citizens and intervene on matters formerly 
regulated by the kinship system.  Matters of crime, intemperance, property, slavery, and 
trade-rights transitioned from the purview of clan-based and chiefly authority to the 
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General Council’s authority.  In this process, expanding and regulating commerce 
became a national project and legitimized new sources of national power and authority.  
Access to markets became a central concern for many Choctaws immediately 
after removal.  During the 1830s, the United States was in the midst of a transportation 
revolution that facilitated the growing market economy by ensuring the flow of raw 
materials, trade goods, and capital.  By connecting formerly disparate regions of the 
United States, the new and improved means of transportation greased the wheels of 
industry, made production significantly cheaper and connected people across the nation 
to distant markets.  Even before removal, the Choctaw economy had been affected by 
this revolution as state and national roads, including the Natchez Trace and other paths 
running through Choctaw lands in Mississippi, connected the East to the West.  Robert 
M. Jones and others capitalized on this by placing trading posts around these paths in 
Mississippi.  In addition to cleared roads, steamships and canals allowed freight to 
travel longer distances for significantly reduced costs.  As early as 1811, a Fulton 
steamship was able to travel from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to New Orleans using only 
the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, opening the possibility of Westward expansion.  
Trains further accelerated this phenomenon.  The transportation revolution played a 
critical role in sparking Choctaw commercial interests in the post-removal period.
9
   
When the Choctaws arrived in Indian Territory, citizens of Arkansas and Texas 
(then part of a Mexican state) had been engaged in a struggle to maximize settlement in 
the richest lands around the Red River.  These locales offered prime land for cotton 
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production, but steamships had no way of accessing the area to take cotton to eastern 
markets.  “The Great Raft of the Red River,” a natural, 165 mile logjam caused seasonal 
flooding and obstructed river traffic past Shreveport, Louisiana.  In many places a 
person could cross the river on horseback or cross from one shore to the other without 
realizing water ran below them.  In 1824, the United States constructed Fort Towson at 
the mouth of the Red and Kiamichi Rivers, then at the border of the United States, 
Mexico, and Comanche empire.  Removing the raft became a priority when supplies 
could not reach the newly built fort.  Answering the pleas of Arkansas land speculators 
and their own strategic needs, the United States dispatched Winfield Scott and twenty-
five men to clear the Great Raft, only to quickly realize that the task would be 
impossible without a much larger and long-term commitment.
10
 
Choctaws arrived in their new territory reliant upon commerce, especially in 
early years when corn was sparse and disease rampant.  Since establishing trade paths 
was a national priority, prominent Choctaws latched onto ongoing efforts to clear the 
Great Raft and construct new trade paths.  To this end, Choctaws joined petitioners 
from Arkansas to clear the Great Raft and construct reliable roads in the name of 
national improvement.  Following Texas’ independence and annexation, Choctaws 
joined Texas societies like “The Raft Convention” aimed at keeping the river path clear.  
This mixed society called on the United States to honor its treaty obligations, reminding 
Congress of their promise that Choctaws should be “protected in their new home” and 
that free traffic of the Red River would be needed for troops and supplies.  
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Subsequently, the Raft was mostly navigable by the late 1830s and by 1849 a United 
States agent bragged that ships could reach 100 miles past False Washita River.
11
     
In addition to river commerce, the General Council passed ordinances 
prohibiting the blockage of public roads and used the military roads connecting them to 
Arkansas and Texas as trade routes.  In 1854, they mandated that all free males between 
18 and 50 years old, including U.S. citizens living in the Choctaw Nation, were required 
to spend six days a year working on road maintenance.
12
  Robert M. Jones offered 
editorials for American newspapers advocating the necessity of spreading railroads, 
which would connect the Southwest to the Mississippi River, and was interviewed by 
the Danville Times, a Virginia newspaper, about a possible El Paso road.  In a solicited 
op-ed to the Clarksville Standard, Jones exclaimed that “I verily believe the period has 
arrived when upper Red River men should arise from their lethargy and unite in 
sentiment, energy, and pursue, and ensure the rapid construction of the…Red River Rail 
Road.”  Regular steamboat commerce commenced along the Red River, trade paths 
remained open and viable, and talk of connecting railroads circulated throughout the 
Southwest.  Though these efforts involved leveraging outsiders, improving commercial 
networks served as a national improvement.
13
 
Clearing the channel of the Red River for reliable steamboat access and the clear 
path between Fort Towson and north Texas instantly increased the value of land north 
and south of the Red River.  Whereas in 1833 there was no settlement on the Red 
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River—called the “stream of death” by Choctaws for its association with disease—in 
1839, a war department official described “many flourishing cotton plantations on the 
part of the river where the raft was located.”14  Jones was among those who had moved 
away from Fort Coffee towards Pheasant Bluff on the Red River by 1837, along with 
his cousin John Riddle, “Widow” Coleman, and Nathaniel Folsom, for the potential 
commercial wealth.  He reportedly constructed a double-log cabin of hewn logs which 
he occupied as a store, along with his wife Susan.  In their first year, they imported at 
least $20,000 worth of goods and began their own cotton plantation.
15
   
 Once trade routes had been secured, regulating trade became a national priority 
for the General Council.  Upon arriving in Indian Territory in 1832, several Choctaw 
leaders attempted to reorganize the Choctaw.  They delayed until 1834 on the advice of 
agent William Armstrong, who noted that their government required the consent of the 
people, the majority of whom had not yet settled.  Moreover, after enduring a traumatic 
and violent removal and aforementioned struggles merely to survive, forming a 
constitutional government was not a top priority.  Nonetheless, by 1834 the Choctaws 
passed a new constitution and by 1840 published all of their laws in English and 
Choctaw, which represented the first constitution and published laws in Oklahoma.
16
 
In 1834, then again in 1838 and 1842, the Choctaws based their constitutions on 
compromises between factions wanting to preserve traditional practices and factions 
desiring to mirror facets of surrounding states and territory.  Concerns regarding proper 
authority over trade, property, and everyday life drove the disputes.  Peter Pitchlynn 
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characterized the results as “constitutions hached [sic] up by party spirit” but “is 
however one which I am satisfied with.”  The new constitution protected chiefly power 
on the local level while recognizing the overarching legislative powers of the popularly-
elected General Council.
17
  It also re-established separate districts—named for past 
chiefs Apuckshunubbee, Pushmataha, and Mushulatubbee—while guaranteeing equal 
rights and access to all citizens in each districts.  The Constitution of 1834 also gave the 
Council the power to pass laws pertaining to all districts with very limited veto power 
from district chiefs.  Choctaws like Jones, many of whom had been educated at 
Choctaw Academy and believed it necessary to encourage controlled commerce within 
the nation, often enjoyed disproportionate representation in the governing body.
18
 
 Members of the General Council used their powers to selectively protect private 
property and expand both personal and national commercial opportunities.  Though 
some of the Council’s actions were clearly self-serving and aimed to line members’ 
pockets, they also served to consolidate and protect the post-removal nation.  While 
confirming previous protections against trespassing on improved lands, they specified 
that no “person’s property be taken or applied to public use, unless just compensation 
be made therefore.”  To further incentivize private property, they ruled that an 
individual cannot make a claim for damages to livestock or their property from 
another’s livestock, unless they have erected a working fence of at least ten good rails.19 
Choctaws had to report stray livestock to a local captain, a chief, or a judge who, failing 
to find an owner, would arrange for an announced auction to the highest bidder.  The 
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proceeds then benefited the district holding the auction.  Any disputes over property 
ownership resulted in seizure by the Light Horsemen until a Choctaw judge and jury 
could determine rightful ownership.  This system of cattle ownership continued to 
evolve until an 1856 law required Choctaws to register brands to establish ownership 
claims.  These initial steps towards protecting private property marked critical attempts 
to stimulate commercial activity within the Choctaw Nation.  Without the assurance that 
their property would be protected, Choctaws had little incentive to raise marketable 
commodities.
20
 
Because personal debts to foreign traders over commodities had been a problem 
in the past, the Council also specified that the debts of individual Choctaws were not 
national debts and that national funds would not be used to pay personal debts, 
regardless of the debtor.  To protect individuals from debtors, the Constitutional 
Declaration of Rights specified that “no person shall ever be imprisoned for debt.”  One 
United States agent noted that with this system, “there is no enforcement on the 
collection of debts, and whatever trading done on credit rests upon the honor of the 
debtor.”  Even after a Choctaw died, their family was entitled to keep two horses, two 
cows and calves, all household furniture, and farming utensils regardless of the 
deceased’s financial obligations.  To collect his debts, Jones regularly placed 
advertisements in local newspapers encouraging those owing money to his firm to make 
arrangements for settlement, “either in cash, corn, cotton, or in any way most 
convenient to themselves.”  It is unknown if this worked, but the paper itself went out of 
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business owing to unpaid debts from subscribers.  By 1860, the Council put a system 
for debt collection into place, but it was stalled by the outbreak of the Civil War.
21
  
Debts and property ownership remained problematic issues when individual 
Choctaws died.  The General Council repeatedly outlined and refined the probate 
process starting in 1834 when they passed a law confirming that “all wills made either 
verbally or written in the presence of two witnesses shall be valid.”  Each subsequent 
Council passed laws refining the probate process, establishing courts to handle probate 
cases, dictating ownership in the absence of a will, and setting stiff punishments for 
fraudulent wills.  In 1846, as the courts decided an estate valued at $20,000, agent 
William Armstrong described the courts as “regularly organized, with judges and juries, 
and the suits are conducted on both sides by professional advocates, of which there is a 
large number.”  Despite this system, probate issues remained a constant problem when 
multiple parties frequently claiming ownership over property.  With this in mind, 
Choctaws like Jones attempted to keep diligent financial records.  For instance, when 
Jones heard that Peter Pitchlynn had stated that Jones owed him money, he immediately 
sent Pitchlynn a statement showing that the debt “was on the other foot”…“so that if 
you were to die…you wouldn’t deceive your ancestors into thinking” that Jones owed 
them money.  One of Pitchlynn’s children even once begged him to manumit all of his 
slaves so that the children would not fight over them after his death.
 22
 
The Council’s involvement in codifying private property and inheritance had 
implications towards gender roles within the Choctaw Nation.  Traditionally, since 
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women worked the land, they had control over its valued improvements.  This position 
gave them protections within marriages, child-rearing, and divorce.  New property laws, 
which coincided with spreading beliefs in patriarchy weakened Choctaw women’s legal 
powers.  Male heads of households received annuity disbursements.  Divorces, once 
informal, resulted in a $10 fine and required reunion if no sufficient cause could be 
demonstrated before a court of male judges.  Stealing another man’s wife and polygamy 
were also outlawed and made punishable by fines and lashes against the bare back.  Yet, 
the Council also took steps to protect certain traditional powers held by women.  For 
instance, women maintained control over any property that they brought into the 
marriage and equal access to property obtained during the marriage.  When Robert M. 
Jones married Susan Colbert, legally she maintained ownership over her slaves and 
after emancipation they chose to take her name. These changes selectively revealed a 
changing power structure in the Choctaw Nation.
23
      
Thus, the major impetus for changes in property law was less an intentional 
attempt to diminish women’s power and more a consequence of attempts to prevent 
white men from leaching onto Choctaw communal land resources by cohabitating with 
Choctaw women.  To thwart this practice, the General Council passed a law requiring 
that all white men living with Choctaw women marry them and that the marriage be 
performed by a civil or religious official to prevent marriage to a corrupt man.  Later, 
the Council amended this measure so that any white man wanting to marry a Choctaw 
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woman had to become a Choctaw citizen at least two years prior.  For the purpose of 
limiting the power of white men within the marriage, the law confirmed that women 
maintained control over their property throughout the marriage and that it could not be 
disposed of “contrary to her consent.”  Punishment for white men guilty of this offense 
included loss of citizenship and banishment.  For example, the Council expelled John 
Johnston, a white man from Texas, in 1854 and his property passed to his Choctaw 
children.
24
  When he attempted to return to the Choctaw Nation, the Council used U.S. 
Agent Douglas Cooper to have him permanently removed. 
Though land remained communal, politically-connected Choctaws made strides 
to assist those wanting to develop the best available lands for market resources.  In 
1842, for example, Robert M. Jones introduced and passed a law specifying that no 
citizen could make a claim on land within 440 yards of another citizen without 
expressed permission from the original holder.  Traditionally, any land not under 
cultivation was available to any citizen who would improve it.  This statute clearly 
aimed to give Jones and others buffer space to build-up large plantations so they could 
continue to grow as their finances increased.
25
  As an added incentive, the 1837 
constitution indicated that “any citizen of this Nation who may find any mine or mines 
or mineral water, shall have exclusive right and privilege so long as he may choose to 
work the same, within one mile in any direction from his work or improvement.”  These 
statutes were in the same vein as an 1839 law which declared that no citizen could open 
a river ferry within one mile of another ferry, granting exclusive rights for anyone with 
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the resources to construct a ferry.  Similarly, the Council granted multiple citizens the 
right to construct toll bridges across various rivers on the basis that the Council set the 
toll and Choctaw citizens receive free access when low water prevented river travel.
26
   
As if Choctaws did not have enough incentive to cultivate the land and enter the 
markets, subsequent constitutions starting with the Constitution of1837 stated that “no 
citizen of this Nation shall ever be required to pay poll tax or be required taxation for 
any property or for any pursuit of business whatever.”   The one exception was that “all 
merchants, both citizens of the Choctaw Nation and United States, trading in this nation, 
shall be required to pay a tax annually…of one-quarter of one percent of the amount of 
their capitals on each year’s purchase.”  Fittingly, the Council put the entire revenue 
from this tax towards suppressing the whiskey trade sparked by neighboring 
merchants.
27
  Aside from this, the Council was content to survive financially upon 
annuity payments remaining from previous treaties with the United States and interest 
from the sum paid by the Chickasaws for Choctaw land.  Not to mention that taxing 
improved property required a full census, something “entirely failed at” both by Agent 
William Armstrong in 1847 and the Council from 1849-1860.  Whereas the Council 
charged U.S. traders a tax for trading in the Choctaw Nation, Choctaw traders shipped 
their crops into the United States for no cost.  When a U.S. internal revenue officer 
demanded and received a total of $12,225.50 for two massive shipments of cotton 
grown by Robert M. Jones and shipped to Shreveport, Jones protested through his 
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American connections and received a full refund as the cotton clearly contained his 
“FL” brand.28 
With these constitutional and legislative provisions, citizens like Robert M. 
Jones, David Folsom, Peter Pitchlynn, Thomas Leflore, and many others had free reign 
to expand their commercial activities.  This not only worked towards their own financial 
gain but also benefited the nation as a whole.  Jacob Folsom, nephew to Peter Pitchlynn, 
summed up this dual advantage when he advocated establishing a water-powered 
spinning and carding machine.  Folsom argued that “we have been depending upon 
(foreign) merchants long enough” and that domestic manufacturing is a “strong 
proponent of a nation and therefore we ought to encourage it.”  While lauding this plan 
as a way for his “country to rise to eminence,” he also noted that whoever built and ran 
this machine would make a reasonable income.  David Folsom also encouraged 
commerce for both national and personal gain when he took full advantage of this 
mineral rights provision to claim salt mines near the Blue River.  Folsom accumulated 
over 1,000 bushels of salt which he sold in Jones’ stores and traded at foreign markets.  
Though this augmented Folsom’s wealth, it also assisted Choctaws who needed a 
reliable source of salt for ranching and a reasonable price.
29
    
In addition to incentivizing commerce, the Council and Choctaw entrepreneurs 
sought to carefully regulate trade within the Choctaw Nation to protect citizens from 
exploitative merchants.  For instance, after several Choctaws accused the trading firm of 
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Pickett and Gregg of short-changing customers on the price and weight of skins and 
gouging on the prices of sugar and blankets from 1832-1836, Robert M. Jones requested 
that the General Council investigate.  It was also alleged that Mr. Gregg attempted to 
manipulate the Council into giving his firm a monopoly over Choctaw trade.  In a 
subsequent hearing, Choctaw agent William Armstrong and Thompson McKinney 
interrogated Mr. Gregg about the accusations, while an auditor examined his account 
books.  When asked to testify, Jones admitted to having financial connections with both 
Pickett and Gregg, which stemmed from his paid position as a United States interpreter, 
as well as various commercial exchanges valued at several thousand dollars.  This, 
however, failed to buy Jones’ fealty.  When Gregg attempted to use Jones as a character 
witness, Jones stated that “I have used my influence to have you put out [of the nation] 
in consequence of the many complaints of frauds practiced upon Indians by you.”  
Gregg countered that Jones was simply trying to eliminate him as competition for his 
own trading ventures.  While the Council considered their relations with Pickett and 
Gregg, Jones recruited Joseph R. Berthelet, a French-Canadian with a reputation for fair 
trade with Native Americans, to take their place.  Berthelet aligned with fellow trader 
John Hobard Heald to form Berthelet, Heald, and Company, with Robert M. Jones 
acting as the company.
30
  For the next thirty-years, Jones and these new partners 
constructed the largest trading networks in the Choctaw Nation.    
With this move, the Council took commerce out of the hands of a possibly-
backward outsider and placed it in control of a Choctaw Nationalist.  Simultaneously, 
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the Council also worked diligently to ensure that affluent Choctaws did not cheat their 
fellow citizens.  Wealthy Choctaw businessmen, including Robert M. Jones became the 
targets of Choctaw National regulation.  After suspicions arose concerning Jones’ 
business practices, Armstrong sent covert representatives to a store under the auspices 
of obtaining yards of fabric and basic items for slaves.  When he found that he had been 
shorted on the length, he reported to the Council and threatened to revoke Jones’ license 
(by revoking Berthelet and Heald’s license).  Jones acknowledged the censure—
blaming a faulty yardstick—and made good on his word to keep trade fair.  William 
Goode, Superintendent of the Fort Coffee Academy, claimed that Jones and company 
“supplied the natives with goods of good quality and at fair rates, scorning to deceive or 
take advantage of their ignorance; a great contrast with the character of most Indian 
traders.  Here were no conspiracies between agents and traders to defraud the Indians; 
no licentious examples to debauch them.”31  At no other time on record did Jones raise 
accusations of fraud.  Berthelet remained in the Choctaw Nation where he also served 
as postmaster in the city of Doaksville, while Heald left the nation in 1848 to work as an 
agent for Jones and others in New Orleans.  Jones remained as the point man of the 
business and fellow Choctaws appreciated his services.
32 
 Jones’ company opened shops in every district of the Choctaw Nation.  He had 
stores in Skullyville, Doaksville, Lukfata, Boggy Depot, Eagletown, Fort Towson, 
Pheasant Bluff, and various other strategically-viable locations.  He and his partners 
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attracted a wide array of customers.  Travelers through Indian country regularly wrote 
about making purchases from Jones, including parties of Delawares, American 
adventurers, agents, and missionaries.
33
  Jones placed occasional advertisements in 
North Texas newspapers informing readers of specific goods and directions to cross the 
Red River.  He offered an accommodating payment system for various clients, 
including peltries, furs, cotton, or cash.  Samuel Rutherford, a temporary Indian agent 
after Armstrong’s death in 1847, lauded this system as a way of having individual 
Native Americans from various tribes sell their produce, be it corn, tallow, or cotton, for 
trade goods and be further encouraged to engage in commercial development.
34 
Primarily, Jones and his partners worked for the business and benefit of 
Choctaws and Chickasaws.  For recent graduates of Choctaw schools, Jones’ shops and 
others offered an opportunity for employment as a clerk or blacksmith.  He advertised 
extensively in the Choctaw and Chickasaw newspapers, including the short-lived 
Choctaw Telegraph, Choctaw Intelligencer, and Chickasaw Intelligencer.  His goods, 
imported from New Orleans and New York included a plethora of both practical and 
comfort items.  Jones’ “Red Store” in Doaksville, frequently promoted basic hardware 
staples like farm implements, rope, twine, nails, and axes as well as grocery items like 
brown sugar, molasses, salt, pepper, beef, vinegar, and teas were always in stock in 
“speechless quantities” for “low rates.”  Flour, taken from Choctaw mills, was said to 
be of a higher quality and less expensive than any in New Orleans.  Additionally, Jones 
regularly advertised luxury items including fine china, multiple colored blankets, 
                                                 
33
 “Journal of Elijah Hicks,” Chronicles of Oklahoma, 13 (Spring 1935), 69; Carolyn Thomas 
Foreman, “‘Black Beaver: Brother Black Beaver…Who is One of God’s Noblemen, Honest and 
Truthful,’” Chronicles of Oklahoma, 24 (Fall 1946), 275. 
34
 Annual Report, 1847, 880; “$100 Reward,” Northern Standard, December 21, 1846;  
134 
 
fashionable Hungarian and Mexican hats, hosiery, gloves, cassimere, denim jeans, and 
cigars.  An archeological excavation later confirmed that any good imported into New 
Orleans, including extravagances from around the world, had potential to show up in 
Choctaw stores.  It is likely that only a select few purchased these luxury items.  Peter 
Pitchlynn frequently racked up considerable debts purchasing such goods as tea saucers, 
which he struggled to repay.  While less affluent Choctaws did not buy these items in 
bulk, many acquired a few luxury goods over their lifetime.  For instance, missionary 
Cyrus Byington reported several traditional Choctaws owning expensive commodities, 
including pure silver spoons that likely came from these stores.  Several competing 
stores, including one owned by Jones’ father-in-law Pittman Colbert, carried similar 
items and encouraged customers to shop for the best prices and rates of trade.
35
   
By the mid-1840s, contemporary observers noticed a marked increase in the 
number of Choctaws engaging in a market-based life as both producers and consumers.  
Missionary Ebinzer Hotckin praised the “a strong desire…to live better—to have better 
houses, clothes, and above all, to have their children at school.”  Another echoed 
Hotchkin’s admiration of Choctaws’ desire to “seek hired labor” after working their 
own crops led to vast improvements in “their dwellings, farms, fences, tolls, and 
garments, as well as their stock in cattle, horses, swine, sheep, and poultry.”  In his first 
year among the Choctaws, missionary Jason Chamberlain marveled, “I have been able 
to buy corn of them, delivered at my house, cheaper than I can raise it.  The various 
products of soil and labor they gladly sell us.  During their leisure they chop fire-
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wood…at a given price per cord.”  He applauded how their work “is always performed 
in a faithful, business-like manner.”  Available records from stores in local towns also 
attest that Choctaws frequently used their income to purchase consumer goods.  The 
books of merchant John Kingsbury, son of missionary Cyrus Kingsbury, are filled with 
purchase records made by Choctaws, suggesting an active involvement in all stages of 
the commercial market.
36
     
 When acting as commercial producers, Choctaws carefully monitored the ebb 
and flow of market variables.  For instance, increases in the market prices for beef 
caused many Choctaws to raise larger herds that could be culled and sent to foreign 
markets.  When cotton prices dipped, more Choctaws grew wheat that could be sent to 
local mills and sold as flour.  They also recognized the importance of location and 
scarcity in pricing their products.  For instance, traders traveling towards or coming 
from Oregon encountered corn prices of $2 per bushel—a significant increase over 
normal, which they paid out of necessity.  William Armstrong noted in 1846 that large 
numbers of “full-blood” Choctaws had constructed valuable improvements on travel 
routes used by immigrants and Texans where they “find a ready market for their 
produce, and are learning to acquire and take care of property.”  As one Choctaw noted 
in 1853, “there is a slow and steady increase of property among us.” 
These small-scale traders also profited from forty-niners en-route to California.  
One agent estimated between 1,500 and 2,000 wagons passed through each month.  
This number undoubtedly grew in 1850 when a North Texas newspaper, fooled by 
hoax, reported the discovery of gold on the Wichita Mountains in the Choctaw Nation, 
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sparking a flood of wealth-seekers unwilling to travel to California.  Subsistence 
farming continued, and to an extent expanded as Choctaws began to clothe themselves 
in cloth of their own manufacture, but was combined with a clear desire to engage in the 
market.
37
 
 With commerce flourishing, Doaksville quickly became the most important 
commercial hub in the Choctaw Nation.  Several American travelers and agents exalted 
it as the most impressive town within Indian country.  Located less than a mile south of 
Fort Towson, Doaksville’s strategic location on intersecting military roads between Fort 
Towson, Fort Smith in Arkansas, and North Texas made it a natural center of 
commerce.  It had all the trappings of a modern frontier city, including seven or more 
commercial stores, multiple mechanic shops, taverns, a gristmill, a temperance society, 
a church, a newspaper, and a resident physician.  In 1850, prominent Choctaws like 
Robert M. Jones and George Harkins even opened a masonic lodge in Doaksville, the 
second masonic lodge in Indian country.  Choctaws also built a courthouse and an 
impressive jail in Doaksville.  By 1850 they made the city into their commercial capital 
and their political capital, signifying its importance to national development.
38
 
 Commerce, however regulated, also had two clear interconnected drawbacks 
that potentially threatened national development: white invaders and alcohol.  The 
Choctaw government undertook vehement efforts to control both of these nuisances.  
Along with the previously mentioned marriage restrictions, the Council resolved that no 
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white man “who has not married a Choctaw woman shall ever be allowed to raise any 
stock within the limits of this nation.”  Even those admitted as citizens were prohibited 
from participating in the Choctaw annuities and education systems.  One law required 
Americans wishing to open a shop within the Choctaw Nation to post a $5,000 bond in 
Doaksville, which would be forfeited and the trader’s shop closed if their license was 
revoked.  This occurred in 1855 when agent Douglas Cooper revoked Francois X. 
Coincon’s license for the alleged sale of liquor, causing him to lose a $5,000 bond and 
most of the $40,000 worth of merchandise he had in stock.  Also fearful about negative 
white influences, Robert M. Jones introduced a law passed by the Council that 
proscribed death for any Choctaw official who signed away any Choctaw land and 
permanent banishment for any white men who suggested the Choctaws sell their land.  
These actions apparently did not solve the problem.  In 1859, the Council requested 
each county tally and remove all the white men living in the nation without a permit.  
White invaders were clearly still a negative side-effect of the Choctaws embracing a 
commercial mentality.
39
 
In 1834, the Choctaws became the first Indian Nation The Choctaws to ban 
alcohol possession and consumption.  Along the Red River and past the Arkansas line, 
however, grog shops preyed on Choctaw clients.  Eight miles into Texas in the city of 
Preston, Native Americans purchased an estimated 300 barrels of whiskey in 1849.  
While personal habits such as alcohol consumption had traditionally been clan 
sanctioned, as the Council grew in power, they regularly intervened in an attempt to 
tackle the whiskey trade.  They took further steps by making it an impeachable offense 
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for any Choctaw officer to consume alcohol and called on local captains to use their 
influence towards shaming all those who drank.  In 1850, they offered a set commission 
for every bottle of whiskey destroyed by private citizens.  Citizens and council members 
created temperance societies and held debates over the virtues of the sober life.  These 
steps, however, could not stop citizens from taking their annuity payments or trading 
profits across the Arkansas or Texas borders and procuring whiskey.  Merchants like 
Jones advertised their refusal to import and sell alcohol in the Choctaw Nation, though 
they often transported it to Texas.  Even in their zeal for prohibition, leading Choctaws 
did not always maintain sobriety themselves.  Temperance society member Peter 
Pitchlynn, for instance, had to issue an apology to agent William Armstrong when he 
erratically rode his horse and let out war whoops following binge drinking.
40
   
The task of destroying all alcohol within the Choctaw Nation and arresting any 
who imported or distilled within Choctaw borders fell to the Light Horsemen.  For this 
purpose, they had extended authority, including the right to arrest or kill any who 
resisted their endeavor to wipe out “ardent spirits.”  Despite their best exertions, a 
constant stream of alcohol spread across the nation, primarily in the Northwestern 
Mushulatubbee region.  In 1849, Red River steamboats dropped their prices to one quart 
of whiskey for one bushel of corn further accelerating alcohol trade.
41
  Enforcing 
                                                 
40
 Folsom, Constitution and Laws, 96, 97, 165, 101, 233;  Annual Report, 1842 1843, also , 
Choctaw Telegraph, August 23, 1849; “Constitution of Eagle town Social and Intellectual Society: 
Tabulation of pro and con debaters on (1) Sober v. Drunken life,” Folder 153, u.d., GM; Peter Pitchlynn 
to John M. Armstrong, Esqr., March 16, 1846, Folder 31, Armstrong Collection, GM. 
41
 Annual Report, 1849; Even blatant murders of Indians often went unpunished along the Red 
River border.  For instance, Choctaw Tom (of the Caddos) and several of his followers were executed in 
their sleep after resting their horses in Texas territory with the permission of both state and national 
officials.  Even after the murders made a written declaration bragging about their grisly actions, the state 
took no action and the murders went unpunished.  See F. Todd Smith, From Dominance to 
Disappearance: The Indians of Texas and the Near Southwest, 1786-1859 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2006), 232-234. 
139 
 
Choctaw laws against Americans proved increasingly difficult and often dangerous.  
That year, Light Horsemen killed three whiskey runners who resisted arrest, sparking an 
inquiry into whether these killings were just.  In another case, a Choctaw officer named 
Feletah and his deputies attempted to apprehend H.C. Flack, a white American living in 
the Choctaw Nation, and his son.  Both Flack and his son resisted arrest and were killed.  
Feletah and his men were acquitted of all charges by a Choctaw court, only to be 
rearrested by an officer of the United States and tried for murder in Arkansas.
42
 
Trade along the Choctaw-Texas border resulted in ongoing tenuous relations 
between white Texans and Choctaws.   To be sure, several fair men from Texas 
conducted honest business in the Choctaw Nation, often buying Choctaw cattle and 
ponies at fair prices but this was not always the case.  Texans often accused Native 
Americans of raiding but they too raided across the border in the Choctaw Nation.  In 
April 1843, two men from Texas who had crossed into the nation under the auspices of 
working for Jones stole two of his horses, a beautiful iron grey and a red sorrel, both 
prized race horses.  He offered a lofty $300 reward for the men’s apprehension—more 
than three times the standard amount offered for runaway slaves in that newspaper.  
Two years later, a Texan named “Melona” stole one of his slaves.  Newspapers at the 
time also indicated the complicity of Texans in runaways from Indian Territory, which 
inflamed Indian slaveholders, especially Choctaws living along the border.
43
  Despite 
the sometimes volatile relations with Texans, residents of other bordering states, and 
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white traders residing within the Choctaw Nation, commerce and trade flourished and 
the Choctaw Nation grew increasingly prosperous from the 1830s through 1850s.   
These transitions did not happen uniformly.  The devastation of removal 
combined with the spread of epidemic diseases and high death rates in the immediate 
post-removal years led some to blame supernatural forces and the acceptance of 
education and commerce for their plight.  In fact, while the practices of punishing 
witchcraft had fallen out of favor among Choctaws in the nineteenth century, it was 
temporarily revived during this period.  Other Choctaws, mostly in the Mushulatubbee 
district, reacted to the strife by withdrawing from the growing market economy and 
attempting to recreate traditional life in relative isolation from other Choctaws.
44
  
They continued traditional gendered economic activity in which women 
performed agricultural duties and men hunted game.  Through the 1830s, they refused 
to allow churches or formal schools.  Whereas other districts had growing towns based 
upon commerce, the Mushulatubbee district centered around Skullyville, literally 
meaning “bit town” or “money town” where residents received annuity funds as their 
primary source of monetary income.  In many ways, they lived their lives as their kin 
had fifty-years earlier. But this isolation did not last in the post-removal nation.  They 
continued to send representatives into the Council and after 1850, had county courts 
which followed national Choctaw laws, schools, and several growing businesses.  Many 
in the region also integrated cotton production into their subsistence farming and used it 
to exchange for trade goods with other Choctaws and traders in Arkansas.  Though 
market-centered Choctaws differed with their more traditional brethren over “the bright 
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path” for the nation, the market economy gradually transformed the economic activities 
and daily lives of all the citizens in the Choctaw Nation.
45
  
The majority of Choctaws also became connected to the expanding market 
economy by either actively or tacitly accommodating the exploitation of slave labor.  In 
rebuilding the Choctaw Nation, citizens of all socio-economic classes accepted the 
integration of racial slaveholding and the commodification of human labor into the 
economic and political structure of the Choctaw Nation.  Above all else, slave labor was 
an integral component in stimulating large-scale commercial development.  By 
exploiting the labor of unfree slaves, small slave-holding families made moderate 
amounts of profit for market purchases by growing cotton and corn, while slave-holding 
planters like Joel Kemp, Peter Pitchlynn, and Robert M. Jones made fortunes.  
Alongside Choctaws and white laborers, slaves plowed the fields, picked the crops, and 
worked the roads that made commercial life viable. 
As historian Christina Snyder demonstrates, during the late eighteenth-century 
Choctaws and other members of the Five Tribes developed a unique form of slavery 
that integrated indigenous forms of captivity with Southern racial slavery.  To more 
culturally traditional Choctaws, owning African slaves represented a way of avoiding 
agricultural labor when hunting became a less viable option.  Simultaneously, a small 
group of wealthy Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Creeks owned the majority of 
slaves in their nations. In the Choctaw Nation near the time of removal, tribal leaders 
like Mushulatubbee and Captain Little Leader and such prominent families as the 
Pitchlynns, Leflores, Garlands, Folsoms, McDonalds, Brashears, and Jones owned most 
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of the total 512 Choctaw slaves.
46
  As Tiya Miles demonstrates in her case study of the 
powerful Cherokee slaveholder James Vann, this elite group of politically and 
economically powerful men among the Five Tribes increasingly abandoned more 
traditional indigenous slaveholding forms to adopt Euro-American racial ideologies of 
black inferiority and the practice chattel slavery.  Vann, Jones, and others remained 
staunch nationalists of their various polities but their adaption to white Southern 
economic and social practices did not protect them from white encroachment.  
Ironically, the federal government removed their nations to Indian Territory in part to 
allow for the expansion of slavery in the South.
47
   
 Rather than separating the Five Tribes from the growing Cotton Kingdom in the 
Deep South, removal facilitated the spread of slavery westward into Indian Territory.  
In the post-removal Choctaw Nation, buying, selling, and exploiting black bodies for 
financial and social gain became far more prevalent than more traditional captivity 
practices that allowed for kinship adoption.  As Barbara Krauthammer suggests in her 
study of Choctaw and Chickasaw slaves, Indian slaveholders “sought to maintain a 
social and economic order premised on the commodification and degradation of black 
people’s bodies and labor.” She asserts, “Slavery in the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
Nations rested on the intersecting racial and gender ideologies that justified the 
enslavement and exploitation of black men’s and women’s bodies, labor, and 
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reproduction.”48  Although Choctaws and white Southern slaveholders used similar 
slaveholding practices and increasingly overlapping ideologies of black racial 
inferiority, slavery among Choctaws stemmed from interests of the Choctaw Nation that 
did not match those of white Southerners in surrounding states.  Thus, in the post-
removal nation, slavery became central to the Choctaw economy while it 
simultaneously became embedded in the social and political structure of the nation.   
Immediately after removal, more Choctaws took an active interest in trading 
their improvements for slaves that they knew would be advantageous in their new 
territory.  On the advice of his father, Peter Pitchlynn traded the family horses to 
purchase five slaves for $2,075.  Mushulatubbee and his sons took several sections of 
land promised to them by the removal treaty and sold them for three young slaves each.  
Robert M. Jones and Israel Folsom followed suit and purchased several slaves 
immediately before making the journey west.
49
  Upon arrival, they continued to 
purchase slaves from any available sources.  John Hobart Heald, acting as Jones’ agent 
in New Orleans, frequently arranged for the piecemeal purchase of slaves that he sent 
back on Jones’ steamship.  Choctaws also acquired slaves from the captive exchange 
system among western Indian tribes that dominated the Southern plains during the 
1830s and 1840s.  For instance, when Jones procured a former Shawnee establishment 
“Shawneetown,” along with their “cultivated fields and railed fences” he also acquired 
at least one slave that resided there.  The slave spoke only the Shawnee language and 
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had tattooed his skin in the fashion of the tribe.
50
  As a result, slaves living among 
Choctaws had diverse backgrounds and included Africans, African Americans, Afro-
Choctaws, and others of black-Indian descent. 
Although in the post-removal nation Choctaws bought and sold slaves as 
commodities, the range of slave experiences varied widely and often depended on the 
views of individual masters.  Some continued to enjoy less-rigid limitations on slave life 
in ways that resembled more traditional captivity experiences.  Travelers reported 
seeing small slave families live almost as free as their masters, merely paying a tribute.  
Though they possessed no defensible rights and lived under the threat of violence, some 
former slaves attested that the burden of their enslavement appeared less heavy than that 
of other slaves.  Other Choctaw masters employed harsh and violent disciplinary tactics 
or hired white overseers to do it for them.  For instance, Peter Pitchlynn wrote several 
times to family members instructing them to ask overseers or neighbors to whip their 
slaves who had gotten out of line.  As one former slave maintained, “there were humane 
and inhumane masters and occasionally some of the cruel and brutal type.”51   
Slaves had wide ranging experiences with the labor they performed, their 
relationships with their masters, and the daily experiences and communities they forged 
with other slaves.  Some worked as translators for their masters, while others 
understood little English or Choctaw.  When asked if she understood the Chickasaw 
language after five years with a Chickasaw master, an enslaved woman replied “I can 
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mumble it a little.”  Many slaves identified as Choctaws while others blended Choctaw 
and African American practices.  Still, others who had only been recently acquired by 
their masters from Eastern markets had very few cultural ties to their masters.  While 
the daily and lifetime experiences of Choctaw slaves varied widely, as they did in some 
Southern states, in the post-removal Choctaw Nation, slavery became far more 
restrictive than indigenous captivity practices.
52
 
 Most importantly, slaves became defined as a valuable, transferable commodity.  
Numerous Choctaws, including Peter Pitchlynn’s mother Rhoda, left detailed 
instructions in their wills on how to transfer their human property.  In cases where the 
children of the deceased were not old enough to be masters, slaves were rented out in 
the interim. Slaves could also be used as collateral for a mortgage on a loan or debt.  For 
instance, Jones’ company accepted Melinda “a slave for life,” as collateral on a $600 
loan for supplies at the local Doaksville tavern in 1855.  The tavern owners, Jane Ball, 
the Choctaw widow of David Folsom and current wife of David G. Ball, took Melinda 
and fled to Texas when they could not repay the loan.  Jones hired attorneys in Texas to 
file suit for Melinda.  To further complicate the matter, Albert Folsom, the son of David 
Folsom and Jane Ball, also sued claiming Melinda lawfully belonged to him.  The 
subsequent trial took place in Texas and involved the testimony of Sampson Folsom, 
Chief George Harkins, Peter Pitchlynn, John Kingsbury, and other Choctaws.  Jones 
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won an initial ruling for $600 instead of Melinda, which was then then vacated and the 
case returned for retrial by the Texas Supreme Court.
53
 
 In addition to buying and selling slaves as commodities and defining them as 
transferable hereditary property, many Choctaw masters also often controlled aspects of 
slaves’ sexuality.  Masters expected women to serve as reproducers of additional slaves, 
and at times sexual commodities to be exploited by their masters.  One slave recalled 
that after slave sales which divided families “the husband or wife of who was sold was 
given another husband or wife by the new master.”54  Despite a Council prohibition on 
open sexual relationships with black slaves, the presence of numerous mixed race slaves 
in the nation indicates that Choctaws did not strictly adhere to this law.  American 
traveler Ethan Allen Hitchcock reported seeing “every imaginable shade and proportion 
of people…in one promiscuous and undistinguishable mass.”  One man even testified in 
the 1896, long after Jones’ death, that his mother was the result of an illicit relationship 
between his enslaved grandmother and Robert M. Jones.
55
  Because these practices 
directly exploited black female bodies and reproductive abilities, they differed widely 
from more traditional practices in which captives were adopted as full and equal 
members of society. 
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Just as the General Council passed numerous statutes to define and protect forms 
of property, beginning with the first post-removal constitution and subsequent laws the 
Council consistently codified slave activities and the institution as a whole.  One law 
prohibited free blacks from entering the nation and called for the expulsion of all free 
blacks “unconnected with the Choctaw or Chickasaw blood.”  Those given an exception 
were prohibited from Choctaw schools, receiving funds from annuity payments, or 
occupying an official office.  Harboring runaway slaves or hiring unpermitted freedmen 
for paid jobs became a punishable offense.  Meanwhile, those suspected of being free 
could be arrested by the Light Horsemen and, if free, enslaved if they refused to leave 
the nation.  In order to manumit a slave, masters were forced to make an appeal before 
the General Council and make assurances that the freed slave would leave the nation 
within thirty days.  Following this law, missionary Cyrus Kingsbury sent slaves that he 
emancipated to neighboring Indian nations, Northern states, or in groups to Liberia.
56
  
These laws clearly aimed to curtail the number of free African Americans in the nation 
and ensure that they did not interfere with the institution of slavery. 
The Council directed other laws less at slaves themselves and more at internal 
Choctaw practices that could potentially threatened slavery.  Just like Southern states 
spooked by the Nat Turner Rebellion, in 1835 the Council passed an act that “no negro 
slaves shall be in possession of any property, or arms,” with prescribed punishments for 
both offending slaves and masters.  They added that slaves could only have guns or 
property with the written permission of their masters, most likely shaping the law 
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towards absentee and lenient slave owners.  Jones himself allegedly allowed a slave the 
use of his valuable masonic rifle, perhaps indicating the flexibility of this law.  A 
subsequent statute made it illegal for a man or woman to “publically take up with a 
negro slave,” which was later extended to free blacks when Tobias Ned, “a free negro,” 
illegally married a Choctaw woman and threatened her family when they intervened.  
Laws also prevented masters from teaching slaves how to read, write, or sing.  Many 
slaves already possessed these skills but its intent is clear—literate slaves posed a risk 
because they might read and write about abolitionism. As such, any American citizen 
“found to take an active part in favoring the principles and notions of the most fatal and 
destructive doctrine of abolitionism” was compelled to forever leave the nation.57   
Even Choctaws who did not practice slavery tacitly consented to its practice.  
Thus, abolitionism gained little ground in the nation and for the most part Choctaws 
sought to prevent it from spreading.  Missionaries working within the nation 
particularly posed a threat.  For instance, as Superintendent of Public Schools in 1855, 
Jones rejected the first choice teacher at Armstrong Academy because he wanted an 
exemption against the abolition law.  Instead, Jones made the teachers that he selected 
sign an agreement not to teach this “destructive doctrine.”  Another openly abolitionist 
school teacher, who coincidentally was noted for his skills in teaching music to groups 
likely including slaves, was replaced after school inspectors led by Jones gave an 
unfavorable report.
58
  Like the codes meant to restrict the agency of slaves and free 
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blacks, laws also targeted abolitionists to further reinforce the institution of slavery in 
the Choctaw Nation.  
While some of these laws mirrored slave codes throughout the South, others 
were more ad-hoc in response to specific local events.  In 1858, for instance, Choctaws 
passed a law redefining larceny and kidnapping to include a prohibition against “selling 
any free person for a slave,” punishable by 100 lashes and “branding across the 
forehead with the letter T”—the most severe punishment aside from death they ever 
issued.  Selling free people as slaves happened on multiple occasions, proving both 
costly and potentially violent.  Robert M. Jones spent years in Texas courts attempting 
to confirm ownership of Laney Colbert Stevenson and her children, purchased by Jones 
and his wife Susan after the death of their master.  Unbeknownst to them, Laney 
Colbert Stevenson had been emancipated in 1821, making her and her children free.  
Jones lost both his initial case and appeal to the Texas Supreme Court in 1847, which 
ruled that according to Chickasaw/Choctaw law the manumission was legitimate.
59
      
Though Robert and Susan Jones pursued no further action, stealing and selling 
free people had the potential to turn deadly.  For instance, a posse of Chickasaws and 
the Choctaw Light Horsemen nearly engaged in a violent struggle over a slave named 
Sarah and her two children.  The dispute began in 1853 when a Choctaw named 
Tickfunka sued and lost a claim to Chickasaw captain and former district chief Edmund 
Pickens for the three slaves in a Choctaw court.  Undeterred, in 1857 Tickfunka sold his 
claim to Peter Baptiste who promptly enlisted his family members serving in the Light 
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Horsemen to confiscate the three and brought them to Baptiste.  A party of armed 
Chickasaws friendly to Pickens planned to retake Sarah, who likely had familial ties to 
Edmund Pickens, by force if necessary.  Douglas Cooper, who served as agent to both 
Choctaws and Chickasaws, intervened to diffuse the situation.  With these instances in 
mind, it is clear why the Council sought to take such drastic action to protect slave 
owners and severely punish those who violated certain slave laws.
60
   
 Similar to slaves in Southern states, slaves in the Choctaw Nation resisted 
bondage using a variety of tactics.  Some cautiously resisted their masters by refusing to 
work when masters and overseers left the plantations.  Others consumed alcohol, 
became loud and unruly on the Sabbath, and acted “sassy” towards masters.  Choctaw 
newspapers frequently bemoaned slaves congregating without permission and printed 
“Sambo” tales warning masters of slave insubordination when not properly monitored.  
Letters from Peter Pitchlynn’s family and overseers often contained reports on activities 
of this nature when Peter would travel for any length of time.
61
    
Other slaves practiced more active forms of resistance.  In February 1839, four 
slaves who had lived with the Choctaws since before removal ran away from Pierre 
Juzan, taking with them “four of the best horses…two guns…a quantity of clothing and 
provisions.”  A similar event occurred in 1851 when two slaves ran from Henry Folsom, 
taking a horse, saddle, and shotgun.  Agents for Folsom found one slave and “peppered” 
his leg with a shotgun to prevent subsequent runaway attempts.   Multiple slaves 
belonging to Jones fled south towards Texas and north towards the Creek Nation, taking 
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various supplies with them.  Sometimes slaves took violent actions to gain their 
freedom.  A slave belonging to prominent Chickasaw Jackson Kemp killed his overseer 
with a shot to the head.  In 1842, three Choctaw slaves, who had been apprehended by 
two professional slave-catchers outside the Creek nation, happened upon twenty-five 
slaves who had run from Cherokee Joseph Vann.  The combined force killed the slave 
catchers and made a break towards Mexico.  A force of almost one hundred men 
overpowered and arrested the group of slaves a mere nine miles from the Red River.  
With this constant risk of rebellion, the Council passed several resolutions, including 
authorizing chiefs and captains to take appropriate actions to prevent rebellion and 
calling for a permanent force to control slave activities.
62
     
One of the most violent and well-documented acts of slave violence and 
retaliation involved some of the most politically prominent and affluent Choctaws.  The 
news of the controversy spread into the United States, damaging opinion of the 
Choctaws among Northern benevolent societies and pushing the Choctaws into a firmer 
alliance with the slaveholding South.  The episode began in late 1858, when Richard 
Harkins, brother to former district chief George Harkins and husband to Peter 
Pitchlynn’s daughter Lavina, disappeared after checking on his slaves’ progress for the 
day.  Though the location of Harkins’ horse suggested that he may have drowned 
crossing a river, Lavina suspected foul play, partially because they had denied their 
slaves the traditional Christmas reprieve from work and additional supplies.  A slave 
named Prince quickly became a primary suspect and, when threatened with a physical 
violence, confessed to luring Harkins off his horse and murdering him with an axe.  He 
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claimed he then tied his body to a rock and sunk it in a river.  The next day, Prince led a 
group to the river to identify the body.  While there, he claimed the master mind of the 
crime was an older slave named Lucy who believed that Harkins’ death would cause 
Lavina to return the slaves to her father’s Mountain Fork estate.  Allegedly, Prince then 
somehow slipped out of his chains, jumped into the river, and drowned.  It is logical 
that Prince had some unwanted assistance in his drowning since it is unlikely he just 
escaped his chains and the custody of an armed posse.  Lucy denied the charges that she 
had planned Harkins’ murder to her last breath.  This did not stop Lavina from pursuing 
further retaliation.  At the mistress’s request, Lucy was placed on a pyre with Prince’s 
body and burned to death before a large crowd.
63
  
 All informed parties, including missionaries, kept word of this grisly episode 
under wraps within the Choctaw Nation for more than six months.  Missionaries gave 
no report of the incidents primarily because Lavina and Lucy were both members of 
Cyrus Byington’s church.  Although the Choctaws had clearly passed a law prohibiting 
retaliatory murder and killing a slave, no charges were brought against Lavina or any 
other person involved.  As Cyrus Byington explained to critics, legal proceedings 
against the families involved would be “simply ridiculous” based on their connections.  
All of those involved seemed content to put the matter behind them until a disgruntled 
former employee at one of the mission schools alerted the New York newspaper The 
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Independent.  The story became an international sensation, with newspapers as far away 
as England providing reports and analyses of the episode.
64
  
 Missionaries had walked a fine-line between appeasing pro-slavery Natives and 
Northern abolitionists for decades.  They often assured their Northern brethren that “9 
out of 10” Choctaws had no interest in slavery, and that slaves inside the nation served 
as agents of the gospel to their masters.  The most adamant slaveholders like Jones 
complained about missionaries spouting abolitionism from the pulpit with impunity.  
Choctaw reverend Israel Folsom, a long-time alarmist regarding abolitionist rhetoric, 
complained that he had been “shot…with their abolition balls…and wounded very 
seriously at times…in the warfare of words.”  In this case, Folsom repeatedly harangued 
Choctaw leaders that if no action was taken “their influence will cause the negroes to go 
in rebellion in the nation + and there will be blood shed.”  All that was needed for this 
tight-rope to snap was a public incident that would force missionaries to take a firm 
position, like a publicized slave burning.
65
  Ultimately, the missionaries did not 
challenge members of the Choctaw Nation who sought no sanctions against Lavina 
Pitchlynn’s action.  Even after Lavina made a full confession of her involvement before 
the church, she was reinstated to full membership.   
Treating slaves as valuable but disposable property emerged in tandem with 
changing racial ideologies within the Choctaw Nation.  As demonstrated by historian 
Barbara Krauthamer, “Choctaw and Chickasaw slaveholders, as well as those who did 
not own slaves, came to embrace those elements of Euro-American racial ideologies 
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that identified people of African descent as an inherently and permanently inferior 
group.”  Part of this racism was defensive in nature as Choctaws sought to distinguish 
themselves from African Americans with the broader racial and socio-economic 
hierarchy of the U.S. states that had in the past been used to justify colonial policies of 
land dispossession.
66
   
 Though Choctaw racial views towards black inferiority dovetailed with white 
Americans’, there were important distinctions in other areas of racial thought.  They 
rejected the idea that whites were racially superior to members of the Five Tribes.  They 
recognized difference, but did not place one above the other in terms of race.  For 
instance, the progeny of Choctaw mothers and American fathers--like Robert M. Jones, 
Peter Pitchlynn, and David Folsom--were viewed as racially different but fully 
Choctaw.  While they occasionally employed racial terminologies like “half breed” and 
“mixed-blood” to define themselves or others, they frequently noted that these words 
rarely corresponded to actual race.  Distinctions were recognized, but the terms 
themselves were often offensive when used.   
Far from a racially privileged position, whites, even those granted citizenship, 
enjoyed less rights and opportunities than Choctaws, and their children were barred 
from the public schools.  Texans and Arkansans who regularly crossed in Choctaw 
territory to work as blacksmiths, overseers, and merchants, reported to Choctaw 
masters.  Men like George Taaffe of Arkansas and Frank Tucker of Texas, prominent 
men themselves, spent their adult lives in the employ of Choctaw Robert M. Jones on 
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his plantations as overseers.
67
  Within the bounds of the Choctaw Nation, citizens and 
the national government successfully inverted the racial and class hierarchy of the 
United States, in which white Americans enjoyed the sole privileged and powerful 
position at the top of the social structure. 
 Choctaws simultaneously embraced self-reinforcing systems slavery and racial 
ideology, as part of a larger effort to develop the post-removal nation into an advanced 
and prosperous sovereign indigenous nation on an equal footing with the United States.  
Stimulating a national market economy, exploiting slave labor, and reinforcing these 
developments with racial ideology that placed Choctaws superior to African Americans 
and equal to white Americans redefined the Choctaw Nation’s social, political, and 
economic structure after removal.  The pursuit of material wealth sharpened class and 
racial divisions among Choctaws and intensified socio-economic stratification.  This 
transformation did not simply result from a handful of Indians who independently 
pursued and acquired financial wealth.  Instead, it emerged from the Choctaw Nation’s 
desire to compete for riches and resources with the United States and other independent 
polities in the capitalist economic system and its citizens pursuit to protect its status as a 
not only a politically sovereign nation but also a rich Indian nation.   
***** 
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After removal, Jones and other Choctaws found a winning formula to acquiring 
wealth, while simultaneously enhancing national development.  This formula included 
communal land, wide ranging accessible trade routes, intensified production of cash 
crops, local centers of commerce, and perhaps most importantly, the exploitation of 
slave labor.  When Reverend P.P. Brown visited Jones, he lauded his Lake West 
plantation: “the flourishing peach orchard—the well of cool water—the necessary out-
buildings, in good repair—the well-furnished table—food served up in good farmer 
style—I almost imagined myself upon the premises of a Kentucky planter.”  He 
marveled at the care and expertise of Jones’ cotton and corn crop and the general 
progress of the Choctaw people from what he imagined it to be in the past.
68
  Reverend 
Brown then spent the night at Rose Hill, Jones’ fifteen-room mansion, which dwarfed 
Lake West.  Jones had spared no expense in decorating the interior or exterior, some 
adornments rumored to be from as far away as Japan.  Parked in front was an elaborate 
horse-drawn carriage, used by Jones and his family on longer trips—one of the very few 
within the nation.   
Although Jones’ extravagant lifestyle seemed antithetical to Anglo-American 
constructions of Native American identity and economic practices, he was only 
anomalous in exceeding other wealthy Choctaws and members of the Five Tribes to the 
levels that he did.  Affluence did not disqualify or challenge Jones and other wealthy 
Choctaws’ political identity or national loyalties.  Instead, commercial ethos, property 
accumulation, racial slaveholding, and the factors that some attribute as precluding 
Jones from a Choctaw identity, became central features of the Choctaw Nation after 
removal.
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CHAPTER FOUR: “THE INDIAN POLITICK”: CONTESTED CHOCTAW 
NATIONHOOD 
After twenty years of working to advance Choctaw causes, Jones withdrew from 
his official office in the National Council in 1850.  In his words, he “quit dabbling in 
the Indian politick.”  As one missionary noted, “Jones got disgusted with politics and 
just quit” and “takes no part in public affairs.”  This was an exaggeration as Jones still 
took an active role by auditing Choctaw schools, petitioning the federal government to 
disburse the Choctaw orphan fund, selecting promising students to receive scholarships 
for college education in the United States, and frequently serving as a proxy for 
National Council members.  Jones also attempted to restart a Choctaw newspaper after 
the Choctaw Intelligencer ceased production, something that he believed to be an 
integral step in the Choctaw nation-building process.  He called for support from other 
leading Choctaws on this newspaper and advocated that it should be printed in both 
English and Choctaw and made available to the masses.  Yet, compared to his decades 
of national service, he seemed content to spend most of the 1850s focused on increasing 
his already massive fortune and avoiding the pitfalls of the political process.
1
  
Secession and the United States Civil War ended Jones’ temporary political 
exile.  He learned from United States Agent Douglas Cooper that Principal Chief 
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George Hudson planned to declare neutrality at a special session of the Council in June 
of 1861.  Indignant, Jones took his private carriage from Rose Hill plantation to the 
meeting in Doaksville.  He was joined in the Council by several visitors, including a 
vigilance committee from Texas.  As the leading Choctaw voice favoring secession, 
Jones declared that “every man who was not with us should be hung up to the first limb 
between heaven and hell.”  Intimidated by Jones’ threat or convinced by his rhetoric, 
Chief Hudson abandoned his neutrality recommendation.  The Choctaws soon after 
signed a treaty of alliance with the Confederacy and entered the Civil War.
2
   
Jones’ withdrawal from Choctaw politics and provocative reentrance has led 
previous historians to conclude that he acted as a self-interested slaveholder seeking to 
manipulate his Choctaw brethren to protect his own financial interests.  Jones was, after 
all, the largest slaveholder in Indian Territory and had the most to lose from abolition.  
In seeking a simple, teleological conclusion, previous historians have missed the 
complexity of Choctaw actions immediately before the war and the nature of their 
subsequent alliance with the South.  At best, historians have portrayed prominent 
Choctaws as a misguided or hapless minority who seized power and invited disaster for 
the masses by choosing the Confederate side; at worst they are presented as greedy, 
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self-interested villains “who lived white” and used their bloated authority to drag 
otherwise neutral Native Americans to their own destruction.
3
   
These conclusions attribute far more sinister motives and coercive power to 
leading men than they actually possessed, while dismissing the considerable agency of 
more traditional Choctaws who could not be compelled into accepting pivotal changes 
in their nation without their consent.  Furthermore, they fail to recognize the volatile 
political climate in the Choctaw Nation in the decade leading up to the Civil War.  A 
close examination of Choctaw politics in the 1850s reveals the contentious process of 
Choctaw nation-building, the political agency of traditional Choctaws, and the tense 
diplomatic relationship between Choctaws and the U.S. All of these factors provide the 
necessary context for understanding the circumstances under which the Choctaw Nation 
brokered an alliance with the Confederacy on the eve of the Civil War.  Moreover, they 
reveal the complex national and international politics that shaped developments in the 
Choctaw Nation during this period.   
******* 
In the decades following removal, Robert M. Jones witnessed his nation undergo 
a rapid resurgence and a cultural, social, economic, and political transformation.  These 
changes, which had roots in pre-removal society, took on new significance as Choctaws 
strove to rebuild a stable nation.  Christianity, education, commerce, and racialized 
slavery became integral facets of the Choctaw Nation during this period.  As Jones and 
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other progressive Choctaws selectively embraced these aspects of Euro-American 
culture and worked to intensify their integration into the nation, Choctaw society 
became more stratified and multi-cultural than ever before by the 1850s.
4
  Sharpening 
racial and class divisions created new wedges in the Choctaw social structure.  Yet, they 
remained a united people that absorbed social tensions and wholeheartedly turned to 
education, economic development, and racial ideology as mechanisms of nation 
building.   
Still, two decades after removal many doubted whether this course would solve 
problems plaguing the Choctaw people.  Israel Folsom wondered “where is union to be 
found among our people…all is dark before us.  I looked for the path of the people and I 
cannot find it.”  Folsom recognized that a disjoined Choctaw Nation was vulnerable.  
Though he was “mixed-blood” himself, Folsom conceded that “most of our mixed 
blooded Indians make bad Indians and also bad white men.”  He predicted that divisions 
among Choctaws would intensify if “mixed-bloods” attacked traditional Choctaw 
institutions, eventually causing “the fall of the nation.”  At the same time, as a reverend, 
he preached the virtues of the Bible, slave-holding, and education as keys to extended 
prosperity.  Folsom reconciled this apparent contradiction by noting that “we are afraid 
of changes…but if a nation is not changing for the better, it is changing for the worst 
[sic].”5 
Social fissures widened along lines of race, class, and cultural practice, but, 
despite these rifts, Israel Folsom and his fellow Choctaw citizens agreed on the primacy 
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of preserving their nation.  Since their first written constitution in 1826, the Choctaws 
had claimed sovereignty as an independent polity with the right of self-government.  
Thirty years later, the same political issues that plagued the Choctaw Nation and the 
United States during the 1830s had only intensified.  Both nations again inched towards 
civil war in the face of volatile political debates during the 1850s.  Alternative concepts 
of nationalism lay at the center of these concurrent controversies.  For Americans and 
Choctaws alike, these debates shaped vital decisions concerning their preferred political 
structure and relationship between the government and citizens.  Just like Euro-
Americans in the North who advocated a powerful national government, many 
progressive Choctaws sought to centralize their nation by weakening local and regional 
autonomy.  In opposition, white Southerners advocated the primacy of local/state power 
just as traditional Choctaws attempted to preserve the authority of distinct districts in 
their nation.  The presence of chattel slavery, conflicting racial ideologies, and 
suspected abolitionism in both nations also led to debates concerning the meanings of 
freedom and slavery.
6
     
For the Choctaws, however, these debates became compounded by the 
threatening United States colonial structure.  White Americans increasingly embraced 
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“manifest destiny” and westward expansion in national discourse, Choctaws had to 
contend once again with the threat of outside intrusion.  Repeatedly the United States 
Senate introduced legislation aimed at incorporating the Choctaws’ land into an official 
“Indian Territory” under the authority of the federal government.  The debate over 
whether to resist or compromise on forced territorialization led to additional divides 
among Choctaws.  These cumulative schisms over the organization and the future of the 
Choctaw Nation dominated Choctaw politics in the decade leading up to the American 
Civil War.   
***** 
 Beginning in the 1826, the Choctaws embraced a national constitutional 
government but introduced a new constitution, on average, once per decade.  Each 
constitution made minor modifications to accommodate political, social, and economic 
changes within the nation.  Choctaws borrowed several tenets of government from the 
United States Constitution.  For example, a constant feature in each constitution was a 
“Declaration of Rights” which provided for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, 
the right to peacefully assemble, and the right to petition the government.  They also 
codified several legal protections such as habeas corpus, trial by jury, immunity from 
double-jeopardy, prohibitions on illegal search and seizure, and unusual punishments.  
By 1850, a new constitution divided governmental authority into three branches—a 
bicameral legislature, composed of a “House of Representatives” and “Senate”, an 
executive branch, and a judiciary.  Whereas earlier constitutions had allowed for 
traditional voting of delegates (through literally lining up behind their candidates) and 
prescribed a limited judicial body, the 1850 constitution called for voting by ballot and 
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expanded the judiciary into a Supreme Court, circuit courts, and district courts.  This 
new constitution also divided the three traditional districts into counties.  These changes 
were aimed at curtailing the legal authority of district chiefs in favor of a codified, 
national legal judiciary system.  These changes also worked to make government more 
efficient and helped accommodate population growth.
7
 
Despite similarities to the American Constitution, the Constitution of 1850 
solidified a distinctly Choctaw system of government.  The executive branch was 
divided between four executives, one for each of the Choctaw districts and one for the 
Chickasaw District.  Judges and lawyers, required to be literate in either English or 
Choctaw, practiced law in accordance with traditional values.  The General Council 
passed laws that pertained to each district, but each district chief had a large degree of 
autonomy in exercising law and order.  These features represented two lasting, 
fundamental tenets of Choctaw society—chiefs as largely autonomous figures who held 
concentrated local power and a national council that served as the dominant national 
political body.  Some Choctaws, like Thompson McKinney and Israel Folsom, 
emphasized the need for a single executive, but this position was rejected by the masses 
who viewed a single executive office as a dangerous threat to regional autonomy.  Thus, 
despite the outward resemblance to the surrounding states, each subsequent constitution 
allowed the Choctaws to protect aspects of traditional political practices.
8
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For approximately five years, the Constitution of 1850 successfully 
accommodated the social and economic changes in the nation; however, treaty 
negotiations with the United States and the Chickasaws in 1855 sparked a political 
crisis.  After decades of mounting pressure from the Chickasaws for autonomous 
control over the lands they leased, Choctaw negotiators acquiesced.  Peter Pitchlynn, 
who led the Choctaw delegation to Washington D.C., hoped that conceding on 
Chickasaw autonomy would provide some bargaining power on issues like the large 
sum owed to the Choctaws by the United States.  Robert M. Jones abhorred this 
strategy, asking “If we have any valid claims upon the Government why not pay it to us 
upon its own merits and not couple it with an obnoxious measure, thereby attempting to 
make us swallow the strychnine with the honey.”9  Chickasaw autonomy meant that the 
shared Constitution 1850 would need to be amended to remove Chickasaw powers.   
 An additional concern was that Pitchlynn arranged to lease a large, mostly 
unused portion of Choctaw land west of the Chickasaw border to the United States for 
an annual payment.  The United States planned to use this area to settle the Wichitas 
and “other tribes or bands of Indians” from the Plains and Texas.  For this concession, 
the Choctaw Nation received a bulk payment of $620,000, as well as non-committal 
assurances that the Senate would deliberate on the large debt the United States owed to 
Choctaws.
10
  
Mere rumors of the treaty created fissures among progressive Choctaws, 
dividing many against one another on nationalist grounds.  Before he had received a 
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copy, Jones wrote to Peter Pitchlynn facetiously feigning the “gratitude of a grateful 
people” for “selling” their country.  Jones also questioned the wisdom of undoing the 
Treaty of 1837, a treaty he had negotiated, which bound the Chickasaws to the 
Choctaws.  He wondered why the Chickasaws, a group of “4,000 souls,” were to 
receive one-third of the nation, including portions occupied by Choctaw citizens.  Jones 
carefully concocted several scenarios which cast the Choctaws as the long-term losers 
of this arrangement.  Still, Jones and others reserved the bulk of their rage towards the 
idea of selling land to the United States for the settling of other Native Americans.  In 
an outburst grounded in nationalistic ideology and imbued with ideas of Choctaw 
manhood, Jones demanded that the Choctaws reject this provision.  He called on his 
countrymen “to allow the Choctaws to act like men for once, and not part with their 
dearest right for filthy money, that white man’s God, and if the US will force us into 
measure be it so.  And let it be handed down in history to future generations, and prove 
that the Choctaws are true men, and prefer to live and die in poverty, but cannot be 
bought.”  Worse still, Jones accurately prophesied that the tenuous terms for settling the 
larger debt between the United States and the Choctaws allowed the Senate an 
opportunity to accept the treaty and ignore the Choctaws payments.
11
 
Jones’ masculine rhetoric was emblematic of a burgeoning gendered ideology 
that increasingly intersected with Choctaw political discourse during the 1850s.  This 
discourse connected concepts of national sovereignty with constructions of masculinity.  
This was a departure from earlier forms of masculinity predicated upon prowess with 
hunting or war, personal adornments, political power, and providing for family.  
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Gendered rhetoric in regards to political issues demonstrates that Choctaws began to 
transplant notions of family relations to national citizenship.  Thus, Choctaw leaders 
began to equate forfeiting land rights and United States intrusion with weak manhood 
and nationhood.  An ideal masculine man would rather forfeit wealth and stand for 
protecting the nation, something Jones was hoping to inspire within Pitchlynn with his 
gendered rhetoric.
12
   
Jones also knew that Pitchlynn and others on the treaty delegation might be 
lining their own pockets at the expense of the Choctaw people.  Delegates were 
reimbursed for their expenses plus a portion of whatever funds they were able to 
recoup.  This left them more likely to make broad concessions to the United States so 
long as they received financial compensation.  Cognizant of this motivation, Jones told 
Pitchlynn to “not think for one moment that I oppose your interests; far from it. Make a 
treaty which will sacrifice no right of our people and if you make a million by the 
transaction you will never find me opposed to it on that account.”  Yet he stressed to 
Pitchlynn, the interests of the nation should come first and personal profit second.  He 
concluded by instructing Pitchlynn to “pick up your flint” and negotiate an improved 
treaty that did not hurt the Choctaws in the process.
13
        
While the leasing of Choctaw land to the United States was a contentious issue 
in itself, Chickasaw autonomy brought a clear flaw in the 1850 Constitution to the 
surface of Choctaw national politics.  This constitution guaranteed Chickasaws 
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representation in the General Council as well as a district chief, but the 1855 treaty 
granted Chickasaws full autonomy including the right to make their own constitution.  
Thus, the standing constitution had to be changed to address Chickasaws living on 
Choctaw lands, change territorial boundaries, and remove Chickasaw representation 
from the Choctaw General Council.   
Many progressive Council members sought dramatic reform that went beyond 
simply amending the current constitution.  Rather than passing an amendment to resolve 
these issues, a process that required 4/5ths approval of the Council and took a full year 
to take effect, the General Council proposed drafting a new constitution that would 
solve current problems and drastically consolidate national power.  This cohort, 
including Tandy Walker, Alfred Wade, and Sampson Folsom, attempted to mold a new 
constitution according to their own visions of government regardless of the people’s 
desire or willingness to change.  A delegation, presided over by Tandy Walker, met and 
completed their new constitution in the city of Skullyville in January of 1857.  Rather 
than risk resistance from Choctaw citizens, the document was announced as ratified 
under the authority of General Council and not subject to a popular vote.
14
 
The so-called Skullyville Constitution radically altered critical facets of the 
Choctaw government and had the potential to change the ways in which traditional 
Choctaws interacted with their government.  The role of popularly-elected district chiefs 
was replaced by a single executive, titled “governor,” who would serve as sole 
executive over the entire nation.  As one historian noted, the title of governor and 
constitution similar to state constitutions should not be confused for acquiescence “to 
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the nominal position as wards to a legally recognized caretaker.”  Instead, selecting the 
name “governor” was meant to show that the Choctaws were equal in power to 
American representatives.  Once in office, the Governor would select three people to 
serve as lower chiefs and work with the Council.  Though the people popularly elected 
the governor, they would have no input over their local chief.
 15
 
Walker and other progressives believed that breaking down regional boundaries 
would unite Choctaws across geographic distances and place them in a better situation 
to resist threats from the United States and unwelcome squatters.  Unfortunately, their 
methods amounted to nation building through a power grab rather than the consent of 
the nation.  Even some in favor of modifying the constitution saw this as a step too far 
and too fast that took too much power away from culturally conservative citizens.  As 
one Choctaw noted, “full-bloods” believed they will have no power under the new 
constitution.  What Walker and other progressives failed to understand was that 
conservative Choctaws fully comprehended the drastic changes written into the 
Skullyville Constitution and the implications upon their daily lives. As historian Clara 
Sue Kidwell adeptly summarized, “what was at issue was the power of the people 
versus the power of the government.”16 
Many Choctaws feared that adopting the Skullyville Constitution was a 
precursor to United States territorialization, replete with the privatization and sectioning 
of land.  To many, this process seemed inevitable.  For twenty years Congress 
repeatedly attempted to combine the Choctaw Nation with neighboring Native lands 
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into one “Indian Territory” under jurisdiction of the United States.  Peter Pitchlynn 
noted that since removal, four separate territorial bills “has been gotten up in 
Congress…and this fact alone ought to satisfy us that this Government is not going to 
leave us to remain any longer undisturbed in our present anomalous condition.” 17  
President James Buchanan went so far as to predict that the Choctaws and some other 
Native polities would become a full state within the Union in the near future.
18
  By the 
mid-1850s, many Choctaws, Robert M. Jones among them, felt that the United States 
would eventually unilaterally put this process in place.
19
  Just as they had done with 
removal, several progressives recommended considering some of the more liberal 
territorialization bills while attempting to negotiate terms that would allow the 
maintenance of a sovereign national government with the right to exclude white 
invaders.  Tandy Walker and many Council members believed that the Choctaws could 
obfuscate the worst effects of inevitable territorialization through controlling access to 
the nation, something best accomplished via the sectioning of land.  They reasoned that 
if the land was in sections, then it would be easier to seize land possessed by 
unauthorized white men.  This plan was popular with many progressives, but a majority 
of Choctaw citizens recognized sectioning Choctaw land was antithetical to the 
Choctaw way of life and rejected the plan. Under the Skullyville Constitution, however, 
Walker assumed the role of Governor in 1858, which put him in position to advance a 
land sectioning agenda.
20
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 Not all progressive Choctaws backed Walker’s position.  George Harkins, 
Choctaw attorney-general and former district chief, along with other reluctant 
progressives formed an alliance with the conservative majority of Choctaw citizens.  
Together they led a charge against the Skullyville Constitution.  Harkins felt that any 
new constitution would require the blessing of the people to be legitimate.  The 
Skullyville Constitution, however, lacked popular support.  Without such consent, 
Harkins asserted that the Skullyville cohort bordered on treason in their attempt “to 
force upon the people a Constitution they are opposed to.”  Directly accusing the pro-
Skullyville faction of political coercion, Harkins told Walker that nothing “will lead to 
anarchy and revolution as quick as the course you and your co-adjators (sic.) are 
pursing.”21  A mixed-blood Choctaw with kinship ties to the elite Folsom, Leflore, 
Pitchlynn, and Nail families, Harkins had vast social connections and political 
influence.  After receiving an education at the Choctaw Academy, he led a party of over 
500 Choctaws during removal and then served several terms as a district chief.  In many 
ways—blood, affluence, religion, education, and connections—Harkins held the same 
social status as progressives like Tandy Walker, Sampson Folsom, Alfred Wade who 
championed the Skullyville Constitution, yet politically he aligned with the 
conservative Choctaw majority.  This demonstrates the fallacy of “mixed blood vs. full 
blood” or “progressive vs. traditional” dichotomies in Choctaw society.  Kinship 
continued to play an important role in shaping social connections, but blood did not 
determine cultural practices or political inclinations.
22
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 Harkins’ conservative supporters throughout two districts and five counties 
boycotted the elections under the Skullyville Constitution.  In March of 1858, they 
submitted a petition with 1,800 signatures calling for a new, legitimate constitutional 
convention.  When their call for redress went unanswered, this faction drafted a new 
constitution in Doaksville, which restored the district chiefs to power and prevented the 
sectioning of land.  Chaos resulted as the Choctaws essentially operated under three 
different governing documents—the Constitution of 1850, the 1858 Skullyville 
Constitution, and the 1858 Doaksville Constitution.
 23
 
Violence erupted throughout much of the nation.  Despite the efforts of leaders 
and ordinary Choctaw citizens to rebuild a more coherent Choctaw Nation, their 
clashing national visions created turmoil.  Several observers complained of bloodshed 
and intemperance, “owing mainly to the fact that there are no laws or officers to 
suppress it.”  Frequent Comanche raids and troubles with neighboring Seminoles further 
exasperated instability.  Robert M. Jones noted that “the Choctaws are in a state of 
feverish excitement, ready to burst forth at any moment, killing up each other on all 
occasions.”  Nobody was certain who could or should enforce which laws and which 
constitution served as the legitimate governing document.  Jones rhetorically asked 
“Why is it, Walker does not put his laws and government in operation – the people are 
willing for any body’s laws to be in force, if they will only protect life and property.”  
He also documented horse stealing, intrusions from Texans to catch criminals, and 
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murders while concluding that he would organize “vegilence [sic] committees in 
Kiamichi County” unless any of the governments would “uphold basic laws.”24 
In addition to bloodshed, the whole Indian Territory experienced severe 
environmental havoc from 1858-1864.  Rivers and creeks disappeared, a plague of 
grasshoppers swarmed in 1854 and 1855, and worsening droughts destroyed even the 
most expertly planted corn crops.  A wide-ranging geological survey later revealed that 
“the severe drought around 1860…could well have been the worst drought in the south-
central United States” for the last 230 years.  One region reported that less than 1/3 of 
their crop would be viable—others reported total loss.  Corn represented the most 
important staple crop for the Choctaws.  It was also the main source of feed for their 
hogs, cattle and horses.  National newspapers reported that the Choctaws were to 
receive 95,000 bushels of corn out of their annuity fund, but little of this came to 
fruition.  Most Choctaws survived this period by relying on surviving wheat crops, 
acorn mush, acorn bread, and sour wild potatoes harvested from swampy areas 
surrounding drying rivers.  Moreover, the dire conditions forced many Choctaw 
families to sell their cattle and thin their horses for lack of feed, leaving them without 
meat for the winters.
25
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  In an effort to bring an end to the Skullyville government and reinstate stability 
in the midst of these volatile circumstances, Harkins employed an unusual strategy.   He 
requested the Commissioner of Indian Affairs cease annuity payments until the political 
situation could be resolved and order restored.  However, the United States sided 
squarely with the Skullyville Council because of its progressive and centralizing 
tendencies.  The United States made this position clear when they initially chose to pay 
annuity payments to the Skullyville Council.  Supporting the Skullyville delegates fit 
with Secretary of Indian Affairs Charles E. Mix’s long-term and short-term objectives.  
He had continuously advocated that Indian Country “must become a State” despite the 
fact that the Choctaws “have title in fee simple” to their lands.  He viewed the new 
organization of the Choctaw government under the Skullyville Constitution as a step in 
this direction.  Mix’s short-term goal, however, was the prevention of a Choctaw civil 
war and an extension of “bleeding Kanas.”  Fearing a violent outcome, Mix advocated 
United States involvement in the Choctaw political crisis citing that “necessity is the 
supreme law of nations.”  Given the insecure political climate in the United States, 
creating stability in Indian Territory became the number one priority.
26
  
Both Choctaws and federal officials were well aware of the threat of violence in 
the region and knew the worst possible outcome for both the Choctaw Nation and the 
fracturing United States would be a second “bleeding Kansas” situation.  There were 
many similarities between the escalating violence in Kansas and growing discontent in 
the Choctaw Nation.  At the legal center of both affairs was a debate over the legitimacy 
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of competing governments and constitutions.  Outsiders flocked into Kansas, killing and 
intimidating as they went, in an effort to shape Kansas’ constitution in their favor.  The 
Choctaws knew that the same could happen to them.  Many predicted United States 
involvement in the Choctaw dispute would be a precursor to Kansas-like violence.
27
  
Robert M. Jones had largely abstained from the constitutional conflict, but offered a 
grim prediction that ongoing violence would be used as justification for “another push 
from the United States…upon us and a way would go our common Indians like chaf 
[sic] before a gale, and this our home would soon become another Kansas Nebraska 
scene.”  Harkin’s request to Secretary of Indian Affairs Mix to halt annuities appeared 
to be the first step towards Jones’ dire prophecy.28 
 Mix called on Elias Rector, Secretary of the Southern of Superintendency, and 
Albert Pike, a lawyer from Arkansas who had helped represent the Choctaws in 
previous claims against the United States, to mediate the constitutional dispute.  
Technically, under the treaty signed in 1855, the United States was obligated to “protect 
the Choctaws and Chickasaws from domestic strife,” providing sufficient legal basis for 
an intervention.
29
  Pike, in particular, had a longstanding relationship with the Choctaw 
Nation and hoped to benefit from his role as mediator.  A few years earlier he had 
petitioned the General Council for permission to become a Choctaw citizen, specifying 
that he did “not wish to manage anything, to control anything, to have influence 
here…but to lead a quiet life, among my books, and to serve and defend your people 
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wherever and whenever it should be in my power.”   Pike also hoped to achieve a large 
legal fee from the Choctaws for his earlier services—something contingent upon a 
stable Choctaw government—which gave him added incentive to exert his influence in 
the negotiations.
30
   
Despite Pike’s vested interest in the matter, he and Rector offered very few 
viable solutions to mitigate the growing political strife among Choctaws.  They could 
threaten to call for Federal troops to quell the violence, but this would create additional 
chaos and exacerbate an already volatile situation.  What laws would they enforce, and 
where would fugitives be taken?  If they recommended granting George Harkins’ 
request to withhold annuities, they would effectively withdraw the sole source of funds 
being used to sustain famine-stricken Choctaws.  Thus, with limited negotiating power, 
Rector, Pike, and the federal government proved ineffective at solving the crisis.  They 
did, however, receive an assurance from the Skullyville government’s Governor Tandy 
Walker that the new constitution would be put to a popular vote.   
 Yielding to pressure from traditional Choctaws who had been denied their 
democratic rights, Walker and the Skullyville backers allowed a vote in March of 1859.  
Ordinary Choctaws had a political stake in the direction of their nation and 
demonstrated clear political agency in the Constitutional Crisis of 1858.  All male 
Choctaw citizens over the age of eighteen had a chance to vote on this issue.  They 
voted overwhelmingly to reject the Skullyville Constitution and called for a new 
constitutional convention.   The General Council responded with a resolution that 
acknowledged “the voice of the people through the ballot Box has been almost 
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unanimous in favor of a convention” and against the Skullyville Constitution.31  
Historians have largely portrayed traditional Choctaws as passive recipients of the 
politics of elite mixed-blood Choctaws or as apolitical Natives who rejected formal 
American-style government.  The political actions of Choctaw citizens during the 
1850s, however, demonstrate that this was not the case.  The large majority of non-elite 
Choctaws actively engaged in their nation’s politics, exercised democratic rights and 
privileges as citizens of a sovereign Indian nation, and had a vested interest in the 
process of Choctaw Nation-building.  
In March of 1860, Choctaw citizens passed a new constitution which merged 
some of the centralizing features of the Skullyville Constitution with the traditional 
features of Doaksville Constitution.  This compromise called for a single executive to 
be titled “principal chief” in addition to three popularly elected local chiefs who 
maintained law and order and controlled local resources.  Choctaws elected George 
Hudson, a lawyer and former district chief, to serve as the first principal chief.  They 
preserved national representation within the General Council, but changed the number 
of representatives to be contingent upon county rather than district.
32
 
 The 1860 Constitution avoided the subject of slavery, but reiterated that the 
rights of citizens applied only to free men.  Tabling the issue of slavery was partially 
aimed at preventing the possibility of factionalism between slaveholders and non-
slaveholders.  A similar solution for keeping the peace by not talking about slavery had 
proved moderately successful in the U.S. House of Representatives throughout the 
1830s.  Eventually the so-called “gag rule” backfired and provoked increasingly 
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passionate rhetoric from those wishing to have their petitions, memorials, and voices 
heard.
33
  Unlike in the United States, a large, vocal anti-slavery contingent did not exist 
or were not seen as a threat in the Choctaw Nation.  
  Choctaw leaders exerted sovereignty by maintaining autonomous control over 
the practice and nature of slavery within their nation and refusing to yield to the 
demands of surrounding southern states.  Leaving slavery out of the constitution meant 
that the General Council had the option to end slavery via a constitutional amendment.  
They were aware that leaving the door open to eventual abolition risked enflaming the 
racial hysteria of surrounding slave states.  Citizens of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas 
openly advocated a wide-range of actions they might take if slavery was not secured 
among the Natives on their borders.  Multiple articles in the Arkansas Gazette and 
Democrat called for Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana “to take such steps, as would, not 
only promote the continuance of slavery in the Indian Territory, but compel its 
perpetual existence there.”  Another article called specifically for Border States to enact 
laws banning Native slaves or freedmen from crossing into their states, thus trapping 
them in Indian Territory.  This suggestions was highly ironic in light of the Southern 
position that human property should be able to travel anywhere with their masters as 
espoused in the notorious Dred Scott case.  The New Orleans-based Daily True Delta 
mocked the feasibility of this proposal and instead called to pressure Natives to pass 
laws prohibiting emancipation using “active moral suasion.”34 As these editorials 
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demonstrate, white Southerners in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas did not wish Indian 
Territory to become a free territory and safe-haven for runaways on their borders.   
Choctaws were well aware of the pressure from surrounding states to codify 
measures aimed at ensuring the “perpetual existence” of slavery in their nation.  Both 
Tandy Walker and George Harkins voiced concerns that previous constitutions were 
viewed as “regular abolitionist constitutions,” inciting the fears of their neighbors.  Yet, 
they did not let threats of white Americans in neighboring states and territories dictate 
the terms of Choctaw National politics.  The main goal for Choctaw citizens in passing 
a new constitution was to overcome the factionalism caused by the political turmoil of 
the 1850s--not to broach new volatile issues or yield to the demands of white 
Southerners.
35
   
Affluent Choctaw slaveholders frequently expressed concern about abolitionist 
outsiders, but few Choctaws ever actively opposed slavery or joined the abolitionist 
cause.  In addition to large and small slaveholder, those who did not hold slaves 
generally accepted the institution as a derivative of traditional forms of indigenous 
captivity.  This indifference created confusion on the part of white bystanders who 
equated apathy about slavery with antipathy for it.  The missionary Cyrus Kingsbury, 
for instance, argued to his superiors that since nine-tenths of the Choctaws did not care 
about slavery, its eventual decline was inevitable.  Unfortunately for Kingsbury, a 
combination of advocacy from some and apathy from others meant that a constitutional 
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mandate was not necessary to ensure the continued practice of slavery among 
Choctaws.
36
 
Of course, the end results of the new constitution did not fully satisfy all of the 
partisan Choctaws parties, but it did create a critical compromise that restored stability 
to the Choctaw Nation.  Choctaw Joseph Dukes, a printer and runner-up in the election 
for principal chief, lauded “those who participated…with few exceptions” acted 
“harmonious; having the good of the people as the primary object in all their 
deliberations.”  Sampson Folsom referred to the new constitution as a “mermaid 
constitution, ½ Choctaw then ½ náhollo (white)” while lambasting the prospective 
principal chiefs.  Tandy Walker complained that the people in his district were almost 
all in favor of retaining the Skullyville Constitution once they understood how it 
worked and that the new constitution would cause anarchy.
37
  Nevertheless, moderates 
like Lycurgus Pitchlynn argued that the constitution was “not the best in the world” but 
“the best that can be agreed upon” which would satisfy the masses.  Douglas Cooper 
informed his colleagues that “all parties appear satisfied to give it a fair trial, and I hope 
and believe the incoming administration will be popular and successful.”38  Despite 
small-scale violence, civil war within the Choctaw Nation had been avoided.   
This constitutional crisis reflects the varied and competing visions of Choctaw 
Nationalism that defined Choctaw politics and nationhood by the mid-nineteenth 
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century.  Disagreements over the nature of Choctaw governance revealed clear fissures 
that existed going into the American Civil War between those wanting a more 
centralized nation-state and those determined to maintain traditional Choctaw 
regionalism.  As one historian accurately noted, these disagreements were so important 
because they dictated the very nature of the Choctaw Nation.  Choctaws did not neatly 
fit into either progressive or traditionalist binaries—several so-called progressives sided 
with traditionalists to fight against the Skullyville Constitution while various 
traditionalists supported it.  The compromise that ended this political crisis allowed 
Choctaws to enter the ensuing the Civil War as a united nation, one fraught with 
political tension, but united nonetheless.
39
  
The political struggles that placed the Choctaw Nation on the brink of civil war 
from 1856-1860 reveal the active role that traditional Choctaws played in the political 
process.  Scholars have tended to conflate Indian politics with federal policy and to 
characterize the constitutional governments of the Five Tribes as the creation of a 
minority of elite, progressive minority.  Nevertheless, throughout the nineteenth century 
American Indians, including Choctaws, actively rather than passively worked to dictate 
the political structures of their sovereign indigenous nations. Choctaws with diverse 
cultural practices and political ideologies took part politics to maintain a high level of 
control over the direction of their nation.  They quickly adapted to new forms of voting, 
and petitions to rally behind leaders who best represented their visions of the Choctaw 
Nation.   
 Issues that led to heightened political tension in the late 1850s reflected 
divergent political ideology but a national consensus still continued to define the nation 
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and prevented civil war.  All parties involved compromised on their respective political 
visions in the 1860 Constitution for the good of the Nation.  Some Choctaws mixed 
their personal interests with their national agendas, but regardless of divides, to the last 
they were committed to preserving a Choctaw Nation.  As the United States tore apart 
in a Civil War, the elasticity and cohesion of the Choctaw Nation proved vitally 
important. 
***** 
 The new Choctaw government established by the Constitution of 1860 had little 
chance to govern effectively before conflict spread from the United States into the 
Choctaw Nation.  News of an attempted slave-uprising spread throughout northern 
Texas in June of 1860, causing widespread racial fear, despite the fact that the rumors 
remained unsubstantiated.  The growing racial tension resulted in the violent “Texas 
Troubles” when a cohort in North Texans hanged between thirty and one hundred 
slaves and accused abolitionists without evidence or trial.  This was especially troubling 
given the close proximity of the Choctaws to North Texas.  Choctaw slaveowner Israel 
Folsom referred to the purported rebellion as “very alarming” and warned that “signs of 
danger are thought to be in the Nation, but I see none.  Still danger may be nearby.”40  
From this point forward, Texans were on high alert against anyone espousing sympathy 
for abolitionism, including missionaries to the Choctaws with Northern connections.  
One Texas paper sarcastically invited missionary Horace Pitkin, whom they had outed 
as an abolitionist, to come to Texas to “tune their pianos,” guaranteeing him safe 
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passage.
41
  This rabid and violent paranoia towards menacing abolitionists posed a clear 
danger to the Choctaws who feared that Texans could invade the nation in search of 
abolitionists at any time.   
 In addition to pressures from the neighboring states, the new Choctaw 
government had to contend with threats from the U.S. federal government.  Southern 
newspapers reported that at the 1860 Republican Convention presidential candidate 
William Seward boldly proclaimed that “Indian Territory, also, south of Kansas must be 
vacated by the Indians” and that land claims should be extinguished.  Seward’s 
declaration made no distinction between “acculturated” Native Americans like the 
Choctaws and raiding Native Americans like the Comanche.  Seward formally asserted 
that slavery should be banned by a “higher law” than the Constitution—the laws of God 
and nature—and that the rights of states and territories were subordinate to this law.42  
Newspapers throughout the United States, including those that filtered into the Choctaw 
Nation like the Cherokee Advocate, the Northern Standard, and New Orleans Picayune, 
reprinted the incendiary speech.  Though Seward was not chosen as the Republican 
candidate, he had a large role in drafting the party platform which also included the goal 
of prohibiting the spread of slavery in the territories.
43
   
Seward’s threat of additional Indian removal and the Republican aim to prohibit 
the spread of slavery served as warnings for the Choctaw Nation.  For twenty-years 
Congress had repeatedly attempted to combine the Choctaw Nation with neighboring 
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Indian held lands into one “Indian Territory” under United States jurisdiction.  Had this 
come to fruition, the Choctaws would be part of a territory that could have slavery 
prohibited, or, even worse, a place like Kansas where “popular sovereignty” and “settler 
sovereignty” led to violent invasions.44  Thus, less than one year removed from the 
constitutional crises, the Choctaws once again found themselves a facing a threat that 
could destroy the nation.   
This crisis stirred Robert M. Jones back into action.  Jones had experienced a 
great deal of sorrow while living outside “the Indian Politick” in 1860.  He suddenly 
lost his wife of twenty-three years, Susan Colbert Jones, to an unknown illness in 
January.  His lone surviving child, Francis, married a prominent Chickasaw named 
Robert Love only two months before.  Jones likely approved of the match, but Francis’ 
marriage left him devoid of family at Rose Hill. The tide began to turn in 1861.  Jones 
married Elizabeth Earls, a white teacher at Armstrong Academy twenty-one years his 
junior.  Elizabeth was pregnant within one month with Jones’ second daughter, Mary 
Elizabeth Jones.  They planned to have more children and continue developing 
education within the nation all while prospering financially.
45
     
Formal political retirement might have suited Jones, but Seward’s speech and 
Lincoln’s election pulled him back into the political arena.  Should a man like Seward 
have his way, removal and emancipation would begin with Native slaveholders.  
Indians held a shaky racial position in a system based on a black-white dichotomy.  
Even the most acculturated Native Americans were still not white, making their right to 
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hold slaves ambiguous.  As historian Donna Akers surmises, Choctaw slaveholding was 
“doubly-offensive” to white Northerners in that “not only did they (Choctaws) practice 
an odious institution…but also usurped the exclusive prerogative of white America in 
erecting a racial hierarchy” with themselves on top.  As a man who had personally 
witnessed removal rhetoric become reality, Jones knew that speeches like Seward’s 
were hardly innocuous.
46
   
 Yet, the growing sectional crises in the United States presented the Choctaws 
with both a palpable threat and incredible opportunity.  In the 1830s, only South 
Carolina contemplated open rebellion over federal versus state power and President 
Jackson’s perceived dictatorial actions.  By 1860, fears over radical policies of the 
incoming Lincoln administration caused more than just South Carolina to consider open 
rebellion against the United States.  Taking a page from the American playbook, the 
Choctaws could exploit the internal strife to force their own agenda. 
Jones and other political leaders recognized that a divided United States could 
be the key to safeguarding Choctaw interests in their land and sovereignty.  The 
imminent conflict of the Civil War was a golden opportunity for the Choctaw Nation.  
Both American factions would be forced to offer otherwise unattainable concessions to 
the Choctaws and others in order to secure their loyalty.  In many ways this was a 
continuation of the play-off system, a way in which a weaker power could play multiple 
dominant powers off of one-another, gaining power for themselves in the process.
47
  For 
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instance, for three decades the United States owed the Choctaws the profits which had 
been made from the sale of their lands, plus interest and minus the costs of removal, but 
had no real incentive to make that payment.  The so-called “net-proceeds” was 
recognized by Senate committees as approximately $3,000,000.
48
  The Choctaws could 
make their continued support contingent upon immediate payment.  To sweeten the pot, 
they could demand that Congress permanently abandon its aspirations towards forced 
allotment and territorialization.  These would be easy concessions for the United States 
to make in order to keep Choctaws out of Confederate uniforms.  
 On the other hand, the rapidly growing Confederacy would likely recognize the 
value of Indian Territory as a buffer for Arkansas and Texas and pay dearly to obtain it.  
A Confederate alliance would settle the slavery question and provided a powerful ally 
should outside forces attempt to compel abolition.  Also, linking with the Confederacy 
assured that transportation networks like the Mississippi River, Red River, and Military 
Road into Texas would remain available.  Confederate states would undoubtedly close 
these trade routes off to the Choctaws in the absence of an alliance.  The loss would be 
detrimental for businessmen like Jones but also devastating for less affluent Choctaws 
who relied upon trade goods in their everyday lives.  In the short-term, closing these 
trading pathways would deprive Choctaws stricken by five-years of drought from any 
means of receiving food aid.  In the long-term, these pathways could only be replaced 
by railroads and the inevitable white intrusions that came with railroad development. 
Key connections with powerful Confederates offered further incentive for the 
Choctaws to align the Confederacy.  Most of the Choctaws’ closest and most trusted 
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allies, including agent Douglas H. Cooper, Senator Henry Johnson, and attorney Albert 
Pike, had decided to side with the Southern cause.  For good reason the Choctaws could 
rely on these men to help secure fair treatment in a Confederate alliance.  Douglas 
Cooper had worked as agent to the Choctaws and Chickasaws for years and consistently 
acted honorably in defending Choctaw interests against United States citizens and 
government.  Chief Hudson described Cooper as “intimately acquainted with our wants 
and necessities, and his services in our time of trouble will be invaluable to us.”  The 
Chickasaws had even made him an honorary citizen of the tribe.  Before becoming a 
senator, Johnson was educated alongside Robert M. Jones, Robert Nail, Sampson 
Folsom, Pierre Juzan, and other prominent Choctaws and the Choctaw Academy in 
Blue Springs, Kentucky.  As a senator, Johnson worked with Choctaw delegations to 
further their agendas and drafted what most believed to be a fair and minimally-
intrusive territorialization bill.
49
  Albert Pike felt financially connected to the Choctaws, 
giving him ample motivation to ensure fair treatment of their pecuniary interest.  The 
loss of these men as allies would be a significant blow. 
  Moreover, Choctaws still living in Mississippi would almost certainly join the 
Confederate cause following Mississippi’s secession.  Choctaws in Indian Territory had 
kept in contact with their brethren who had remained in Mississippi after removal.  
Officially as citizens of the state of Mississippi, these Choctaws were subject to 
conscription and service in the Confederate Army.  Donning a Confederate uniform 
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would mean fighting alongside their relatives while an American uniform could mean 
pitting brother against brother.
50
  
With the secession crises and an impending civil war, the United States halted 
the delivery of annuity payments to the Choctaws out of fear that they would fall into 
rebel hands.  The absence of this money further bolstered the claims made by 
neighboring Texans, Arkansans, and Louisianans in the General Council that the federal 
government ceased to exist and would not honor its previous promises.  Taken together, 
going against the South would mean going against commercial interest, and quite 
literally fighting friends, fraternal brothers, and distant clan members to defend a nation 
that was once again violating its treaty obligations.   
  Neutrality was a third option only in the impractical event that both warring 
parties respected the Choctaws neutrality rights and individual Choctaws avoided the 
conflict.  Neutrality could only work if the war was brief and both sides discounted the 
value of Indian Territory.  This was highly unlikely considering the Choctaw’s strategic 
geopolitical location as a buffer for several Confederate states, the large number of 
potential soldiers Native soldiers, and vast livestock holdings.  A single discontent 
party, perhaps still upset about the recent constitutional fiasco, could form an 
unauthorized alliance and drag the Choctaws into the conflict.   
This was the fate of the Cherokees and Creeks who had divided leadership make 
conflicting alliances.  For the Cherokees, John Ross attempted neutrality by expressing 
Southern sympathies but refusing an alliance.  His long-time political rival Stand Watie 
seized the opportunity to gain a political upper-hand and started recruiting Confederate 
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soldiers.  Ross tacitly accepted a Confederate alliance, only to switch sides with his own 
political followers called the Keetoowas.  For the Creeks, lower-Creek William “Chilly” 
McIntosh courted a Confederate alliance while aging upper-Creek Opothleyahola and 
his followers attempted to stay neutral in the conflict.  The result was Creek and 
Cherokee civil wars within the United States Civil War, in which Creeks and Cherokees 
in various uniforms killed each other in large numbers.  Their cases illustrated both the 
dangers of having a split leadership and the impracticality of favoring neutrality.
51
 
Despite all of the potential advantages of each alliance, leading Choctaws knew 
that an alliance with either side could also be courting disaster.  Simply making a choice 
would invite an invasion by a foreign army and could lead to retribution if caught 
backing the losing side.  A Confederate alliance would permanently halt annuity 
payments from the United States and void unpaid debt, including the approximately 
$3,000,000 in net proceeds.   For the first time ever, in 1860 Congress seemed on the 
verge of appropriating these funds.  The Senate appropriated $500,000 as an advance 
while they deliberated on the final amount after Senator Robert Ward Johnson pleaded 
that “after thirty years, for God’s sake, give them a small part of that which is justly 
their own.”52   
On the other hand, negotiating a continued Union alliance would require 
thousands of Union soldiers to protect against neighboring Confederate troops in Texas 
and Arkansas.  The United States was under treaty obligations to defend each of the 
Five Tribes against any foreign invaders, but these same treaties demanded that the 
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United States pay net proceeds which had never been paid.  Right on cue, American 
troops assigned to Indian Territory retreated to Kansas at the first sign of potential 
conflict.  The United States also halted all annuity payments out of fears that they would 
be intercepted and used towards the Confederacy.  Without troops for defense and 
expected money, many predicted that invading Texans would use “whiskey fires” and 
force to compel complicity with the South.
53
  Even if a Union alliance was successful, 
the absence of friends like Senator Johnson would leave the Choctaws unlikely to 
realize the remaining net proceeds and further the likelihood that Republicans could 
pursue a plan of forced removal and territorialization.  In essence, both alliance options 
and neutrality contained potential benefits tied to perilous pitfalls.   
Worse yet, pursuing any option ran the risk of the dividing the Choctaws 
between sides, inevitably plunging them into their own civil war.  Most historians 
teleologically ignore this potential outcome.  Considering that the Choctaws were 
operating under a new constitution and under one year removed from a potential civil 
war, the prospect of an internal divide was not implausible.  To avoid this outcome, the 
Choctaws needed a force that could unite the various factions—progressives who still 
demanded a more American-style Choctaw Nation, moderates wanting to preserve key 
distinctions between Choctaws and Americans, and traditionalists wanting to remain 
undisturbed in established life-styles and government.  Once united, the Choctaws could 
confidently align with whichever side would offer a better deal and protect Choctaw 
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interests.  Jones emerged from his political absence to unite the Choctaws on a course of 
action.
54
 
The role of unifying and guiding the Choctaw people through the crises 
technically fell upon Principal Chief George Hudson.  Hudson had lived a life very 
similar to Jones.  Both were born in Mississippi in 1808 to white fathers and Choctaw 
mothers.  Both were appointed Captains during removal and led moderately large 
parties from Mississippi to Indian Territory.  They also lost their fathers at young ages 
and had to depend on kin.  They served together multiple times on the General Council.  
Hudson also held a slave, something that allowed him to gain a political edge in the 
contest for Principal Chief over competitor Joseph Dukes who was believed to tolerate 
abolitionism.  However, this is where their similarities ended.  Hudson was a slender 
six-plus feet tall, described as having a “prominent forehead, Roman nose…with a 
graceful swanlike neck” to Jones’ stout five-foot seven, awkward blind eye, and 
hawkish look of determination.  Hudson studied law and was considered “an eloquent 
pleader” whereas Jones studied business and approached opposition with more bravado 
than suaveness.
55
 
Following Texas’s secession in March of 1861, the General Council called for a 
special session in June at which Hudson was tasked with making a recommendation on 
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which course to pursue.  The Council had earlier stated their preference for the Southern 
position, but offered no thorough plan of action.  Texans almost instantly demonstrated 
that they would not be a neutral party in the Choctaw’s decision.  A committee with the 
official blessing from the state government of Texas attended a meeting in March 
between the Choctaws and Chickasaws, presented their argument for secession then 
exited.
56
  Other unofficial “vigilance committees” sought out those they believed to be 
threats to a Choctaw-Confederate alliance.  These extra-legal mobs were often joined by 
prominent Choctaws who tactically outwitted them and limited their overall damage.  
Texas vigilantes primarily targeted missionaries, almost all of whom they suspected of 
abolitionism based on deep connections with Northern states and anti-slavery churches.  
Only two years before, parties from Texas had failed in lobbying efforts to oust the 
missionaries associated with the Northern-based American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions for an alleged bias towards abolitionism.  Now, with an impending 
war, Texans felt little need to restrain their actions to legal measures.
57
  
Choctaws once again impeded the intrusion of Texans.  In one case Choctaw 
Calvin Howell openly vouched for a controversial missionary from Maine with obvious 
Northern sympathies, preventing a vigilance committee from interrogating him.  When 
Sampson Folsom discovered that “Texian filibusters” were “making war upon the old 
missionaries of the country,” he proposed raising “five thousand Choctaw and 
Chickasaw troops at once to keep out land pirates…to maintain the supremacy of the 
laws of the land.”  He was certain that such incursions were the precursors of “white 
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settlement in our midst.”58  Therefore, when he intercepted a Texas committee, he 
prevented them from searching Reverend Alexander Reid’s house and interrogating him 
on his views regarding the conflict.  He forcefully demanded, “gentlemen, you must not 
doubt Mr. Reid’s word.”  Considering that members of this mob had recently attempted 
to lynch a man for equating Abraham Lincoln with other presidential candidates, 
Folsom possibly saved Reid’s life.  These actions from Choctaws who supported a 
Confederate alliance—Sampson Folsom became a colonel in the Confederate Army—
demonstrate that Choctaws were determined and savvy enough to control their own fate 
and make their own decisions regarding the sectional crises.
59
 
  Despite repeated intrusions, Hudson became convinced by his long-time 
neighbor Peter Pitchlynn that neutrality offered the best course.  Fresh from 
Washington, D.C., Pitchlynn falsely claimed to have met with President Lincoln and 
assured Hudson that Lincoln would quickly restore troops and resume annuity 
payments.  Pitchlynn had his own reasons for pushing neutrality.  Chiefly, he wanted to 
receive a portion of the net proceeds claim for his services in Washington.  Pitchlynn 
even helped draft a speech for Hudson to read which outlined the necessity of avoiding 
conflict and trusting the United States government.
60
  Pitchlynn’s polemic opinion drew 
the ire of a vigilance committee from Texas which surrounded his house and threatened 
his life if he continued to oppose the Confederate cause.  Still, heading into the special 
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session, Hudson and Pitchlynn revealed their intentions to declare neutrality at a dinner 
with missionary John Edwards, claiming that “it was none of their fight.”61   
United States Choctaw Agent and Confederate officer Douglas H. Cooper 
leaked word of Hudson’s intentions days before the Council began.  Jones was 
indignant at the idea of squandering the numerous opportunities presented by a 
Confederate alliance and pursuing an obviously doomed course.  He was content to 
watch from the sidelines as bickering parties debated various constitutional forms, but 
this crisis threatened the very survival of the Choctaw Nation.  To Jones, the Choctaws 
had been thrown a life-line in the form of American Civil War, and he had no intention 
of watching it slip away in a hopeless bid towards neutrality.  Thus, Jones made a 
fateful trip from his Rose Hill plantation to the special session of the Council in 
Doaksville along with a vigilance committee from Texas.  Before Hudson could 
recommend neutrality, Jones made a furious speech in which he declared that “every 
man was not with us should be hung up to the first limb between heaven and hell.”62  
Only scant second-hand accounts exist from the proceedings at Doaksville that evening, 
but it is logical that in Jones’ speech he did far more than simply issue a violent threat.  
Undoubtedly, he laid down an elaborate case for why the Choctaws should align with 
the Confederacy.  
Hopes of neutrality disappeared with the echo of Jones’ rousing rhetoric as he 
refused to withdraw over this issue.  Either convinced by Jones’ prose or intimidated by 
his threat, Chief Hudson discarded his prepared remarks and called for an alliance with 
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the Confederacy, heralding the Choctaw entrance into the Civil War.
63
  He called for a 
special commission to form an alliance with the Confederacy and for all males to 
prepare for service in a militia or home guard.  Unlike residents of seceding states who 
burst into joy upon secession declarations, many Choctaws struck a fatalistic tone.  
Joseph Folsom went so far as to remark that “we are merely choosing the means of our 
destruction.”64 
Following his declaration, Hudson called for a committee to coordinate with the 
Chickasaws and meet with a Confederate delegation in order to negotiate the terms of a 
formal alliance for both Nations.  Fittingly, the committee elected Robert M. Jones 
president of the delegation, a position he reportedly accepted “in an able and splendid 
manner.”  Jefferson Davis appointed Albert Pike, now a Confederate officer, to 
negotiate alliances between the Confederacy and all of the Five Tribes in Indian 
Territory.  Pike and Jones’ delegation negotiated and signed a treaty between the 
Confederacy, the Choctaws, and the Chickasaws at North Fork Town in the Creek 
Nation on July 12
th
, 1861.
 65
 
****** 
Most historians characterize Pike’s work with the Choctaws as something of a 
foregone conclusion; since the Choctaws had already declared in favor of secession, it 
seemed logical that they would accept basic terms with little resistance.  One credits 
Pike for his diplomatic skill for completing a treaty at all.  Another claims that the 
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treaties did not represent the interests of the Choctaws, but were “agreed to because of 
pressure exerted by the Confederacy.”  These interpretations ignore the tremendous 
agency exercised by Jones and the Choctaws in attempting to exploit the Confederacy.  
Certainly the Confederate States had a more powerful military and in theory could force 
an alliance, but that would take time and resources better spent preparing for war with 
the Union.  Thus, the Choctaws dictated the terms of their position, not Pike or the 
Confederacy.  Jones and his team capitalized upon their advantageous position and their 
relationship with Pike to secure an incredibly favorable alliance.
66
 
Pike received strict parameters dictating what he could and could not offer 
Native nations.  He was advised that he could not offer any financial guarantees and that 
any treaty must include a commitment to forming a territorial government and the 
parceling of land.  The treaty that was actually signed, however, bore little resemblance 
to the visions of Confederate leaders.
67
  For instance, the Choctaws only accepted a 
Confederate alliance with the promise that the Confederacy agreed to assume the debt 
due to the Choctaws from previous treaties, including the approximately $3,000,000 
from the net proceeds case.  In addition, the Confederacy became responsible for 
arming and paying ten companies of Choctaw and Chickasaw soldiers who would serve 
as home guards for specific terms.  These home guards would not be required to fight 
outside their territory without approval from Choctaw authorities.  Dictating the actions 
of their troops was a key feature that separated Native polities from Confederate states, 
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offering an overt clarification that an alliance with the Confederate States did not mean 
forfeiture of sovereignty.
68
 
Beyond financial and military assistance, the treaty guaranteed the Choctaws 
sovereignty over their lands and the option of statehood on an equal basis with other 
states, should they choose to pursue it.  It also reaffirmed their right to keep their land in 
common until a majority decided upon allotment while also elucidating that “the 
Confederate States hereby solemnly agree never to use force” or any means of 
persuasion to change the Choctaws methods of holding land.  Thus, the Choctaws had 
full power to decide for themselves whether they wanted to be a full part of the 
Confederacy or a disjoined ally.  If they rejected both statehood and territorialization, 
they would still enjoy immediate representation in the Confederate House of 
Representatives.
69
  
Choctaws wanted immediate representation to secure their interests in the 
Confederacy.  As early as 1824, legendary Choctaw chief Pushmataha had predicted the 
Choctaws would eventually gain Congressional representation.  In 1830, delegates at 
the treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek in 1830 requested “the privilege of a Delegate on 
the floor of the House of Representatives,” which Congress subsequently ignored.70  
Therefore, with Pike and the Confederacy, the Choctaws did not leave the matter to an 
aspiration that would quickly be discarded once an alliance was secured.  With a 
delegate in Congress, the Choctaws would no longer have to send delegations with the 
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hope that congressmen would eventually raise their concerns to the floor.  A standing 
Choctaw member could instead be part of an active lobby, coordinate with the Council, 
and better protect Choctaw interests. 
  Finally, Pike committed the Confederacy to constructing and maintaining a 
court inside the Choctaw Nation that would be responsible for mediating disputes 
between Confederate citizens and Choctaws.  Securing this court inside the Choctaw 
Nation was a major step towards protecting autonomy.  All too often grievances 
between Euro-Americans and Choctaws had resulted in Choctaws placing their lives on 
hold while they traveled to Arkansas or Texas to defend themselves in a trial in front of 
a white judge and white jury.  Most could not make the trip, a reality which Americans 
used to exploit Choctaws and other Natives.  Jones had experienced this inconvenience 
in multiple disputes over ownership of slaves.  A local court, along with the provision 
that the Choctaws have “full jurisdiction, judicial and otherwise, over persons and 
property within their respective limits” would circumvent this inconvenience.71 
At the same time, the treaty contained numerous provisions aimed at 
distinguishing between the sovereignty of the Choctaw Nation and Confederate States.  
The Choctaws were left to decide how much autonomy and sovereignty they wished to 
maintain.  They could choose to vote for statehood and enter as an equal member of the 
Confederacy, or they could choose to keep a great distance between themselves and 
Richmond.  Given the Confederacy’s feelings on the right of secession, they had the 
option to break from the confederacy.  The terms of the treaty allowed Choctaws to 
decide to whether to send their troops to fight alongside Lee’s Army of Northern 
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Virginia or to position them on their borders in Indian Territory.  With these choices 
came power, and vested in this power was a clear recognition of both sovereignty and 
the right to autonomy within the Confederate alliance.  These provisions fit with one of 
Hudson’s instructions to the committee, “be united and forbearing and endeavor to 
preserve that great heritage of all free men, the right of self-government.”72          
In one crafty treaty negotiation, the Choctaws addressed decades-old grievances 
and re-legitimized their claim to sovereignty while gaining representative in the 
Confederate Congress.  Other than an allowance for railroad development, their only 
obligation for such auspicious terms was that they accept an additional subsidy of 
money and weapons to defend their own territory.  Far and away, this was the most 
favorable treaty that the Choctaws had ever negotiated with an external power.  The 
treaty was so radical and one-sided that a perplexed Jefferson Davis publically 
questioned whether or not large sections of it were even constitutional.  Davis felt that 
the power to admit states was a right held exclusively by the House of Representatives.  
He also doubted “whether the proposed concessions in favor of their local governments 
are within the bounds of a wise policy” and suggested that Congress debate if it was 
“impolitic” to allow such drastic, permanent guarantees.73 
Davis’s words foreshadowed a relatively simple treaty ratification with only 
minor alterations.  Confederate Representative Henry Ward Johnson agreed with Davis 
regarding statehood and added the provisions that Congress would have to accept the 
Choctaw Nation as a state and that the state would have to join with other Native 
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nations to become one state.  They also decided to limit the power of Indian 
representatives to that of delegate with the ability to introduce bills that pertained to 
Natives.  The Choctaws would be forced to share a delegate with the Chickasaws, with 
the delegate being alternatively chosen from each polity.  Chief Hudson recognized that 
these modifications were trivial and advised the General Council to accept the new 
stipulations.  After accepting these amendments, they naturally selected Jones to serve 
as their first and only delegate to Congress.
74
 
Albert Pike’s longstanding relationship with Jones and the Choctaw Nation 
proved favorable for the Choctaws in the treaty negotiations.  Undoubtedly, 
Confederate desperation for allies factored into Pike’s acquiescence on long-term 
commitments, the consequences of which could mostly be put off until the war was 
over, as well as low-cost short-term concessions.  In effect, Pike leveraged short-term 
gains against long-term costs.  He had also just left the Cherokee Nation where he failed 
to convince Chief John Ross to join the Confederate cause.  Two consecutive failures 
on a mission that was expected to be easy did not endear the ambitious Pike to his 
superiors.  Other factors also impacted the outcome of the negotiations between Pike 
and Jones. 
Jones and Pike had connections through the fraternal order of the Freemasons.  
In 1859, Pike had been elected “Sovereign Grand Commander of the Southern 
Jurisdiction” and Mason of the 33rd degree, a rank he held for the rest of his life.  His 
personal library of masonic writings was so extensive and revered that Union General 
(and fellow Mason) Thomas Hart Benton, Jr. personally saved it from being burned.  
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Jones was also an inaugural officer of the Doaksville Lodge, one of two in Indian 
Territory, which acted under the authority of the Grand Lodge of Arkansas.  Jones held 
one of three officer positions in the Doaksville Lodge.  He also adorned his personal 
rifle with elaborate silver inlays filled with masonic imagery and was revered by the 
masonic order even decades after his death.  Masonic doctrine dictated that members 
conduct business justly and equitably, something both men would have applied in their 
negotiations with one another.  Pike, the author/compiler of Morals and Dogma of the 
Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry, was well aware of such 
requirements in negotiating with a fellow Mason.  Jones, a cerebral, tactical 
businessman well-versed in the art of negotiation would not have discarded the 
advantages that this brought.
75
 
In addition to masonic fraternal ties, Jones and Pike were both aware that unless 
the Confederacy agreed to recognize and fulfill treaty obligations of the United States to 
the Choctaws, Pike believed he would lose a substantial legal fee from the net proceeds 
claim.  If paid in total, Pike expect to collect $150,000 (5% of approximately 3,000,000) 
for his services.  Moreover, as Senator Henry Johnson had pointed out in Congress, 
treaties between the United States and the Choctaws were the legal basis of American 
ownership for the state of Mississippi.  Failing to recognize their legitimacy could 
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logically mean that half of Mississippi still belonged to the Choctaws.
76
  The practical 
ramifications towards Mississippi statehood were admittedly flimsy, but the 
ramifications towards Pike’s finances were serious.  Thus, whether Jones appealed to 
the better angels of Pike’s masonic nature, his legal conscience, or his pocketbook, the 
power in these negotiations firmly rested on the side of the Choctaws which netted 
overwhelming gains. 
Clearly Jones and his cohort took advantage of the impending war as an 
unprecedented opportunity to protect their long-term sovereignty against a constantly-
encroaching United States.  After years of negotiating from a position of decreasing 
power, the Choctaws held the trump cards and played them to their full effect.  The 
treaty also demonstrates that the Choctaw delegation and leadership was not simply a 
self-interested cohort forcing an alliance on traditional Choctaws for their own interests.  
Protecting slavery might have only benefitted a few, but adding a court inside the 
Choctaw Nation, refusing territorialization and allotment, resuming annuities, and 
confirming local sovereignty benefitted all Choctaws regardless of affluence or 
acculturation.  Jones’ specific demands and Pike’s acquiescence demonstrates that 
leading Choctaws placed national concerns first and personal desires second. 
***** 
The General Council, however, did not remain content to bet the future of their 
nation on a favorable Confederate alliance—the stakes were too high and opposing 
powers too strong.  In July of 1861, immediately prior to forming alliances with Pike, 
Hudson asked the Council to select delegates for a convention “of all Indian tribes…for 
the purpose of perpetuating…peace and harmony…and to act in concert in 
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confederating themselves together for the mutual safety in defense of our country 
against invasion.”  At this convention, delegates formed the “United Nations of Indian 
Territory,” which included the Five Tribes and Caddo Indians from Texas.  This second 
alliance served numerous important purposes.  Formally aligning with neighboring 
Natives instantly augmented the Native clout within the Confederacy.  From disease, 
famine, and environmental factors, the Choctaw population (not counting slaves or 
white men) had fallen to 13,666 at the outbreak of war.  A population this low could not 
hope to command the Confederacy’s attention should it be needed.  The 73,274 of the 
combined five tribes clearly stood a better chance of safeguarding the guarantees 
reached with Confederate treaties.
77
 
Forming these alliances clarified that the Choctaws intended to simply align 
with instead of be subsumed by Confederacy.  Jones personally lobbied for a provision 
that would allow Natives polities to break-away from their Confederate alliance while 
still maintaining neutral position with other Natives Americans.  This became especially 
important when Native polities needed to extract themselves from the South following 
its military defeat.  Just like aligning with the Confederate States, aligning with the 
United Nations of Indian Territory, Choctaw leaders carefully strategized to protect the 
Choctaw Nation without forfeiting its sovereign rights.
78
 
Hudson also called on the Council to pass a law “that all offences committed by 
a white man in the nation against the person or property of Indians be tried by the laws 
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of the Nation, and the same of a native against a white man.”  Proclaiming that white 
men would fall under the jurisdiction of Choctaw law regardless of birth and citizenship 
was a major assertion of sovereignty.  The Choctaws recognized the Confederate States 
as an ally, but did not forfeit their long-held rights in the process.  Instead, they 
augmented their sovereignty at the expense of a vulnerable Confederacy.
79
 
With two fresh new alliances in place, the Choctaws felt that they could securely 
weather the coming storm.  Not every Choctaw agreed with the Confederate alliance, 
just as many had disagreed with each of the constitutions passed through the 1850s.  But 
with careful calculation and a consensus on the need to protect tribal sovereignty and 
autonomy, Choctaw leaders reached agreements that the majority could support.  The 
political crises ended just in time for Choctaws to come together to face the threat of the 
Civil War.  This did not mean that the Choctaws’ problems had been solved.  Drought 
and famine still gripped the nation, leaving many without basic subsistence.  War 
loomed and though the Choctaws knew that they had the power to keep their men close 
to defend their homes, this did not mean that conflict would stay outside of the nation.  
As Jones made his plans to serve in the Confederate Congress, he must have known that 
the crises of a Choctaw civil war had been averted, but danger to the nation was far 
from over.
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CHAPTER FIVE: “DEFENSE OF THE NATION:” THE CHOCTAW CAUSE 
IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
Jones guided the Choctaws into the Civil War with confidence and optimism 
that the new treaty with the Confederacy would alleviate many of the problems 
plaguing the Choctaw Nation.  The treaty protected annuities, stipulated full 
payment for the net-proceeds claims, provided Choctaw courts with jurisdiction over 
cross-border conflict, ensured open trade networks, and reaffirmed the Choctaws’ 
right to decide the territorial question as a sovereign nation.  Moreover, Jones 
understood that guaranteed munitions and funds from the Choctaw’s new ally put 
them in a formidable position to defend their lands from any invading force.  As the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw delegate to the Confederate Congress, he personally 
planned to see that the Confederacy upheld these guarantees.  Despite the 
advantages that the alliance offered, not even the most clever and pragmatic 
Choctaw diplomacy could protect the nation from the surrounding conflict.  As the 
Choctaws found themselves “between two fires,” they struggled to remain “a nation 
within” the conflict rather than a nation dissolved by the crisis.1   
Following the formal Choctaw alliance with the Confederacy in June of 1861, 
the joint Choctaw-Chickasaw treaty council elected Robert M. Jones as their delegate to 
the Confederate Congress in July.
2
  Jones had to choose between remaining at home 
with his pregnant wife Elizabeth where he could defend his own family, property, and 
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nation within its borders, and traveling to Richmond to provide the Choctaws with a 
voice in the Confederate Congress.  Since he had insisted on the Choctaw alliance with 
the Confederacy, he sought to see that the nation wrought every advantage from the 
relationship.  Representation in the Confederate Congress ensured that Choctaws could 
negotiate on equal terms with representatives from the Confederate states.  Thus, as the 
Choctaw Nation prepared to defend their land and sovereignty, Jones prepared to travel 
to Richmond, Virginia, as the Choctaw’s chosen delegate.3   
Before he departed, however, several immediate issues arose in the wake of the 
new alliance.  These initial problems foreshadowed many of the troubles that the 
Choctaws faced throughout the war.  Because the treaty with the Confederacy promised 
that Choctaw soldiers would receive prompt payment in hard currency, Jones began 
personally enlisting soldiers with the pledge that they would receive this form of 
compensation.  Next, he began equipping Choctaw soldiers with many of the supplies 
necessary for extended periods in the field by opening up his store houses and providing 
thousands of pounds of flour, sugar, salt, coffee, and bacon, bushels of corn, and bridles 
for horses.
4
  He expected quick remuneration from Confederate officials since Pike’s 
treaty obliged them to provide such provisions themselves.  Instead, Jones’ claims for 
reimbursement lingered for years or were never paid.
5
  Worse still, Confederate soldiers 
unconnected with the Choctaws began seizing and damaging his property.  Several 
wagons disappeared after they had been loaded with corn and other supplies.  Even 
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before he had arrived at the Confederate Congress in Richmond, Jones had to send a 
plea to receive reimbursement for the property stolen and damaged by his supposed 
allies. Clearly, the war did not start out as Jones had planned but eager to ensure that the 
Choctaws and Chickasaws had an advocate to protect their stake in this new political 
relationship, Jones travelled to Richmond, Virginia.
6
    
***** 
 Not only was the Civil War a watershed moment in American history, it was 
also a seminal point in Choctaw history.  The conflict had large scale consequences 
for leaders like Jones and Pitchlynn whose diplomacy and political acumen 
negotiated their entry, as well as ordinary Choctaw men who entered service, 
Choctaw women who remained on the home-front, and Choctaw slaves whose very 
freedom was at stake.  Surprisingly, the subject of Choctaws in the Civil War has 
garnered relatively limited attention from historians.
7
 
A handful of early histories attributed Choctaw participation in the Civil War 
either to the coercion on the part of the Confederacy or the sympathies between a 
handful of elite Choctaw slave-owners and white Southerners.  These conclusions do 
not attempt to examine the perspective of common Choctaws and subsequently portray 
them as a passive majority unable to make their own decisions regarding the war.  More 
recently, historians including Clara Sue Kidwell and Mark Lause have complicated 
these interpretations by exploring the Choctaws’ apparent desire to abandon the 
                                                 
6
 G. A. Schwarzamen to Major R. C. Newton, July 4, 1862, The War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. 15 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1902), 487 (Hereafter cited as “Official Records”); Journal of the Congress 
of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865, Vol. 6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1905), 455. 
7
 The Cherokees are far and away the most documented Native Americans in Civil War studies, 
followed shortly by the Creeks.  This likely stems from their internal civil war and the massive 
destruction that it caused, as well as historical figures like Opothleyahola and Stand Watie.  
207 
 
Confederate cause long before the end of the war.  Even these studies, however, focus 
heavily on Confederate leadership, rather than the Choctaw soldiers, civilians, and 
slaves.
8
  Consequently, these interpretations fail to consider the ways in which 
Choctaws engaged in the conflict as citizens of a sovereign indigenous nation 
aligned with the South, rather than subordinate to the South.  This chapter 
demonstrates that the Choctaw Nation engaged in the Civil War in order to fight for 
a distinct Choctaw cause that did not match the broader goals of Southern slave-
holding states in the Confederacy and maintained their status as a united and 
autonomous nation throughout the conflict.  Moreover, it highlights the diverse 
experiences of Choctaw leaders, soldiers, women, slaves and citizens of other Indian 
nations whose lives were disrupted as the Civil War enveloped Indian Territory. 
Despite the fact that the Choctaw Nation had itself been on the brink of its 
own civil war only one year before, it entered the Civil War as a unified force. 
Political factionalism persisted but did not challenge the collective sense of Choctaw 
nationhood. Those who had been political adversaries during the Constitutional 
Crisis set aside their ambitions and fought to protect and advance the nation.  
Choctaw leaders personally enlisted troops, lobbied for supplies, and in many cases 
led soldiers into battle.  Politically and culturally conservative Choctaws also rallied 
behind the cause and revitalized traditional practices, including dances, paint 
adornment, and scalping in battle.  Together, the Choctaws entered and fought the 
war as a single political entity whose members considered themselves a sovereign 
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ally of the Confederacy and not under its authority.  Unlike the Creek and Cherokee 
Nations whose members split along Confederate and Union lines, very few 
Choctaws—approximately 212—defected to the Union cause.  This unity combined 
with their advantageous geopolitical position south of the Canadian River in 
Oklahoma, allowed the Choctaws to better defend their territory than the 
neighboring Indian nations.
9
   
Unity did not mean that the Choctaws fell in lockstep behind the Confederate 
war effort.  In June 1861, before official treaty negotiations with the Confederacy, 
Chief Hudson issued a proclamation to the Choctaw citizens explaining the reasons 
for proposed alignment with the Confederacy.  His proclamation declared that 
slavery lay at the heart of the dispute between the Northern and Southern states but 
implied that this was not the case for the Choctaws.  Instead, Hudson clarified that 
the Choctaws’ alliance with the Confederacy resulted from the dangers posed by 
Union against the Choctaw Nation.  He reminded citizens that the United States 
“refused to pay us our money…and have abandoned the military posts placed in our 
country for our protection.”  Moreover, he concluded that “there is a strong 
possibility our country will be invaded.”  He called for all Choctaw men between the 
ages of eighteen and forty-five to prepare for service in a home guard capacity.  He 
also asked for volunteers to serve in mounted regiment of Choctaw and Chickasaw 
riflemen.  Hudson made clear that these volunteers would be used for “defense of 
the Nation at a minute’s warning” and “to defend the country (against) all disorderly 
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and unlawful acts.”10  However, as the political turmoil of the 1858 Constitutional 
Crisis indicated, the edict of a Choctaw leader, even a popular moderate like 
Hudson, could lead to violent chaos if implemented without the consent of the 
people.  Hudson, Jones, and other leaders feared the Civil War could potentially 
reignite the barely contained political fires.  Consequently, after securing the 
Confederate alliance, Choctaw leaders made uniting their people behind the 
Choctaw cause their first priority. 
 Part of achieving unified support for the Confederate alliance coincidentally 
involved protecting dissenters who did not agree with the Confederate alliance, but 
supported the Choctaw cause.  For instance, Jones and others recognized that 
missionaries who had Northern ties, open anti-slavery ideologies, and long-rumored 
abolitionist sentiment would need safe asylum either inside or outside of the 
Choctaw Nation.  Leaders feared that within this volatile climate,  some Choctaws or 
Texans would take Jones’ passionate oratory about hanging the opposition to heart.  
Even as Jones spoke, William Harkins interrupted and declared that missionary John 
Edwards should be hanged for abolitionism.  Texans had often accused the 
missionaries of abolitionist sentiment, while politicians from various states sent 
confidential letters warning of secret abolitionist plots by various missionaries.
11
  
Yet, by the 1860s many missionaries were very popular with much of the Choctaw 
population.  Any actions against them could spark an internal conflict against the 
Confederate alliance.   
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Jones, Hudson, and Choctaw agent Douglas Cooper acted quickly to preempt 
any violence.  Together, they sent three letters to John Edwards via Choctaw Nancy 
Duke.  Hudson’s letter vouched for Edward’s character and “enjoined and required 
all Choctaws or others within the Choctaw Nation to allow Mr. Edwards and family 
to proceed in peace and without hindrance or molestation.”  Cooper signed a brief 
note certifying a passport for Edwards and his family, which would carry legal 
weight throughout the Confederacy.  Finally, Jones signed a note certifying 
Edwards’ character “as a gentlemen and a minister” who was “in no way tinctured 
with abolition sentiments.”  Edwards successfully “escaped” from the South with his 
full family intact.
12
  Reverends Cyrus Byington and Cyrus Kingsbury, both over 
sixty-five years old and in constant poor health, suspended their missions and 
remained within the nation staying safe so long as they were in favor with the 
general population.
13
  As soon as the war began, Choctaws worked to protect even 
missionaries with open abolitionist sympathies because of their service to the nation 
and their deep ties within Choctaw communities.  This strongly contrasts with the 
actions of white Americans in Southern states who tried to violently expel 
abolitionists out of fear they would uproot the social order ensured by slavery.
14
  
 In addition to protecting law and order, officials led by Jones immediately 
began recruiting an army to defend the Choctaw Nation.  Unlike Cherokee 
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Confederate leader Stand Watie who used force and conscription to raise a Cherokee 
army, Jones convinced rank and file Choctaws to join the Choctaw Home Guard 
using practical incentives and appealing to their sense of Choctaw Nationalism.  
Jones encouraged Chief Hudson and other Choctaw leaders responsible for troop 
recruitment to remind men that the alliance “will not require us to go outside of our 
nation unless in state of emergency, and will permit us to return home and attend to 
our farms.”  Jones explained that “under these assurances, I have went to work, and 
raised two companies of 75 or 80 men—each in our country.”  He personally 
equipped the men he recruited with supplies from several of his stores, including 
“Jones and Thebo” in Doaksville and Skullyville.  Other leading Choctaws, 
including Lycurgus Pitchlynn, Sampson Folsom, and Tandy Walker followed suit  
and recruited men based on the necessity of a military force to protect the Nation.  
Within months, they enlisted able-bodied men to serve in the First and Second 
Choctaw Regiments of an Indian Brigade.
15
 
 Though Jones, Peter Pitchlynn, and other powerful Choctaw leaders largely 
dictated the political decision to enter the Civil War on the national level, focusing 
on their motivations and actions ignores the agency of ordinary Choctaws during 
this period.   This interpretative trap has largely silenced the voices of the Choctaw 
majority who actively partook in the Choctaw politics leading into the conflict and 
voluntarily took up arms to protect their lives, territory, and political sovereignty 
during the war.  The daily lives of non-slaveholding Choctaws did not revolve 
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around the institution of slavery or a red-black racial dichotomy.  Nevertheless, 
thousands of Choctaws consented to a Confederate alliance and actively joined the 
effort to defend their home from invasion.
16
  Oral accounts from Choctaw veterans 
and their descendants provide glimpses into how non-elites experienced the war 
years and offer insight into their motivations for engaging in the conflict.  
Throughout the Civil War, ordinary citizens negotiated their own meanings of 
nationhood and demonstrated remarkable agency in defense of their political 
autonomy. 
Choctaws enlisted in Confederate service for a variety of reasons.  Many 
agreed with Jones and other leaders that joining the Confederate cause meant 
protecting their homes from outside invaders.  The treaty stipulation that Choctaws 
would not have to leave the confines of Indian Territory without consent provided 
reassurance that their efforts would go towards home protection.  Ordinary soldiers 
understood that they were political allies of the Confederacy against the common 
enemy, Union invaders, rather than a subordinate state within the Confederacy.
17
  
The guarantee of a regular salary and food rations also offered a powerful incentive.  
After three years of progressively worsening drought, the assurance of basic food 
supplies for Choctaw subsistence farmers proved highly desirable.  
Moreover, wartime service offered Choctaw men of varying ages a vehicle 
through which they could reclaim any perceived deficiencies in masculinity 
                                                 
16
 For instances on how this differs with the Confederate cause, see: James McPherson, What 
They Fought For 1861-1865 (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), 54.  
17
 Vine Deloria and Raymond J. Demallie, Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, 
Agreements, and Conventions, 1775-1979 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 603-607; 
Robert M. Jones to George Hudson, August 22, 1863, Box 3, Folder 112; “Interview with Elizabeth 
Kemp Mead,” vol. 61, interview 6218, IPH, WHC. 
213 
 
stemming from an inability to provide subsistence during the terrible droughts.   The 
warrior role was the most masculine in Choctaw society.  Choctaw leaders 
understood this fact and continuously relied upon masculine rhetoric to convince 
men to enlist.  Even as the Confederate cause waned, leaders like Pitchlynn lauded 
Choctaws who “had fought like brave men,” and called for more to “risk every 
hazard” in defending refugee “women and children.”    He further called on them to 
approach upcoming difficulties “as becomes men, and as faithful sentinels upon our 
national right, and as patriots true to the great inheritance bequeathed us by our 
forefathers, that of freemen.”18  Even Confederate leaders like General Maxey 
frequently evoked masculine tones in praising Choctaw troops for their bravery and 
ongoing cooperation with the Confederacy.
19
   
Also, preparing for war was a traditional way of unifying Choctaws against a 
common adversary.  As one historian put it, the Civil War provided Choctaws an 
opportunity to “quit killing each other” while “turning their aggression against the 
outside enemy.”20  Sometimes enlisted Choctaws engaged in traditional wartime 
practices.  At one Council meeting, A. E. Folsom reported seeing “more Choctaws 
there than I ever saw,” who had gathered to dance and watch him receive a new 
honored name for his part in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek.  Later, the “the leading 
men” gave speeches in favor of the cause and held a large traditional dance.  Events 
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of this nature solidified the connection between enlisting in the war and advancing 
the Choctaw cause.
21
 
The speed and excitement with which Choctaws flocked to active duty in the 
Confederate army pleased the Confederate authorities.  Respected Confederate 
General Ben McCulloch noted that by July 18th, only two-weeks after forging the 
alliance, the Second Choctaw Regiment was fully formed and ready for service.  The 
Choctaw and Chickasaw agent-turned-Confederate, General Douglas Cooper, 
elected to stay with the Choctaws and wrote to Jefferson Davis claiming to be able 
to field 10,000 warriors between the Choctaws and Chickasaws if proper supplies 
could be sent.  Cooper undoubtedly knew that his goal of 10,000 soldiers could not 
be met in a population of under 23,000, but likely believed that inflated numbers 
along with a personal relationship with Davis would hasten the arrival of supplies.   
The Confederacy did not make outfitting Indian troops a priority despite their treaty 
obligation to supply the arms necessary for Choctaws to defend their home from 
Union invasion.  Weapons did eventually trickle into the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
regiments after repeated appeals by Choctaw leaders.  By August 1861, Cooper led  
the full Indian Brigade to respond to a Creek uprising against the Confederate 
alliance.
22
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Aged Upper Creek leader Opothleyahola refused to respect the alliance made 
by the Lower Creeks with the Confederacy.  “Loyal” Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees, 
and some runaway slaves flocked to Opothleyahola in hopes of avoiding the 
conflict.  These men continued to believe that the Union would uphold their treaties, 
whereas the Choctaws gave up on the Union and formed a new alliance. 
Opothleyahola wrote to Abraham Lincoln requesting military assistance to protect 
neutral and loyal Creeks, Seminoles, and other Indians.  Opothleyahola famously 
reminded Lincoln that his “memory is good” regarding the United States’ obligation 
to protect the Creeks from outsiders, but “now the wolf has come.”  Opothleyahola’s 
plight received much press and gained national attention. A former missionary to the 
Choctaws even petitioned the state department to allow him to lead a commission to 
“teach them to drill and help them fight and encourage the Union feeling among the 
Indians.”  Nevertheless, Lincoln had no forces in Indian Territory that could readily 
assist.  United States authorities informed Opothleyahola and his 7,000 followers 
that they could offer protection and asylum only if they could march to Kansas.  
Many elderly men and women and young children comprised Opothleyahola’s 
followers.  Most lacked shoes, food, and other necessary supplies to make a winter 
march across the icy plains.
23
   
Confederate officials feared that Opothleyahola’s numbers could grow and 
eventually undermine their alliances and stronghold in Indian Territory.  Cooper held 
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the task of taking his newly-formed Indian regiments and either convincing 
Opothleyahola to comply with the Confederate treaty or to drive them out of Indian 
Territory.  On November 19
th
, Cooper sent his brigade, which consisted of 
Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, Creeks, and Texans, to drive out 
Opothleyahola’s “loyal” Creek and Seminole warriors from Rounded Mountain in 
Eastern Oklahoma.
24
  One Texan scorned the Confederate Indian troops.  He made 
note of their traditional attire and “lack of order” while remarking that “if there is an 
enemy near at hand our Indian brethren will certainly be cut up.”  His prediction 
proved incorrect.  Instead, when Opothleyahola’s warriors surprised Cooper’s men 
by opening fire and burning the surrounding prairies, the Texans panicked and 
began to retreat while “Colonel Cooper with his Choctaws met them 
(Opothleyahola) & in a bloody fight of 15 minutes turned them back.”25  Despite 
racial stereotyping and even harassment by their Texas allies, the Choctaws 
demonstrated discipline and poise under fire despite limited training.    
This battle, known as the Battle of Round Mountain, was one of three large 
strategic retreats in which Cooper’s Indian soldiers, along with Texas and Arkansas 
units, forced Opothleyahola’s followers along what was later named the “Trail of 
Blood on Ice.”  A slave named Phoebe Banks later recalled the ongoing scene in 
gruesome detail.  She remembered “dead all over the hills when we get away; some 
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of the Negroes shot and wounded so bad the blood run down the saddle skirts, some 
fall off their horse miles from the battle ground, and lay still on the ground.”  
Thousands of Opothleyahola’s malnourished and sick followers made it to Kansas.  
Still, over one thousand “loyal” Creeks, including Opothleyahola, were either killed, 
captured, died en route, or perished in refugee camps.
26
  This tragic campaign 
demonstrated to Choctaw and Confederate leaders the skill and poise of Indian 
troops under fire and potential for expanded use.
27
  For the Choctaws, fighting 
against Creeks, Cherokees, Seminoles, and slaves qualified as defending Indian 
Territory against those attempting to align with the Union cause. 
 Confederate authorities mistook Choctaws’ willingness to clear Indian 
Territory of perceived enemies as a zeal for the Confederate cause.  Yet, the 
Choctaws quickly clarified that their primary concern by defending Indian Territory 
from Union invasion. Choctaws soldiers, who expected the Confederacy to uphold 
its promises, began to resist Confederate demands and demonstrate their political 
autonomy as citizens of a sovereign Indian nation.  Even after the Choctaws proved 
their military skill in the “Trail of Blood on Ice” campaign, the Confederacy 
struggled to provide munitions and prompt payment as mandated by Pike’s treaty.  
Since the Confederate government and military leaders did not uphold their 
obligations, the Choctaws felt less and less inclined to stand by their alliance.  For 
instance, two-plus months without firearms caused one Confederate officer to note 
high levels of “discontent prevailing among the Indians in consequence” of delays 
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and broken promises.
28
  For their part, the Choctaws understood that certain 
circumstances could not be controlled during wartime, but they still maintained the 
power to negotiate their relationship with the Confederacy.  Remaining at home 
within the bounds of the Choctaw Nation remained the clear objective of Choctaw 
leaders and soldiers.  Choctaws’ ability to control where and when their troops 
engaged in battle with Union troops protected their political autonomy within the 
Confederate alliance.   
Albert Pike, the man who had negotiated the Choctaw’s treaty and requested 
to become a citizen before the war, learned this the hard way in the key Battle of Pea 
Ridge.  On March 1
st
, 1862, Major General Earl Van Dorn ordered Pike to gather his 
Indian soldiers and head to Missouri to meet with the forces of Generals McCulloch 
and Price.  Southern commanders designed this campaign to force the Union out of 
Missouri and Arkansas—a cause with only indirect importance for the Choctaw 
Nation.  Pike ordered the Brigade of Indian troops, including the Choctaw 
Regiments, to prepare for an extended march. Under the leadership of Stand Watie, 
the Cherokee troops complied and mustered out towards Western Missouri.  The 
Choctaws and Chickasaws, however, refused to follow the order.  Pike later recalled 
that when he attempted to press the issue with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, they 
informed him that they would not comply “until they were paid” the money owed to 
them by the Confederacy.  Pike acknowledged his lack of power over the Choctaws 
and Chickasaws who knew all too well that “by their treaties with us they could not 
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be taken out of the Indian country without their consent.”  He also reported that he 
had “no alternative but to submit.”29   
Pike spent three days attempting to secure sufficient funds to pay the 
Choctaws and Chickasaws what the Confederacy owed them for their service.  
Having distributed all he could acquire, he promised to settle any remaining balance 
once they had reached the Illinois River.  Pike then left Fort Gibson for Missouri, 
hoping that the Choctaw and Chickasaw brigades would rendezvous with him along 
the border.  Eventually he gave up and proceeded without them when a full day 
passed without Choctaw arrivals.
30
  Not only did the Choctaws realize that they 
answered to Choctaw authorities above Confederate authorities, they fully exercised 
their rights when necessary. Battles in Missouri would perhaps advance the 
Confederate cause, but were only tenuously connected to the cause of defending the 
Choctaw Nation. 
 The battle turned into a disaster for the Confederates.  General McCulloch 
was killed by a Union sharpshooter.  His second in command fell minutes later 
while attempting to retrieve his body, leaving a gap in the chain of command. The 
next morning, a Union counteroffensive drove the Confederates from the field and 
into retreat.  Into this chaos arrived the Choctaw troops under General Cooper along 
with 200 men from the Creek regiments.  These men volunteered to help cover the 
retreating supply train until it reached Elm Springs, but saw no major combat at Pea 
Ridge.
31
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To some Confederate officials, Pea Ridge demonstrated that Indian troops 
could not be relied upon and lacked loyalty.  These officials failed to realize that the 
Choctaws acted faithfully within both the terms and spirit of their alliance with the 
Confederacy.  Under their agreement, the Choctaws held the power to decide where 
and when it was worthwhile for their men to fight and die.  If the Choctaws had 
forfeited the right to choose whether or not to leave the nation--a clear violation of 
their treaty with the Confederacy--it would have yielded their autonomy to the 
power of the confederacy.  Instead, their refusal set the precedent that Choctaw 
troops would fight valiantly, but only when it fit within their own war effort of 
protecting the Choctaw Nation.  
Pike retreated with approximately 200 troops to the banks of the Red River 
on the Choctaw-Texas border after this embarrassing defeat.  He predicted that 
Union forces would exploit their victory and drive through Missouri into Texas and 
Arkansas.  To prevent this, he made camp and ordered his troops to begin 
constructing a permanent fortress that would enable “a small force to hold this place 
against a large one.”  Building this installment, which he named “Fort McCulloch” 
after slain General Ben McCulloch, required extensive labor.  Pike believed Texans 
and Choctaws would both heed his patriotic call to aid in its construction, only to 
discover that Texans no longer found him credible and most Choctaws responded 
only with “burlesque” and mockery.  The Choctaws recognized that a fort located 
along their southern border would defend them only in the unfeasible event that a 
Union attack came from the south through Texas.  They realized this was an overt 
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attempt at hoodwinking the Choctaws into building a fort that would defend Texas 
while leaving Indian Territory open to invasion.
32
 
A desperate Pike issued a public appeal to Peter Pitchlynn, and a private 
appeal to Robert M. Jones to allow the Confederate army to rent their slaves to help 
complete Fort McCulloch, as well as two others along the Texas and Arkansas 
borders.  Pike promised payment for their services, and to “treat them well, work 
them lightly, feed them, take care of them if they are sick, and have them managed 
by one of your own people.”  He solicited Simpson Folsom to vouch for the 
necessity of the fort.  Folsom agreed that Jones “ought at least put in one hundred 
hands, he having at least three hundred.”  Pike concluded by emphasizing that 
without proper fortifications he would have no choice but to flee beyond the Red 
River and allow the Choctaw Nation “to be divided out as bounty lands to northern 
soldiers.”  Abandoning Indian Territory would violate Pike’s own treaty.  Article III 
clearly stated “that under no circumstances will they permit the Northern States or 
any other enemy to overcome them and sever the Choctaws and Chickasaws from 
the Confederacy; but that they will, at any cost and all hazards, protect and defend 
them.”  It appears that Pitchlynn ignored Pike’s appeal, realizing that Pike’s 
usefulness to the Choctaw and Confederate causes had expired and his proposed fort 
was of no benefit.
33
 
Though a long-time friend to the Choctaws, Pike failed to deliver on the 
liberal terms of the alliance treaty that he helped negotiate.  He wrote scathing 
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public and private letters accusing his superior officers of squandering and 
sacrificing Indian Territory, but he also failed to be a reliable political ally to the 
Choctaw Nation.  His retreat to Fort McCulloch opened up much of Indian Territory 
to invasion, leaving the Choctaw population without adequate protection.  As one 
missionary noted, “Pike’s forces being at the Red River, they (Union forces) rather 
caught us with our breeches down.  You ought to have seen the stampede and how 
our women and children skedaddled towards Dixie.”34  Pike’s failures led the 
General Council to seek alternative allies within Confederate leadership.  They 
turned to their old agent and long-time friend Douglas Cooper.  Appealing directly 
to Jefferson Davis, the General Council advocated that Cooper receive command 
over a separate Department of Indian Territory.  This would effectively separate the 
Indian regiments’ command structure from some of the Western Confederacy.  The 
fact that the Choctaws requested a particular Major General confirms they believed 
that they maintained autonomy within the Confederate alliance.
35
  
 Davis eventually replied that the Choctaws would need to raise additional 
brigades in order to create a new department and promote Cooper to Major General, 
something Davis likely knew to be improbable.  This was part of a larger move to 
appease their Indian allies.  As a conciliatory move, the Confederacy placed Cooper 
in command of Indian Territory in the fall of 1862 after Pike was arrested, resigned, 
and charged with treason.  To further smooth over matters, Davis sent Secretary of 
the Interior S.S. Scott to personally apologize for delays in delivering supplies, 
                                                 
34
 Ramp and Ramp, Civil War in Indian Territory, 12. 
35
 “His Excellency Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States to the President of the 
Grand Council of the Six Confederate Indian Nations,” February 22, 1864, General Maxey Collection 
MSS, Gilcrease Museum, S.B. 52. 
223 
 
which “resulted from this great and terrible war” while assuring the Choctaws that 
“The Confederate Government will comply strictly with all of its engagements to 
you.”36 Despite these attempts at appeasement, Choctaws continued to promote the 
Choctaw cause as separate and more important than the larger Confederate effort, 
which baffled much of the Confederate leadership.  Those who understood and 
respected Choctaw autonomy and worked to gain the trust of this Indian nation had 
little difficulty negotiating cultural differences and finding Choctaw soldiers willing 
to follow military commands.  General Cooper, for instance, convinced Choctaw 
soldiers to march into to Newton County, Missouri, and hold their ground against a 
numerically superior Union force.
37
 
Constant defeats under Cooper did not spoil his popularity among the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw troops under his command.  Surprisingly, his popularity 
actually increased.  At Fort Gibson, for instance, “the Choctaws commenced firing 
and running forward in large numbers” against a Union entrenchment without 
receiving any orders.  The attack proved successful, but the fort remained in Union 
hands.
38
 Cooper’s poor tactics cost several Choctaw soldiers their lives at Fort 
Wayne, Fort Gibson, Perryville, and Honey Springs.  He was reportedly “drunk as a 
lord” at the Battle of Newtonia, and failed to anticipate the most basic of counter -
attacks, turning a first day victory into a second day retreat.  Certain Cherokee 
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troops took notice of this trend and deserted rather than continue to serve under 
Cooper’s tactical command.39  Yet, Choctaws continued to fight for Cooper, a man 
who understood their unique cause. 
Commanders unfamiliar with the Choctaws frequently struggled to meet their 
end objectives using Choctaw and Chickasaw troops.  Most erroneously assumed 
deficiencies of the Indian race, specifically a lack of loyalty or a failure to reach a 
certain point in “civilization” to allow for proper conduct in a modern army, caused 
Choctaws to disobey orders.  One of these men was Cooper’s superior officer, 
Brigadier General William Steele.  Steele was viewed as a competent officer who 
took immediate action to provide troops in Indian Territory with sufficient 
munitions, noting that their current gunpowder was “barely sufficient to drive the 
ball from the rifle.” But most of Steele’s contact with Natives before the war came 
in the form of fighting Comanches and Kiowas.  He believed that Indian troops 
“are…of but little value as soldiers, but they are better as friends than enemies.”  His 
experiences and accompanying prejudices left him ill-prepared for a year-long term 
in 1863 as overall commander of Indian country.
40
  
 The collective agency of common Choctaw soldiers can be gleaned from 
Steele’s frequent complaints about the Choctaw and Chickasaw troops under his 
command.  First, the Choctaws made clear that they intended to hold the 
Confederacy to the spirit of their alliance.  Choctaws could not control certain 
Confederate commitments like guns and powder, but they could others such as terms 
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of service and command structure.  As General Pike discovered at Pea Ridge, 
Choctaw soldiers recognized that they alone had the power to decide whether to 
participate in engagements outside of Indian Territory.  A confused and frustrated 
Steele bemoaned this fact when he asserted that “their allegiance to the Government 
seems to be regarded more in the light of a voluntary contribution on their part, 
susceptible of being withheld at their option, than a performance of an obligatory 
duty.”  Steele accurately assessed that the Choctaws viewed themselves as aligned 
with the Confederacy but their priorities stood with protection of Choctaw homes.  
Choctaws refused to follow orders that violated terms of the alliance.
41
   
Choctaws acted cohesively in support of trusted leaders who understood their 
priorities.  These leaders did not necessarily have to be Choctaws, but could be 
trusted white men as well.  Steele referred to these men as “Indianized white men” / 
“half-breeds” who regularly “coax and demagogue with the Indians” to  achieve their 
personal objectives, rather than use “discipline among the troops and systems in the 
various departments.”  It never dawned on Steele that the objectives of Choctaws of 
varying blood-levels and acculturation could be the same.  Choctaws consistently 
followed these “Indianized white men” and “half-breeds” over Steele, a high-
ranking Confederate officer. He attributed this to the inherent “ignorance” of 
traditional Choctaws and selfishness of men who “find no difficulty in molding the 
masses to their generally interested views.”  This upside-down power dynamic drove 
Steele mad.  In his letter of resignation, he concluded with the accurate but 
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misunderstood accusation that “among the Indians there was a settled design to 
subordinate white officers and white troops to Indian officers and Indian troops.”42     
Rather than learning part of “their language, feelings, prejudices, etc.,” the 
very factors that in Steele’s estimation allowed others to control troops under his 
command, he attempted to treat Indian troops like any other outfit of the 
Confederate Army.  They responded by repeatedly thwarting his attempts to exert 
control.  Steele saw this as disloyalty.  He and other Confederate leaders failed to 
realize that the Choctaws remained loyal to the Choctaw Nation, not the alliance that 
Confederate leaders violated from the start of the war.
43
  
In a war caused by attempts to preserve a system of race based slavery, racial 
ideology pervaded nearly every aspect of the conflict.  Civil War historians have 
frequently noted this but tend to consistently impose a black-white dichotomy to 
describe race relations in the conflict, ignoring racial constructions of Indianness.
44
  
The participation of the Choctaws and the other Five Tribes accentuates the fallacies  
of this exclusion.  No theatre had more complex racial conflict than the battles in 
Indian Territory because black, white, and red troops met in a complicated nexus of 
racial conflict.  Yet, Choctaws actions indicate that unlike white Confederate troops, 
racial ideology did not serve as a motivating factor in battle against black Union 
troops.  The Battle of Honey Springs and Poison Springs highlight this.  
On July 17
th
, 1863 black, white, and Indian soldiers from the Confederacy 
and the Union met in the Battle of Honey Springs, the largest Civil War engagement 
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in Indian Territory.  General Douglas H. Cooper led a Confederate force of 3,000 
men, including the entire Indian Brigade and white troops from Texas.  They sought 
to push the General James G. Blunt’s Union troops out of Indian Territory and 
retake Fort Gibson.  Blunt decided to go on the offensive before Cooper could 
receive an additional 3,000 troops from Arkansas.  Blunt’s forces consisted of 
Cherokee, Creek, and other Indian troops that formed the Indian Home Guard, white 
troops from Iowa and Kansas, and African American troops in 1
st
 Kansas Colored 
Regiment. A tri-racial Union Army squared off against the Confederates’ bi-racial, 
multi-national force in this unprecedented nexus of race relations in military battle.
45
 
For Confederate Cherokees, Seminoles, and Creeks, Honey Springs offered 
the opportunity to defend Indian Territory against the invading Union army and 
factions of their own nations who they considered treasonous.  “Loyal” Indians and 
Confederate Indians entered the battle determined to ensure the rightful leadership 
of their respective nations and sought vengeance against their own dissenting 
members.  Unlike the divided Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Nations, the 
Choctaws engaged in Honey Springs as a unified national force alongside their 
Confederate allies.  For the Choctaws, Honey Springs offered an opportunity to 
expel invading troops from Indian Territory.
46
   
For the Choctaws’ Confederate allies from Texas, however, Honey Springs 
offered a chance to fight and capture black Union soldiers of the 1
nd
 Kansas Colored 
Regiment in Blunt’s army.  The 1st Kansas Colored consisted of runaway slaves 
from Arkansas, Texas, and the Cherokee Nation, as well as some freedmen.  These 
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men fought for the right to live in a society free from the bonds of slavery.  As 
armed black troops, they understood that fighting against men under the Confederate 
banner meant “victory or death” with no option of peaceful surrender.  On their 
march in to battle, the Texas soldiers boasted about their inevitable success against 
the black soldiers they considered racially inferior.
47
  The Texans carried over 500 
sets of shackles, which they planned to use to enslave the African American soldiers 
who had taken up arms against them and overturned the social order. 
Unlike their Texas allies, the Choctaws viewed all of the Union soldiers – 
white and black – as comparable threats against their nation and hoped to expel them 
from Indian Territory.  They clamored for battle “with their usual intrepidity,” but 
did not enter the battle with the same racial vendetta as the white Confederate 
soldiers.  A witness to the battle, an Afro-Creek slave Lucinda Davis recalled 
hearing loud “war whoops” as the Indian Confederate soldiers approached Honey 
Springs.  Another slave remembered Confederate soldiers as “mostly young boys 
like, and they jest laughing and jollying and going on like they was at a picnic.”48  
This and other eyewitness accounts of the battle do not describe the Choctaws 
conceptualizing their enemies in the same racialized ways that the Texas soldiers 
did.   
Face to face against the 1
st
 Kansas Colored, the Confederate center line 
crumbled before the Choctaws entered the field.  After making several bold stands, 
the Choctaws fled the field “wet and disheartened by finding their guns almost 
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useless.”49  Blunt’s forces raided the supply depot at Honey Springs, including 5,000 
pounds of flour, a sizeable store of salt, meat, and sugar, two cannons, and five 
hundred small arms.  The loss of these critical supplies at Honey Springs 
represented a devastating and demoralizing blow to the Choctaw Nation. A slave 
who witnessed the battle claimed that immediately after, “Dem Indian soldiers jest 
quit de army and lots went scouting in little bunches and took everything dey find.  
Iffen somebody try to stop dem dey git killed.”50  Choctaws understood that they 
failed the Choctaw cause in this engagement by failing to defend their nation against 
the invading Union Army. 
For the Texans, Honey Springs represented a humiliating failure of the 
Southern cause.  Blinded by racism, they had expected that the First Kansas Colored 
troops would not fight “and that all the Southern troops would have to do would be 
to march up to the colored men and take them in.”51  Attempting to reinstate a racial 
order in the course of the battle, the Texans had lined up directly in front of the First 
Kansas Colored Infantry.  The black troops that they underestimated, dehumanized, 
and planned to re-enslave soundly defeated the white Southerners.  Three times their 
flag-bearer fell before they finally abandoned the cherished object to be claimed as a 
war trophy.  Texas troops were crushed by the loss, with one lamenting “they are too 
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strong for us” and that “I believe they will whip us and whip us all the time until we 
are reinforced from Texas.”52   
Choctaws who fought at Honey Springs did not experience the battle in the 
same racial terms as the white Texans.  While eyewitness accounts of Choctaw 
soldiers often commented on the presence of African American troops, they did not 
perceive them as any more of a threat than the white Union soldiers.  One Choctaw 
commented that he “never did see so many wounded Negroes in a fight,” but said 
nothing more.  Another member of Walker’s Regiment commented that he was 
“rather low spirited since our army has been defeated…we were all too sure of 
whipping them but no.”53  Unlike the Texas soldiers who persistently recalled the 
stinging loss to African American soldiers, this Choctaw did not even mention the 
racial makeup of the invading Union army.  
Nine months later, the Texas and Choctaw troops seized an opportunity for 
revenge at the Battle of Poison Springs in Arkansas.  Like Honey Springs, this battle 
was multi-faceted with Texans fighting for racial revenge and Choctaws fighting for 
national defense.  General Samuel Bell Maxey, Cooper’s superior in Indian 
Territory, convinced the Choctaw troops and leaders to march to Arkansas as a way 
of diverting Union attention from the Choctaw Nation.  Maxey’s argument was 
augmented by the fact that Union troops had spent the previous nine-months 
terrorizing the population in a strategy elucidated in correspondence between Union 
Generals Blunt and Steele: “They have rebelled so grievously and so wickedly…that 
I am satisfied that the true policy is to sweep their nation with fire and sword so as 
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to terrify and drive out all that would not at once yield.”54  Maxey also noted that 
Choctaw soldiers had been executed at Middle Boggy Depot, “their throats cut from 
ear to ear…and left on the field” after a small skirmish with white troops “with no 
Indians on their side.”  A Union soldier at the battle confirmed that many Choctaws 
“were killed in their homes because Col. Phillips instructed his men not to take any 
prisoners for they have had all the chances to come in if they wanted to do so.”55  
This continuous brutality against the Choctaw Nation provided ample motivation for 
Choctaw soldiers to seek retaliation against the nearest column of the Union Army.  
Eager to remove the conflict from their territory, the Choctaw soldiers now 
acquiesced to march into Arkansas. 
At Poison Springs, a combination of Choctaws, Texans, and Arkansans 
surprised a Union Brigade which had been sent to search for supplies.  The First 
Kansas Colored Infantry formed the center of this brigade.  With sound battlefield 
strategy, the Confederate forces quickly gained the upper-hand.  The battle rapidly 
turned into a massacre when Confederate soldiers refused to accept any surrender  
from black soldiers.  Notions of Southern honor among the Confederate troops had 
no bearing on their attitudes towards those they deemed racially inferior.  After 
executing wounded soldiers of the First Kansas Colored, the Confederate leaders 
then denied Union surgeons access to the battlefield for three days, leaving any 
survivors to slowly perish.  Many of these black soldiers had been mutilated in 
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various forms and fashions.  Out of the approximately 301 Union soldiers that died 
on the battlefield, an astounding 172 were African American.
56
   
Contemporaries erroneously placed the blame for the massacre on the 
Choctaw troops; an interpretation which has remained largely unchallenged by 
military historians.  Historian Gregory J.W. Urwin recently claimed that “of all 
those who succumbed to the homicidal frenzy…none surpassed Col. Tandy 
Walker’s Choctaws for sheer ferocity.”  However, based on available evidence, it is 
much more likely that the Choctaws became the racial scapegoats in the immediate 
aftermath of the massacre.  Even with a policy of not offering or granting quarter to 
wounded or surrendering black soldiers, it was not seen as a civilized action to 
massacre and mutilate an opponent.
57
  Yet, a massacre beyond the confines of not 
granting quarter undoubtedly took place.  Ascribing the worst excesses to the 
Choctaws was therefore a logical political move.  
Scapegoating Indian troops for the atrocities of war was not an uncommon 
public relations tactic.  For instance, reports circulated that Cherokee soldiers had 
executed and scalped eight wounded Union soldiers after an ambush at Pea Ridge.  
General Pike vehemently refuted these claims, while conceding that one soldier had 
been scalped and the man responsible punished.  These reports were sensationalized 
to cast a negative shadow over the Confederate war effort because whites viewed 
Indian acts of scalping as savage.  Confederate leadership became hesitant to call 
out Indian troops in the wake of the scandal due to the possible public relations 
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ramifications.  Even in a savage war, the “savage” label easily affixed to Indians, 
even of the so-called “civilized tribes.”  A similar trend of painting Native 
Americans as savage took place at Poison Springs.
58
  
Newspapers often exaggerated the actions of Indians in the Civil War, but 
modern historians have accepted these descriptions at face value.  For instance, the 
pro-Confederate Washington Telegraph attributed the massacre solely to the 
Choctaws by describing the staging of stripped, dead black soldiers as “Choctaw 
Humor.”  The paper gives no source for its assertion that Choctaws perpetuated 
“savage” acts against the soldiers of the First Kansas Colored . Choctaw soldiers 
took several scalps from the battle, but did so from both white and black soldiers, 
further suggesting that their rage was not purely racially based.  Choctaws under 
Walker had cause to seek vengeance against these specific Union soldiers who had 
executed wounded Choctaw soldiers only months earlier at Middle Boggy.  Taking 
the scalp of an enemy as an act of vengeance—regardless of race—was perfectly 
acceptable according to traditional Choctaw war practices.  Union and Confederate 
soldiers accepted this practice so long as it was against other Native American 
troops.
59
 
Choctaw accounts discuss the battle more in terms of defending the Choctaw 
Nation and seeking retribution for Union attacks than in exacting racial justice.  A. 
Edward Folsom and his fellow Choctaws spent weeks tracking down Steele’s troops, 
who had ravaged their homeland.  Folsom mentions “fighting the rear guard men 
and negroes,” but credits Fagan’s Texas cavalry, which “came up like a syclone 
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[sic]” for driving back the black troops from the field.  In an “orderly fashion,” 
Folsom then collected his company and followed orders to fall back to Fort Gibson.  
Likewise, Tandy Walker’s report portrays an orderly and controlled Choctaw 
fighting force: 
I feared that the train and its contents would prove a temptation too 
strong for these hungry, half-clothed Choctaws, but had no trouble in 
pressing them forward, for there was that in front and to the left more 
inviting to them than food or clothing: the blood of their despised 
enemy.  They had met and routed the forces of General Thayer, the 
ravagers of their country, despoilers of their homes, and murderers of 
their women and children; and on they went, driving immediately by a 
second charge of the enemy from a strong position.
60
 
 
General Maxey stated that “many an avenging blow was struck” by Choctaw troops, 
but these were struck in retaliation against “the very army that had destroyed their 
once happy homes, insulted their women, and driven them with their children 
destitute upon the world.”61   
Most convincingly, Choctaws who did speak of the massacre mostly 
attributed excessive violence to their white Confederate allies.  For instance, a 
Lieutenant in Walker’s Brigade mentioned turning over three black prisoners of war 
and their commander to General Sterling Price’s command, only to learn that they 
had been executed, “lying among their companions at Poison Springs.”  Another 
Choctaw solider took a black prisoner he intended to enslave, only to helplessly 
watch a white soldier execute the young black captive right in front of him.
62
  
Though the desire to enslave captive only black soldiers shows a clear racial 
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distinction, the fact that this Choctaw solider accepted a surrender rather than 
execute black troops refutes the idea of a Choctaw-inspired massacre.  Decades 
later, Choctaw veterans recalled that Colonel Simpson Folsom used his  sword to 
keep him men in line, “thus saving many nappy heads from being scalped.”63  This 
is a stark contrast from the Arkansans and Texans who openly bragged about the 
brutal nature of their battlefield exploits, specifically against black soldiers.  A 
member of the Arkansas Cavalry boasted that “If the negro was wounded our men 
would shoot him dead as they were passed and what negroes that were captured 
have…since been shot.”  The same Arkansans gleefully drove their wagons over the 
heads of the dead and dying black soldiers.  Another recounted recognizing several 
of the dead slaves as local runaways—each of these “were disposed of.”64  These 
accounts all indicate that the Choctaws were present and active at Poison Springs, 
but hardly the instigators or worst offenders of the resulting massacre.  
Yet, the scalpings at Poison Springs were indicative of a resurgence of 
traditional Choctaw war practices that dictated how the Choctaws participated in the 
conflict. While most segments of Choctaw society had adopted aspects of white 
Southern culture, many retained traditional, cultural practices that separated them 
from Southern troops.  Many of these Choctaw soldiers who practiced traditional 
warfare belonged to the more acculturated factions of Choctaw society.  Tandy 
Walker, for instance, was the Christian, former brother-in-law to Robert M. Jones.  
Their embrace of Christianity, education, and other tenets of Euro-American culture 
did not preclude them from simultaneously continuing practices central to Choctaw 
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culture. Understanding these customs is critical for understanding Choctaw actions 
during the war.  For instance, receiving an enemy scalp was cause for celebratory 
dances.  These dances brought communities together as the Choctaw war dance 
involved women as active participants.  Additionally, when possible, during the war 
Choctaws continued the traditional “cry” in response to deaths, sharing food and 
uniting the community in both sorrow and joy.
65
  
The victory at Poison Springs served as a huge morale boost for the soldiers 
of the First Choctaw Regiment.  They responded by voluntarily reenlisting for the 
remainder of the conflict.  Newspapers throughout the Trans-Mississippi theatre 
reported their continued dedication to the war effort and called for similar 
commitments from the men throughout the South.
66
  The newspapers, however, did 
not distinguish that the Choctaws remained loyal to the Choctaw cause, not the 
South’s defense of slavery.  The General Council openly praised the commitment of 
ordinary soldiers to the nation.  Simultaneously, Choctaw officials debated 
Lincoln’s Amnesty Proclamation and attempted to distance themselves from the 
Confederate cause.  Colonel Jackson McCurtain of the Third Choctaw Regiment 
made national and international news when he allegedly offered to surrender to 
Union officials under the terms of the Amnesty proclamation.  Newspapers as far 
away as London, England reported that the Choctaws were in the process of 
accepting Lincoln’s terms.  McCurtain explained he would form a Choctaw militia if 
the Union army came deeper into the Choctaw Nation, but keeping a Confederate 
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militia “would draw federals to attack...and we stand no showing.”67  As the war 
continued to wage, defending their homes and land base in Indian Territory remained 
the central objective of enlisted Choctaws.      
Despite the victory at Poison Springs, three years of war and three years of 
broken treaty promises from the Confederacy left the Choctaw Nation as a whole 
devastated and discouraged.  Soldiers remained dedicated to defending the nation 
and Choctaw leaders remained committed to finding the best possible solution for 
preserving sovereignty.  Loyalty to the Choctaw cause did not waiver, but wartime 
conditions for soldiers and citizens who remained on the home-front became 
increasingly dismal.  Regardless of the Confederacy’s promises and Robert M. 
Jones’ efforts to see them fulfilled by the Confederate Congress, many Choctaw 
soldiers had learned the hard way over the past three years that the South lacked 
either intent or ability to uphold the obligations of the alliance.  The stability--
promises of rations, payment, and protection--that enlistment offered Choctaw 
soldiers largely did not come to fruition.  A disgusted Allen Wright noted that “here 
there is more injury done to the people by Southern people than by federal.”68  
Unfortunately, the Confederacy also broke their treaty promise that the 
Choctaws and Chickasaws would have a voice in the Confederate Congress.  
Although they allowed Robert M. Jones to fill a seat as delegate, they denied him a 
vote in the Congress and continuously ignored his pleas to compensate and protect 
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations according to the treaty promises.  His  only 
legislative accomplishment was securing additional copies of the Annual Report 
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from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  Disgusted, Jones withdrew from the 
Confederate House of Representatives, leaving his seat vacant for the remainder of 
the war.
69
  
Northern soldiers and Indian adversaries from factions within Indian 
Territory constantly harassed the Choctaw Nation throughout the war, but their 
intensity increased in 1864.  Union General Phillips set out on a campaign of total 
war that reached within twenty-five miles of the Red River, the southernmost border 
of the Choctaw Nation.  He distributed Lincoln’s amnesty proclamation along the 
way, but attached to it a letter warning that the US “will soon crush all enemies.  Let 
me know if you want to be among them.”  He ordered his men to treat any Choctaws 
they found with arms as enemies and to kill them immediately.  He clarified that his 
soldiers should “not kill a prisoner after he has surrendered…but I do not ask that 
you take prisoners.  I do ask that you make your footsteps terrible.”70  This 
campaign caused complete destruction in portions of the Choctaw Nation and 
weakened the resolve of citizens who remained on the home front. 
Many Choctaw soldiers suffered from their status as Confederate allies.  One 
Choctaw soldier reported to his family that he often went days without anything to 
eat and slept most nights on cold, wet ground.  He wrote that to ameliorate hunger 
his unit would “kill anything they found to eat and roast it on the fire without any 
salt.”71  Another reported that “we were too hungry to eat much.”  Most also lacked 
                                                 
69
 T Paul Wilson, “Delegates to the Five Civilized Tribes to the Confederate Congress” 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 53 (Fall 1975), 364. 
70
 “Circular” January 10, 1864, Official Records, Vol. 34, series 1, 190; Edwards, Prairie was on 
Fire, 93, 95. 
71
 “Interview with Jancy Bell, April 25, 1937,” Interview 5383, IPP, 20-23; “Interview with 
Eastmen Ward, May 1, 1937,” interview 5774, IPP, 126-130. 
239 
 
adequate clothing to protect them from harsh weather conditions.  Firewood and 
hatchet supplies dwindled and Choctaw soldiers struggled to remain warm and cold 
nights.  Rates of illness spiked and smallpox breakouts swept through Confederate 
camps, increasing the Choctaws’ death count.72  Of those healthy enough to fight, 
less than half of the Choctaw troops had reliable working firearms.  This left them 
unfit for battle and unable to defend themselves against Union soldier and raiders, 
making the Choctaw cause all the more difficult.  Protecting their homes and nation 
proved a daunting task without the proper means of defense.   
As their Confederate allies broke treaty promise after treaty promise, 
Choctaws gradually came to realize that what had promised to be an advantageous 
diplomatic relationship now threatened the very future of the nation.  
Disillusionment with the Confederate partnership pervaded Choctaw soldiers and 
citizens.   For instance, after Confederate leaders replaced specie with Confederate 
currency, Choctaw soldiers had no useable form of payment even when they did 
receive what they were owed.  One recalled seeing others burn both Confederate 
payments and captured Union money, claiming that they were worthless.
73
  The 
currency was not the only aspect of their political alliance with the South that 
Choctaws began to deem worthless. 
Meanwhile other enemies besides invading Northern soldiers violated the 
Choctaw Nation and strengthened Choctaws’ commitment to their national cause.  
Bushwhackers and Jayhawkers—who consisted of conscription dodgers, deserters, 
and outlaws from Kansas, Missouri, Indian Territory, and Arkansas—rode in bands 
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throughout Indian Territory, pillaging all that they could find.  One slave explained 
that bushwhackers “would appear like they was the enemy of anybody they run 
across, just to have an excuse to rob them or burn up their stud.  If you said you was 
with the South they would be with the North and if you claimed to be with the 
Yankees they would be with the South.”  Accounts from Choctaw scouts who 
encountered the notorious Confederate raider William Quantrill wearing a Union 
uniform confirms the raiding tactic of playing both sides.  Quantrill was so effective 
in raiding that he received a Confederate rank and dispensation to raid behind Union 
lines in Missouri, Kansas, and Indian Territory.
74
  These raiding parties combined 
with irregular guerilla warfare between Cherokees and Creeks terrorized much of the 
Northern part of the Choctaw Nation. 
Choctaws had to worry constantly about raiding from all different geographic 
directions, including raiding Indian tribes to the West.  In many cases, thieves 
targeted slaves and horses, the nation’s two most valuable forms of property, and 
sent them deeper south.  Thieves easily passed off these illicit sales as legitimate due 
to the robust and ongoing slave trade between Indians and Southern states.  Afro-
Choctaw Spence Johnson, for instance, explained that his mother and three sisters—
who could easily pass for Choctaws—were kidnapped from Boggy Depot, sold in 
Shreveport, and lived the rest of the war as slaves in Texas.
75
  Essentially, slaves 
were at risk of being displaced, kidnapped, and sold into the deep South where 
markets continued to thrive throughout the war. 
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Many Choctaw slaveholders sought to protect themselves and their slave 
property by fleeing South across the Red River into Texas.  Choctaw slave Kiziah 
Love remembered that “at that time it look like everybody in the world was going to 
Texas.”  Texas was no more of a safe haven for slaves than the Choctaw Nation.  
Texans decided that Indians living within the state should be subject to taxation 
regardless of their special political status.  Texas officials confiscated one 
Chickasaw woman’s slaves for the war effort.  Though she protested that the slaves 
did not belong to Texas, her objections fell on deaf ears.  Other slave refugees came 
and went between Texas and Indian Territory.  For instance, one slave reported that 
“My master refugeed me to Texas at the outbreak of the war…bought a herd of 
cattle…and we took them to the Indian Territory around Webbers Falls.”76   
The power and affluence of slave owners combined with strategic geography 
along the Red River provided slaves with protection from the war but also limited 
their ability to escape.  Among the largest slave population in the Choctaw Nation, 
Robert M. Jones’ more than 250 slaves remained mostly unmolested during the 
conflict based on their strategic geographic position along the Red River.  It later 
became something of a legend that these slaves assisted in hiding gold and valuables 
from scavenging parties and Union soldiers.  Though the Union Army came very 
close to the slaveholding region of the Choctaw Nation, slave patrols kept regular 
watches and intercepted runaways heading to the North.  One slave, whose 
plantation neighbored Jones’ Lake West home, recalled how one runaway from 
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Texas sought refuge with the Choctaws, only to be returned to Texas with “a chain 
around his ankles” when slave patrollers arrived.77   
Choctaws displaced by the war also sought refuge in Texas and remaining 
safe havens in their nation.  The chain of Choctaw plantations along the Red River 
that continued to produce crops throughout the war offered protection to many 
impoverished Choctaw refugees.  Jones’ plantations produced a remarkable amount 
of corn and cotton during the war making them natural points of flight for Choctaws 
throughout the conflict.  For instance, Jones took in Peter Conser, a ten year old 
Choctaw orphan, for most of the war, among many others.  Conser later became a 
prominent business leader and controversial Light Horsemen Captain.  Choctaw 
Regiments also frequently stayed nights on Jones’ properties and borrowed 
firewood, tools, corn, and other vital supplies from his storehouses.
78
 
While the Choctaw soldiers had the hope of receiving scarce rations, 
thousands of Choctaw citizens went hungry during the war.  From June to December 
of 1864, the number of Choctaws receiving aid from the U.S. soldiers at Fort Smith 
swelled from 70 to 900 with no indication of stopping.  In addition, the number of 
Choctaws receiving aid at various Confederate outposts on the Red River reached 
4,480 by August of 1864.  General Maxey called for some of these refugees to 
return to their homes and plant a harvest, but he knew that he could not guarantee 
their safety.  Prominent Choctaw Alfred Wade reported encountering “some children 
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and women…naked…with nothing to buy corn with because their corn was taken by 
the federal nuisance.”79   
Women served various roles during the conflict.  Many continued farming when 
and where it was possible.  Choctaw women regularly performed farm labor up to the 
Civil War but now they bore the brunt of subsistence production as men left to enlist.  
For many women trying to protect their families on the home-front, even basic 
subsistence farming proved difficult as the war waged.  Traditional Choctaw women 
proved particularly deft at locating vegetation such as roots, greens, acorns, and 
potatoes which grew wild along river banks.  Women also parched corn and used it as a 
substitute for coffee, another war time adaptation.  Some of the more fortunate women 
provided food to traveling soldiers.  One woman recalled that her mother would “cook a 
whole hog in a wash-pot” and distribute meat to rebel soldiers as they passed.80  
Another recalled that her family prepared and distributed virtually all of their provisions 
when informed that needy friendly soldiers were nearby.  Less affluent women did not 
have the option of sharing as poverty and hunger intensified during the war.  Many 
attempted to conceal their meager food supplies from scavengers.  This normally 
entailed having a designated hiding place—often a set hole in the floor—that could 
quickly conceal rations.  In some cases this proved successful but not often. 
Women actively worked towards the Choctaw war effort in various capacities.  
They served as couriers, nurses, and sometimes spies for regiments within the Choctaw 
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Nation.
81
  Native American women played a critical role in the war effort, not only 
among Choctaws, but throughout Indian Territory.  For instance, Chickasaw Elizabeth 
Kemp faithfully transported letters to General Cooper and other soldiers on the front 
lines.  These letters frequently contained information regarding troop movements and 
other official war business.  This trend also extended to Indian women supporting the 
Union cause.  In 1863, a group of Choctaws stopped a Native American woman riding 
along their front lines and accused her of spying for the enemy.  She initially denied the 
charge, before confessing and bribing two guards to defect with her to Union lines.
82
  
Women also served as nurses at Armstrong Academy once it was converted to a make-
shift Confederate hospital. 
In slaveholding families, women often traveled to Confederate refugee camps as 
a way of retaining slaves.  One slave recalled temporarily staying at Fort Gibson: “The 
negroes piled in there from everywhere, and I mean there was lots of them, too.  
Cooking in the open, sleeping most anywhere, making shelter places out of cloth scraps 
and brush, digging caves along the river bank to live in.”  Seeking refuge along 
Confederate lines often entailed extended hunger, rampant disease, and quick retreats in 
the case of a Confederate defeat.  For instance, following a Confederate withdrawal, a 
Northern missionary recalled “fifteen or twenty Indian families numerously supplied 
with children” rapidly fleeing out of fear of reprisals from the U.S. Government.83  
The war disrupted life for everyone within the Choctaw Nation to varying 
degrees and differed largely between soldiers and civilians, slaves and free people, and 
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men and women.  Each group coped slightly differently.  Male soldiers often fought and 
suffered outside the confines of their nation in desperate attempts to divert invading 
armies away from Choctaw towns.  They coped by maintaining traditional practices and 
keeping the Choctaw cause their primary objective.  The war also forced many civilians 
to leave their homes and seek refuge at friendly safe havens throughout the nation and 
in Texas.  Maintaining community ties and continuing traditions undoubtedly assisted in 
coping with the war.
84
  Both male and female slaves faced constant threat of kidnapping 
from bushwhackers, dislocation into Texas, and the enticement of freedom. 
As conditions on the Choctaw home front worsened as the conflict tore 
through the nation, the Choctaw population suffered.  Already disgusted with the 
Confederacy’s failure to uphold its treaty obligations, the General Council viewed 
the worsening conditions in the Choctaw Nation as further impetus to seek a 
withdrawal.  Yet, immediate withdrawal in 1864 did not seem to be a viable option.  
Amnesty was appealing, but amnesty would not guarantee that the Choctaws would 
still benefit from the privileges of their earlier treaties with the United States.  
Amnesty did not guarantee sovereignty.  Amnesty also did not secure protection 
from Indians aligned with the Union or roving bands of bushwhackers.  Also, 
political leaders accepting amnesty could lead to a division between Choctaws 
wanting to continue fighting, splitting the tribe into an internal civil war.
85
   
Choctaw leaders began using rhetoric that appealed to both sides.  As a 
result, in 1864 both the North and South simultaneously contended that the Choctaw 
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people were among their loyal allies.  The Southern Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
extolled the Choctaws for almost unanimously refusing to join the Union Army, 
while Union officials claimed that Southerners had clearly coerced and trapped the 
nation in a rebel alliance, which they desired to leave.  This confusion was 
deliberately manifested by Choctaws as a political tool. While affirming fealty to the 
Southern cause, they simultaneously tested the waters for a withdrawal, and actively 
began firming up alliances with all neighboring Natives.  A perplexed and otherwise 
occupied North and South failed to understand that the Choctaws supported their 
own national cause above the sectional causes of the North and South.
86
   
These diplomatic and political tactics to protect their own sovereign interests 
evolved over the course of the conflict.  Choctaws in every social strata 
demonstrated tremendous agency in defending their lives, land, and nation against 
exploitation by the Union and the Confederacy. As long as the Confederacy upheld 
treaty promises, they supported the Confederate cause as an ally.  While previous 
historians have misinterpreted this support as Southern sympathy for the 
Confederate cause or the result of Confederate coercion of naïve Indians, Choctaw 
citizens demonstrated consistent agency and occasional power in their relationship 
with the South.  When the Union militarily gained the upper hand in Indian Territory 
in 1864, the Choctaws cautiously backed away from the Confederacy but still used 
political rhetoric that gave the appearance of unrelenting support.  For instance, 
while praising one battalion of Choctaw soldiers who pledged to fight with the 
                                                 
86
 Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865, vol.2.  
247 
 
Confederacy until the end, the General Council privately debated the merits of an 
immediate withdrawal.
87
   
Disastrous political division became a distinct possibility in 1864 when a 
group of opportunists—a handful of white Americans who had been granted 
Choctaw citizenship—met at New Hope Academy and called themselves both the de 
facto and de jure Choctaw government.  Historian Annie Abel ably categorized this 
group as “self-seeking, abjectly craven” and “rats that leave the sinking ship.”  They 
elected a puppet governor and released a statement claiming “you have nothing to 
fear” from accepting amnesty, and that “every effort is being made to secure for you 
your ancient privileges and customs.”88  As seen with the Creeks and Cherokees, 
competing internal governments could easily make a terrible situation worse.  Thus, 
in 1864, Choctaw political leaders took active steps to casually remove support from 
the Confederate cause while attempting to keep the Choctaws united. 
Peter Pitchlynn, the newly elected Principal Chief in 1864, led this cause.  He 
began with an inaugural address praising his Choctaw brethren for being “an 
undivided people” fighting “in the defence [sic] of our homes and the graves of our 
ancestors.”  Pitchlynn chided Confederate officials for their inability to protect 
citizens after Honey Springs, and called for a local militia to aid in the enforcement 
of national law.
89
  Pitchlynn and the General Council also mandated that 
Confederate troops currently subsisting off of Choctaw corn, especially those 
stationed at Jones’ Shawneetown plantation, were required to provide their own 
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supplies from Texas and redistribute corn to indignant Choctaws.  Not wanting to 
risk alienating the Choctaws, Maxey complied and apologized, claiming that the 
troops belonged to Cherokee Stand Watie who would be moved across the Arkansas 
line.
90
  Pitchlynn and the Council’s subtle actions demonstrate that the Choctaws 
gradually began withdrawing their support from the Confederacy. 
By early 1865, most people recognized that the Confederate cause was a lost 
cause.  General Maxey attempted to spin each critical Confederate setback, noting 
that “we have survived the fall of New Orleans, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, the loss of 
the Mississippi…and the loss of Savannah is small compared with any of them.”91  
Despite outward optimism, Confederate authorities like Maxey and Cooper as well 
as Choctaw leaders like Pitchlynn and Jones undoubtedly knew that the Confederacy 
could not survive much longer.  They feared that their entangling connection with 
the Confederacy could serve as justification for retribution by a victorious Union 
Army.  With their supplies destroyed, citizens in refuge, and warriors depleted, they 
realized that they could not stand alone against the United States once the 
Confederacy crumbled.  Recognizing that they no longer stood in the position to 
negotiate an advantageous alliance, Choctaw leaders needed a new alliance out of 
necessity and their very survival depended on it.  Therefore, they refocused their 
efforts on solidifying alliances with all neighboring Indian polities—regardless of 
their affiliation with the Union or Confederacy.   
Courting pro-Union Indians risked enflaming Confederate soldiers in and 
around Indian Territory.  To avoid arousing suspicions, Grand Council sought and 
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received approval from Jefferson Davis and General Kirby Smith to hold a mass 
meeting aimed at convincing various Plains Indians to resolve their grievances with 
the Texans and other Natives groups and to secure their alignment with South.  
Davis solicited Albert Pike to lead the negotiation, who promptly refused the 
invitation.  Instead, General James W. Throckmorton, the future Governor of Texas, 
and Justice W.D. Reagan, agreed to represent Confederate interests at this meeting.  
Confederate leaders faintly believed new alliances with Plains Indians could be a 
potential lifeline for the Confederacy.  Cooper confidentially schemed to encourage 
Plains Indians to raid Union settlements in Kansas and serve as a distraction for 
simultaneous Confederate raids.
92
  At the very least, a truce between Texans and 
Plains Indians promised to limit the need for reserve troops in Texas to protect 
against raids. 
Israel Folsom, the current President of the United Nations of Indian 
Territory, Pitchlynn, Jones, and other Choctaw leaders had different ideas for the 
meeting.
93
  Their primary objective was to secure a peace with Plains Indians that 
would provide a new alliance, while distancing themselves from the Confederacy so 
as to allow Choctaws to determine their own fate when it fell.  They called for “a 
body that would afford sufficient strength to command respect and assert and 
maintain our rights” and presented a compact for the various Natives to consider.  
General Cooper endorsed this plan upon hearing word on May 16
th
 that General Lee 
had surrendered at Appomattox.  He wrote to Pitchlynn, arguing that “the unity of 
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the Indian race will enable all to secure their rights, perpetuate their race and assume 
a portion of strength and respectability among the Nations of the Earth.”  He also 
informed his superiors that he would not surrender Native American troops with the 
hopes that they could secure their own favorable peace.
94
 
The Choctaws originally set the meeting to take place on May 15
th
 at Council 
Grove, near present-day Oklahoma City.  After scouts confirmed that Blunt’s army 
was in the vicinity and preparing to attack, they moved the site to an area near the 
Washita River on the Texas Road.  This camp ground became known as Camp 
Napoleon.
95
  Representatives from the Reserve Comanches, Reserves Caddos, 
Osages, Kiowas, Lipans, Arapahos, Cheyennes, Anadarkos, Comanches, and each of 
the Five Tribes met initially on May 14
th
-16
th
 at Council Grove, and then 
reconvened at Camp Napoleon on May 26
th
 where they agreed to a final compact.  
At least 5,000 Indians attended, with some estimates ranging as high as 20,000.
96
 
The Five Tribes’ representatives relied upon shared racial and cultural 
connections to form quick, meaningful ties with disparate Native polities.  Despite 
the fact that the Choctaws often chastised the “wild” and “savage” “red-men”, they 
knew that they were viewed as racial equals with a shared history and overlapping 
cultural iconography in the eyes of nineteenth-century white society.  Notes from the 
meeting and the subsequent compact signed by the various Indian representatives 
confirm this belief.  John Spears of the Cherokees, for instance, spoke of “ancient 
council fires nearly extinguished” and the need to quell “divisions and wars among 
the Red Brethren.”  These racial and cultural undertones extended into the compact 
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itself, warning that “the red man” was once a “great and powerful race” but is 
“rapidly passing away as snow beneath the summer sun.”  Their shared stated 
objective was for “the protection of all alike, and the preservation of our race.”  
Other cultural symbols included a demand that “the tomahawk shall be forever 
buried.  The scalping knife shall be forever broken.  The warpath heretofore leading 
from one tribe or band to another shall grow up and become as the wild 
wilderness.”97   
In addition to racial categorization and culture, the Choctaws had an 
additional connection with various Indian leaders through freemasonry that allowed 
for stable and immediate rapport.  The General Council recalled a company of their 
troops serving under Cooper to act as escorts for the meeting.  The 
Choctaw/Chickasaw company were startled to see various Natives in full regalia 
“dressed to kill” coming towards their camp.  A. E. Folsom told his men to raise 
their arms and prepare for battle but was waived off by his father, Israel Folsom, 
who recognized the masonic symbols worn by the approaching Natives and insisted 
they posed no threat.  Folsom recounted that “they ran up, dismounted and ran up to 
father and hug him.  Every one doing the same.”  The leaders of each group then 
agreed to begin with a Masonic meeting under a large tent.  Folsom noted that 
although “imperfect,” the Plains Natives were “very stricked [sic], more so than the 
whites.”  This was followed by a “general shaking of hands,” passing a peace pipe, 
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and a full day of shared camaraderie.  These masonic connections allowed Natives 
of various backgrounds to enjoy an instant rapport.
98
 
Whether through racial, cultural, or masonic connections, Indian 
representatives at Camp Napoleon had little difficulty in setting aside their 
differences and ratifying the Camp Napoleon Compact.  This included large strides 
at resolving the intertribal conflicts among the Cherokees and Osages.  All parties 
present committed to forming “an Indian Confederacy, or band of brothers,” 
predicated upon the motto that “and Indian shall not spill an Indian’s blood” under 
any circumstances.
99
  A member of the Ross faction arrived and had a public debate 
with several followers of Stand Watie.  The men hurled mutual accusations of 
treason against legitimate governments, but stopped short of exchanging gunfi re.  
After violently fighting each other for four years, a peaceful resolution to a heated 
exchange of words was a huge step forward.  General Throckmorton from Texas 
attempted to use this opportunity to make peace and gain concessions from the 
Comanches.  A Comanche leader, supported by other Indians in attendance, retorted 
that “I am determined to fight Texas as long as grass grows and water runs.   I have 
no confidence in white men.”  Clearly, the pledge of peace extended only between 
Indian polities and not Confederate allies.
100
 
 Though historian Annie Abel referred to the Camp Napoleon alliance as 
“pathetic” and a weak “channeling” of Tecumseh and Pontiac , she suggests that 
forming this alliance gave the Choctaws the needed security to better decide their  
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own fate in exiting the war.  Negotiating peace as the single most rebellious Native 
tribe invited firm retribution; however, negotiating as part of a large Indian 
confederacy increased the likelihood of favorable terms.  The meeting concluded 
with signatures and a request that the Grand Council convene in September in the 
Choctaw Nation to select delegates to negotiate a peace between Natives and the 
Union.  Essentially, this alliance allowed the Choctaws to theoretically approach the 
negotiating table as one of many Native Nations, and not the often-touted most 
rebellious Natives.  Peter Pitchlynn reported back to the Grand Council regarding 
the developments at Camp Napoleon.  He requested that “each tribe act in such a 
manner as not only to secure its own welfare and benefit but also have an eye to the 
other tribes of the Confederate.”  Pitchlynn arranged for an armistice with remaining 
Choctaw troops who had not been purposefully excluded from General Kirby 
Smith’s surrender.  This left only one Confederate Army in the field in any theatre, 
under the command of the highest ranking Indian officer: General Stand Watie.
101
   
***** 
As Jones had played an integral role in advocating a Confederate alliance, it 
was fitting that Jones also end the war.  On June 23, 1865, more than two months 
after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, Watie surrendered his sword to Lieutenant 
Colonel Asa Matthews.  This action, the last surrender of any army in the entire 
Civil War, took place in the Choctaw Nation at the Doaksville Masonic Lodge.  As 
master mason, Jones officiated Watie’s final surrender.102   
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All of the optimism that accompanied the Choctaws entry into the Civil War 
vanished with years of gruesome and futile combat.  Worst of all, by abrogating 
treaties with the United States and taking up arms against them, the Choctaws’ 
political sovereignty seemed precarious at the close of the war.  Yet, the nation had 
weathered the storm of the Civil War as a united polity and remained dedicated to 
the Choctaw cause.  For these reasons, Jones, Pitchlynn, and other Choctaws left the 
conflict battered and weary, but determined to mitigate the losses that came with 
taking up arms against the United States. 
 
256 
 
CHAPTER SIX: “MAINTAIN OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE”: INTERNAL 
FACTIONALISM AND THE CIVIL WAR OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 The Civil War had devastated the Choctaw Nation, but Robert M. Jones and 
others had reason to be appreciative about their current situation and cautiously 
optimistic about the future.  By staying united and acting pragmatically towards 
national goals, the Choctaw Nation had survived the conflict as a unified and sovereign 
polity.  By and large, farms and towns remained in far better condition than the 
neighboring Creek and Cherokee Nations, which had divided loyalties and erupted in 
internal conflict.  Environmental conditions drastically improved allowing for the return 
of corn and cotton crops.  The United States still owed the Choctaws approximately 
$3,000,000 which, if paid, would reinvigorate the Choctaw economy, reestablish 
schools, and mitigate most of the damage caused by the war.
1
  The threat of American 
colonial policies still lingered, but Jones and others knew firsthand from the experience 
of the removal crisis that conditions could be worse. 
 Jones approached Reconstruction much as he had approached removal—
securing his personal finances while promoting efficient national government, wide-
spread education, and regulated commerce.  With the assistance of President Andrew 
Johnson, Jones quickly secured his financial statutes.  He served terms in both the house 
and senate of the General Council following the war.  While in these positions, he acted 
as Trustee for Choctaw schools.  Since his daughter Mary still attended classes at 
Wheelock Female Seminary, he remained as personally and politically invested in the 
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success of the Choctaw education system as before the war.
 2
  Recognizing the 
importance of commerce, he obtained temporary passes for several Americans to fix 
mills damaged in the war.  Though his stores suffered a loss of at least $40,000, within 
one year they were again opened for business in most Choctaw towns.  He even 
provided a loan to the nation on behalf of Chief Allen Wright, a political rival, to build 
a lumber mill which would further aid in the Choctaw economy.  Despite these 
rebuilding efforts, the entire Choctaw Nation faced several new challenges in the era of 
Reconstruction.
3
   
***** 
 Although Indian Territory has largely been isolated from the broader narrative 
of Reconstruction, it is integral to the larger understanding of this period in American 
history.  Elliot West asserts “It’s as if there are two independent historical narratives, 
and because the one that is set in the East and centered on the Civil War has been 
tapped as the defining story of its time, the one that is set out West seems peripheral, 
even largely irrelevant to explaining America during a critical turn in its history.”  The 
Choctaw Nation and more generally Indian Territory highlight the ways in which these 
two seemingly divergent narratives interconnected during the mid-nineteenth century.  
This region simultaneously experienced the overlapping impact of the Civil War, 
emancipation, and federally mandated Reconstruction along with the expanding 
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American nation-state’s “flood of white settlement” and “challenges to Native 
America’s physical and cultural independence.4   
West offers the temporal framework of a “Greater Reconstruction” era from 
1845-1877 to shed new light on the ways the greater Civil War era and American 
westward expansion transformed the United States during the nineteenth century.   This 
chapter, however, focuses more narrowly on the traditional Reconstruction period from 
the close of the Civil War to 1877 to show how the Choctaw Nation, Indian Territory, 
and the American nation-state underwent a dramatic transfiguration during this period.  
The result of this transfiguration was the increasing loss of national political consensus 
in the Choctaw Nation and intensified colonial policies from the United States 
ultimately aimed at dissolving the sovereign nation.   
Removal and the Civil War tested the political unity and social cohesion of the 
Choctaw Nation under dire and volatile circumstances.  Reconstruction, however, 
marked a turning point in its national history.  Even as Choctaw leaders, including 
Jones, worked to rebuild the nation, a number of internal and external pressures—
including white intrusion, land ownership, citizenship rights of freedmen, political 
corruption, and financial affairs—fractured and factionalized the nation more so than at 
any other time.  Never before had it appeared so inevitable that the Choctaws would 
cease to exist as a sovereign nation.  Though they had survived forced removal, 
constitutional crises, and the Civil War without resorting to large-scale internal 
violence, by the end of Reconstruction members of dissenting political factions killed 
and avenged at alarming rates.   
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These difficulties did not stem from the Choctaw’s decision to align with the 
Confederate States.  As Creeks and Cherokees discovered, the United States mandated 
their post-war agenda with total disregard for wartime loyalties.  Reconciliation 
between the North and the South facilitated this process.  While the North won the 
military Civil War, the South came out the victors of the subsequent Reconstruction 
era.  As the two sides reunited, they collaborated in an endeavor aimed at dismantling 
sovereign tribal governments and conquering valuable Native landholdings.
5
   
The Five Tribes, on the other hand, lost both in the War and Reconstruction 
periods regardless of which side they supported.  Each of the Five Tribes forfeited a 
considerable portion of their lands following the war.  As the Choctaws frequently 
noted, if the concept of losing land as punishment for rebellion was applied equally, 
more than half of the South would be forfeited to the Union.  But that, of course, did not 
fit the larger agenda of the United States.  In comparison, no Confederate states 
forfeited their land base and although forced to adopt freedmen as citizens, they were 
allowed to disregard liberal ideologies of land redistribution while forcing former slaves 
into quasi-slavery.
6
  Notwithstanding rabid complaints of radical agendas and 
carpetbagger rule from unreconstructed rebels, historians like C. Vann Woodward 
quipped at “how essentially nonrevolutionary and conservative Reconstruction (in 
Southern states) really was.”  Native Americans, however, regardless of loyalties were 
not given the luxury of a forgiving and conservative Reconstruction.
7
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Instead, Choctaws joined countless other American Indian polities to learn 
firsthand that the United States’ acumen for opportunistic exploitation in times of war 
was surpassed only in establishing peace.  American negotiators, agents, congressmen, 
and citizens employed a double-pronged strategy to justify accelerating policies of 
colonialism aimed at seizing land, dismantling tribal governments, and ending 
indigenous sovereignty.  First, they actively scapegoated Native Americans for making 
an alliance with the Confederacy while passively ignoring or actively lying about 
American treaty violations and complicity in creating Indian-Confederate alliances.  
Along with waiving the bloody shirt, they employed the rhetoric of justice for freedmen 
and loyal citizens as rationalization for intruding into Choctaw domestic affairs and 
forcing what could not be achieved before the war.  While Americans openly 
abandoned these noble goals of freedmen justice and compensating loyal citizens in 
Southern states, they vigorously employed them as a smoke-screen to compel 
territorialization and opening tribal lands for white settlement.
8
 
Unlike in previous crises like Removal and the Civil War, during Reconstruction 
the Choctaws struggled to find sufficient common ground to present a unified front 
against American machinations.  Corruption, bribery, self-interest, suspicion, and 
division ran rampant in the General Council in a parallel fashion to reconstruction 
governments in both Southern states and the federal government.  Once friendly 
American agents and merchants like Douglas Cooper and John Hobart Heald sought to 
recoup their larger war losses at the Choctaws’ expense.  Railroad agents offered bribes 
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and distributed propaganda.  Prominent Choctaws, hoping to bounce back from the war 
themselves, failed to reconcile national concerns with their personal interests.  At given 
times three or more factions within the General Council attempted to undermine the 
credibility of their opposition and manipulate the masses into supporting particular 
policies.  Failing to focus on national crises and to resolve internal quarrels resulted in 
violence and corruption by the end of Reconstruction and set the stage for the eventual 
forced dismantling of the Choctaw National government. 
 Former allies and lifelong friends turned into passionate enemies, making it 
impossible to efficiently combat the numerous threats facing the nation.  These threats 
included the following: Northern and Southern carpetbaggers flooding into Indian 
Territory; the federal government attempting to open Choctaw land to white settlement; 
freedmen demanding citizenship rights; and perhaps most troubling, former friends 
seeking to recover financially from the Civil War at the expense of the Choctaws.  
Rather than uniting to face these perils, Choctaws fought each other for control. 
Emancipation posed the most immediate challenge for the Choctaw Nation as it 
struggled to adjust to the absence of an unfree labor pool and define the place of former 
slaves within national bounds.  Choctaw freedmen found themselves in the middle of 
ongoing disputes, while actively negotiating their own newfound freedom.
9
  Jones 
recognized that emancipation raised important questions about freedmen’s rights and 
social order, but believed that this could be decided within the Choctaw Nation.  Like 
most Choctaws, Jones felt that most emancipated slaves should be either removed from 
the nation and given American citizenship or accept a subordinate status.  Those who 
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wished to remain would then be seen as equal in rights as Americans doing business 
with the Choctaws.  Above all, he felt the Choctaws should have the right to determine 
the implications of “freedom” and parameters for citizenship within their borders.  
Jones personally emancipated slaves at his Rose Hill and Lake West plantations while 
white overseers performed the task at his remaining properties.  He encouraged 
freedmen to stay and work his land while their status in the nation was determined.  As 
incentive to stay, Jones offered either a portion of the year’s crop or cash payment.  
Almost a century later, one slave claimed that Jones personally provided a substantial 
gold ration to each emancipated slave.  By September 1865, Jones’ former slaves had 
resumed production of corn, salt, and cotton.
10
  
As in slaveholding states, emancipation generated controversy over the 
implications of freedom—whether freed slaves were equal citizens with requisite rights 
over land and suffrage, a special subset with codified limitations, or outsiders who 
needed to be removed.  Though historian Claudio Saunt argues that “freedom for former 
slaves offered hope” to “Indian nonslaveholders” in that emancipation undermined 
economic stratifications, freedmen actually represented more of a threat than hope for 
all financial classes of Choctaws.  This was through no direct fault of the freedmen. 
Rather, they represented a foot-in-the-door to Euro-American policymakers seeking to 
open Choctaw lands.  If Americans could force the Choctaws to grant citizenship and 
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land rights to freedmen with no Choctaw blood or familial ties, surely they could 
accomplish the same for needy whites.
11
   
Some Choctaws openly encouraged select freedmen whom they had known for 
decades to remain in the nation.  Others opposed freedmen with violence, but never to 
the levels seen in bordering Southern states like Texas and Louisiana.  The freedmen 
themselves were also divided over what they desired.  Some identified as Choctaws, 
spoke primarily the Choctaw language and wanted Choctaw citizenship; others, who 
had spent as little as a few months among the Choctaws, wanted American citizenship 
and separate land.  Most distressing for Choctaws, one cohort demanded that the United 
States intervene on their behalf, section the land, empower a territorial government, and 
encourage white and black immigration.  This cohort threatened all classes of Choctaws 
in that they offered a face-value justification for extending United States sovereignty 
over the Choctaw Nation.
12
   
 In addition to emancipation, negotiating a favorable peace with the United States 
was the other main trial facing the Choctaws at the close of the Civil War.  They 
approached peace negotiations as a united nation that had largely maintained its 
autonomy throughout the conflict.  Even in their cease-fire, they affirmed that their 
cause was distinctive from the Confederate cause, and that the Confederacy and not the 
Choctaws had been defeated.
13
  After negotiating the final surrender of the Civil War at 
Armstrong Academy, Robert M. Jones sensed that the time was right to negotiate a 
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quick peace.  He convinced federal commissioners to delay their plans to return to 
Shreveport by allowing them to be his guests at his Rose Hill or Lake West plantations.  
In the interim, the General Council elected Jones to lead twenty-one peace delegates, 
equipped with plenary powers and tasked with reestablishing relations with the United 
States at Armstrong Academy.
14
   
Following several delays, a peace conference for all of the Five Tribes was held 
in September of 1865 at Fort Smith, Arkansas.  One area newspaper reported that the 
Choctaw delegates remained “entirely resolute and fearless…expecting to make a treaty 
favorable to their interests—protecting their persons and property” and that the 
delegation expected to “have lost no rights by the result of the late war.”  As they had 
done since the colonial period, Choctaws approached treaty making as a sovereign 
power intent on negotiating the most favorable terms possible to protect their interests.
15
  
Although Choctaw citizens continued to suffer great losses from the ravages of war, the 
delegates represented a cohesive nation that did not suffer from the same political 
fissures that had caused civil strife in neighboring nations during the war. 
 As the negotiations commenced at Fort Smith, American negotiators, including 
famed Seneca Colonel Eli Parker, attempted to divide Choctaws as a method of 
achieving a radical agenda.  Rather than waiting for the official Choctaw delegation to 
arrive, Commissioner of Indian Affairs D. H. Cooley started negotiations with other 
tribes and a small delegation whom American officials dubbed the “loyal Choctaws,” a 
week earlier.  Cooley claimed that the group of “loyal Choctaw” represented a large 
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faction that numbered 1,800 people.  In reality, Robert Patton, the representative of this 
group present at the negotiations claimed their numbers only totaled 212.  Undeterred 
by the fact that the Choctaw Nations official delegates were not present, Cooley 
proceeded with negotiations.
16
  
The American delegates convinced the small group of “loyal Choctaws” to sign 
an agreement as “representing or connected with” the Choctaw Nation.  This agreement 
conceded that all Southern Natives were “without any…treaty obligations from the 
United States” because the rebellion negated previous treaties with the Union.  Aside 
from the absurd, almost comical notion that violating a treaty somehow voided it—
following such logic would induce the United States to forfeit claim to the entire United 
States—by his own admission Cooley was addressing only the “loyal” element.  This 
action clearly represented a crooked attempt to clear the balance sheets and force each 
polity, regardless of loyalty, into unreasonable concessions. Superintendent Charles 
Mix, the same man who had threatened to use American troops during the Choctaw’s 
constitutional crises in the 1850s, laid out a seven point plan for peace.  The proposal 
included massive land cessions, emancipation of slaves, citizenship rights for freedmen, 
and the formation of a territorial government under American jurisdiction.  “Loyal 
Choctaw” Robert Patton stated outright that he was not “a delegate at all,” did not 
represent the Choctaws, was “not authorized to make, sign, or enter into any treaty 
stipulations,” and only came to reestablish friendly relations with the official delegates.  
Notwithstanding these clear disqualifying factors, Patton signed days before the 
Choctaw delegation arrived after Commissioner Cooley questioned the loyalty of any 
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person with objections.  With his actions, Patton had served multiple American 
agendas: his “loyalty” proved that the Choctaws could have resisted the Confederacy, 
that a cohort was willing to capitulate to all of the United States’ demands, and that so 
few Choctaws had remained loyal that there was little need to exercise restraint out of 
fear of punishing a loyal element.
17
   
 Once he had arrived at Fort Smith, Jones ascertained that the United States had 
every intention of capitalizing on the Choctaw’s perceived disloyalty to force these 
otherwise unthinkable concessions.  Mix once again laid-out the proposed terms, 
declared that the United States owed the Choctaws nothing, and presented a preliminary 
treaty.  Jones, joined by president of the Chickasaw commission David Birney, 
responded with a “breathtaking,” address which rebuffed Cooley’s paternalistic hokum 
and jettisoned any notion that the Choctaws would accept American extortion in re-
establishing peace.  He corrected Cooley’s erroneous account of the Civil War, 
skewered the United States for removing their troops in 1861, and argued that under 
such circumstances a Confederate alliance was the best option “to secure our 
independence, maintain our national existence, and secure the lives of our citizens.”  
Moreover, far from treason, he contended the Choctaws had every right as a sovereign, 
independent nation to align with the Southern states.  Regarding the treaty, he inserted 
the language that “we do not understand the United States as meaning to assume the 
control or jurisdiction over our internal, local, or national affairs, except as to slavery, 
which is open to further negotiation.”  The entire Choctaw delegation refused to accept 
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any land cessions, sectioning, or territorialization without the approval of the General 
Council.
18
   
After inserting amendments, including the above quotation, Jones indicated he 
would sign a preliminary agreement on the basis that a comprehensive treaty addressing 
controversial demands be negotiated in Washington D.C.  Pitchlynn urged Jones to take 
this position out of a belief that changing the venue and going over Commissioner 
Cooley and Superintendent Mix’s heads would result in more favorable terms.  Unable 
to control himself, Jones issued a parting shot to the negotiators before exiting the 
conference.  He insisted a statement be read and recorded which clarified his 
amendments and brazenly proclaimed that the Choctaws believed the Southern states 
had a right to secede and that the Choctaws were not fooled into aligning with them.  
Pitchlynn attempted to have this statement stricken from the record in favor of more 
conciliatory language to no avail.  Despite Jones’ and other Choctaw delegates’ 
resistance, Cooley left the negotiations and proudly reported favorable agreements with 
all polities linked to the Confederacy.  Simultaneously, the Choctaws left Fort Smith 
content that they had challenged any notion that the Confederate defeat diminished 
Choctaw autonomy.
19
  
 The preliminary treaty signed at Fort Smith sparked immediate action in the 
General Council.  In addition to confirming an earlier abolition of slavery, in October 
1865 the Council passed an act selectively granting and denying basic rights for 
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Choctaw freedmen, essentially codifying second-class status.  In many ways this act 
resembled the “black codes” enacted in Southern states aimed at preserving the social 
hierarchy forged under slavery.  This act granted freedmen the right to remain within 
the nation but stipulated that all freedmen had to enter into labor contracts.  Freedmen 
had the option of a minimum cash wage based on age and gender, or to continue a 
system of reciprocity in which former masters traded reasonable housing, clothing, 
food, medical care, and a predetermined portion of crops in exchange for labor.  Both 
former masters and former slaves were required to present contracts to county judges 
for evaluation and ratification.  Freedmen without contracts could have their labor sold 
to the highest bidders.  Far from benevolent, Choctaws clearly believed that they could 
use contracts as a way to maintain a steady supply of labor while limiting who worked 
within their national borders.  Within weeks of this system going into effect, Indian 
agent Isaac Coleman bragged to his superiors that the Choctaws had accepted 
emancipation with almost no opposition.
20
    
 Most Choctaws found this system an acceptable transition from slave to free 
labor.  Freedmen, dissatisfied with continued marginalization, worked to claim freedom 
by exercising the few rights they possessed and lobbying for more.  Some tested the 
labor market, comparing offers from their former masters and others in need of steady 
labor.  For instance, the former slaves of Cal Howell, a white man married to a Choctaw 
wife, rejected his contract offer in favor of a less lucrative proposal on Lycurgus 
Pitchlynn’s farm.  Howell had reportedly been a brutal master and this most likely 
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inspired his emancipated slaves to look elsewhere for work.  Also, freedmen remaining 
on Pitchlynn’s land were quick to organize and select leaders tasked with advocating for 
freedmen rights, which also likely attracted the former Howell slaves and other 
freedmen.  Regardless that they were performing many of the same tasks as before 
emancipation, by negotiating contracts and deciding on their employer Choctaw 
freedmen established that they owned rights over their own labor—an exercise of 
freedom.
21
 
 In addition to transitioning from slave labor to a nation with a large class of free 
black laborers, the Council also worked to restore order in other national affairs.  It 
resumed appropriations for education, including neighborhood schools, the “Forty 
Youth” program, and financing repairs to schools damaged by the war.  Many were 
reopened within one year regardless of state of repair.  Each day more refugees who had 
fled to forts and missions returned to their homes to plant their own crops.  The Council 
bought and distributed cotton and corn for these “refugee citizens” to reduce their 
suffering while rebuilding their lives.  Jones convinced Chief Pitchlynn and a county 
judge to grant permission for several American merchants to also provide cotton cards 
and other farming implements where needed.  The Council partially subsidized a new 
lumber mill aimed at providing income for Choctaw families and reducing lumber 
poaching from Texans.  Police efforts from remaining American troops and an auxiliary 
Choctaw militia targeted bushwhackers and thieves who sought refuge on Choctaw 
lands.  Most of these actions passed with near unanimous approval.  Indian agents 
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applauded these efforts and again lauded the Choctaws for their superior drive towards 
education and law and order.  Clearly, the war had been detrimental to national 
infrastructure, but there was little reason to believe that the Choctaws would not rapidly 
recuperate.
22
    
Less than half a year removed from the Civil War, the Choctaws clearly 
demonstrated that they could survive and thrive in Reconstruction.   Meanwhile, they 
began preparing to negotiate a formal treaty in Washington D.C. to complete the 
preliminary Fort Smith one.  Jones’ brash statements at the Fort Smith negotiations 
made him no friends among the American delegates, but fortified his credentials among 
Choctaw leaders who again named him president of the delegation to Washington D.C.  
Of the nine specific delegates Chief Pitchlynn requested, the Council chose three and 
added Allen Wright and James Riley—two men who had opposed Pitchlynn in the past.  
These additional members offered assurance that one faction could not shape the 
negotiations solely to their own advantage.
23
   
Jones and other delegates compiled considerable legal documents pertaining to 
the nature and limits of Indian sovereignty, the pitfalls of territorialization, sanctity of 
treaties, distinctions between rebellion and treason, scope of the Emancipation 
Proclamation, relevant Supreme Court case history briefs, and the actions of the General 
Council in preparation for an inevitable push-back by the American negotiators.  
Considering their legal rights according to American international law, the Council 
issued clear instructions to forfeit all money due to the Nation rather than part with any 
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land outside of the Leased District.  It also advised delegates to seek additional funds 
for removing additional Indians into the Leased District and to compensate owners for 
emancipated slaves on the basis that the United States lacked the authority to 
emancipate Choctaw slaves without consent.  These private instructions reveal that 
perhaps Jones’ bravado blinded the Choctaw officials to the vindictive reality of an 
opportunistic United States.
24
 
 Warning signs of approaching political strife appeared even before the 
delegation left for Washington.  Chief Pitchlynn used his connections with American 
officials to obtain an invitation to attend the negotiations, but only in an unofficial 
advisory capacity.  Pitchlynn’s hazy preference for neutrality at the start of the conflict, 
joined with his conflicting statements in favor of Confederacy and Union, was the 
closest thing the Choctaws had to a loyalist in high office.  Moreover, since he was in 
Washington in 1860 when Congress had decided in favor of the net proceeds case, 
Pitchlynn potentially offered useful intelligence on reestablishing the claim.  The 
Choctaw delegation needed friends and connections in Congress and Pitchlynn 
appeared to have them.  Along with Pitchlynn and the five official Choctaw delegates, 
former agent, longtime friend, and Confederate general Douglas Cooper also joined the 
group.
25
   
Both Cooper and Pitchlynn had ulterior agendas that proved disastrous towards 
the Choctaw National interests.  As a member of the 1853 delegation, or “old 
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delegation,” Pitchlynn stood to gain at least 5% of approximately three million dollars if 
the net proceeds claim was confirmed and paid.  Though net proceeds were in the 
Choctaw’s national interest, Pitchlynn’s personal interest drove him to ensure that 
above all else the Choctaws reaffirmed this obligation.  Douglas Cooper also had 
financial motives for wanting a part in the Choctaw treaty negotiation.  He had suffered 
large financial setbacks as a result of the war.  As the Choctaw agent in the 1850s, he 
had joined John H Cochrane and Albert Pike’s legal team on the net proceeds case and 
believed he was entitled to a percentage of the eventual payment.  As historian W. 
David Baird concluded, “Cooper expected to fish in the troubled waters of Choctaw-
United States relations.”  Personal ambition and national interests had often dove-tailed 
for these men in past endeavors, mitigating serious harm from befalling the Choctaws 
while they pursued both agendas.  That changed on the way to Washington.
26
 
The delegates traveled separately with Robert M. Jones stopping in Wisconsin to 
resolve undisclosed business matters, Pitchlynn leaving weeks later, and the remainder 
traveling with Douglas Cooper.  Cooper convinced his cohort to meet with his half-
brother-in-law, renowned Baltimore attorney John H. Latrobe, en route to Washington.  
Latrobe contended that the delegation needed a loyal face and considerable legal 
expertise when petitioning a radical Republican congress for leniency and justice.  Of 
course Latrobe believed he was describing himself.  He was also confident that the 
Choctaws had lost no real rights during the conflict and had considerable legal ground 
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to reestablish their past claims.  He agreed to accompany the Choctaw delegation to 
Washington and leave the matter of his legal fee to Cooper.
27
 
Upon arriving in Washington in late 1865, the delegation quickly discovered 
that the radical demands made at Fort Smith paled in comparison to those of a vengeful 
United States interior department.  Cooley’s resolve had only hardened since Fort 
Smith.  For instance, Cooley insisted that the Choctaw leased district “was a sale, but 
the word ‘lease’ was put (in the treaty) instead of ‘sale’” to provide political protection 
for delegates.  Even if true—which it was not—political considerations would be 
irrelevant since the 1855 treaty clearly dictate an ongoing lease of land that the 
Choctaws held in binding fee simple.  The delegates pressed the issue, demanding at 
very least the price of fifty cents per acre for the district—the same price Cooley had 
granted the Seminoles for less valuable land.  Cooley exploded when informed that fifty 
cents an acre would equal nearly five million dollars and declared that he would pay no 
more than five cents an acre, $500,000, less costs for surveys and sale.  Cooley’s 
amplified audacity likely stemmed from anticipated support from the new Secretary of 
the Interior James Harlan, a former senator who authored a bill ending tribal 
governments by act of congress.  Secretary Harlan thrice refused to meet with the 
delegation when they sought redress.  Instead Harlan sent a representative with the 
message that he was “so enraged that he has no time to see you” and a copy of a note 
instructing Cooley to reduce the amount to $300,000, all of which to be paid from the 
sale of Kansas Indians’ lands.  As this initial incident demonstrated, appeals to fairness, 
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justice, or the touted benevolence of the United States would accomplish little without 
an upper-hand.
28
      
This incident, combined with the observation that Chickasaws frequently 
prevailed in legal battles after hiring attorneys, convinced Jones, Wright, and Pitchlynn 
that they needed an advocate like Latrobe to secure their interests.  The Chickasaws 
followed suit and also hired Latrobe.  He allegedly quoted his fee at $100,000 if he was 
successful securing all Choctaw lands aside from the leased district, preventing Kansas 
Indians from resettling on Choctaw lands, and confirming all the rights of the previous 
treaties.  His rate fell to $50,000 if he procured either land or money, but not both.  
Failing to save land or money would earn him solely compensation for his costs.  Jones 
and Latrobe also made a separate agreement at a later date regarding back annuities 
abrogated by the United States during the war, the orphan fund, and the $250,000 
appropriated immediately before the war.  Latrobe believed he could also secure these 
funds, something even the delegates and Council had considered permanently lost.  
Jones offered half of whatever Latrobe could recover, convincing fellow delegates that 
“half a loaf is better no bread.”  Latrobe’s fee was undoubtedly steep considering the 
strength of the Choctaw’s legal case, but, as Jones later argued, was defensible in light 
of the United States’ history and temperament.29  The federal government still had not 
paid over thirty-year old payments which the United States Senate repeatedly admitted 
were just and binding—the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had just claimed a lease 
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equated a purchase; in light of perceived treason, relying on Congress to follow any 
laws outside of self-interest was naïve at best. 
While Latrobe toiled on the Choctaw’s behalf, Cooper hatched a plan to profit 
substantially from the negotiations.  Consultations dragged through the winter and 
spring of 1866.  Latrobe “made the happy discovery” that President Lincoln was given 
the option by Congress to void treaties with warring Indians in 1862 but declined, 
indicating that the treaties and their obligations were in still in place according to the 
recently-martyred president.  By March of 1866, he regularly traded treaty drafts with 
American negotiators who willingly conceded the resumption of financial obligations 
from previous treaties.  Latrobe even procured an additional $25,000 for Choctaws 
delegates to cover living expenses while the negotiations played out, which greatly 
exceeded their three dollars per day from the General Council.  Yet, the 49
th
 article 
obligated the United States to loan the Choctaws $150,000 for no official reason, likely 
intended as an advance to alleviate suffering and buy supplies until other claims could 
be appropriated.  Cooper saw this loan as an opportunity.  He approached Jones, 
proposing that $100,000 go as an advance on Latrobe’s legal fee, of which Cooper had 
secured a one-third interest.  To grease the wheels, he offered the delegation a bribe—“a 
gift”—of half of everything paid to Latrobe if they agreed.  Jones declined, but 
acquiesced to Cooper’s demand that the delegation as a whole decide the matter.30  
At this critical moment in March of 1866, Jones abruptly departed Washington 
to attend to personal matters, leaving Cooper’s bribe in the hands of his co-delegates.  
For months, Jones, too, had been working towards both national and personal agendas.  
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During the war, Jones had stored vast amounts of cotton on his plantations due to 
deflated prices and the Union blockade.  Once the war had ended, he shipped the whole 
stock—4,500 barrels, valued at well-over $100,000—towards New Orleans for sale.  
United States treasury officials stopped the shipment while still on the upper Red River 
and seized the cotton on suspicion of tax evasion.  According to Jones’ lawyers, the 
officials did not believe that an Indian could grow that much cotton, but rather Texans 
were attempting to dodge taxes by using Jones’ name.  A trip to Washington gave Jones 
an opportunity to appeal directly federal officials for redress.
31
   
Jones wrote to President Andrew Johnson, requesting “an interview, now…in 
relation to a matter involving my all.”  He also hired attorney Samuel Bell Maxey for 
$20,000, a former Confederate General working out of Paris, Texas, to travel to 
Shreveport, find exactly where his cotton was held, and secure its release.  
Simultaneously, he convinced Peter Pitchlynn to give a recorded deposition confirming 
that “Jones neither has nor cultivates any land out of the Choctaw Nation, but that he 
cultivates large bodies of land therein, and raises large crops of cotton.”  Pitchlynn 
undoubtedly knew this was not entirely true considering Jones’ land in Texas, but had 
no moral qualms about a small lie to secure a friend’s future favor.  The tripartite attack 
proved successful on March 8th when Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch 
ordered the cotton released due to insufficient evidence of Confederate ties.  Weeks 
later Attorney General Henry Stanbery informed McCulloch that taxes should also be 
refunded on Jones’ cotton.  Newspapers like the Shreveport Southwestern praised 
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Jones’ victory as “but the beginning of better days ahead.”32  Jones claimed that he 
needed to be present in New Orleans to secure the cotton’s release, and, by his own 
account, “was disgusted with the proposition General Cooper had made; and I 
concluded that my best plan was to leave.”  Thus, he penned a brief note to Allen 
Wright, who had again traveled to Massachusetts, requesting that as treasurer Wright 
settle his bill using allotted national funds and reminding him “if you can’t make a 
treaty without selling land, or making a railroad grant, invite them to send 
commissioners to our country and let our whole people treat with them…but we could 
not sell them lands.”33     
After Jones left Washington, Allen Wright, Peter Pitchlynn, Douglas Cooper, 
and John Latrobe had a hand in several fraudulent activities.  On April 28,
 
1866, 
Latrobe witnessed a ceremony of Choctaw delegates, Chickasaw delegates, and 
American officials signing an official peace treaty, which then became ratified in July.  
A matter of days after ratification—far from record time for discarding obligations—
Secretary of the Interior Harlan advised against fulfilling the $150,000 loan in article 49 
out of fears that the money would go towards attorneys.  Latrobe and Cooper lied and 
assured Harlan that they anticipated only $5,000 while Pitchlynn voiced an appeal on 
behalf of starving Choctaws who were in need of reprieve.  The ploy worked.  Allen 
Wright collected the money and scampered down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Lepreux 
House to meet his fellow conspirators, Douglas Cooper, and attorney John Cochrane.  
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Wright gave $100,000 to Cooper, who then returned $50,000 split between the 
delegates to fulfil their corrupt bargain.  Pockets loaded with approximately $15,000 
each—$10,000 from Latrobe’s fee, $5,000 from the United States’ contribution—
Wright, Pitchlynn, and the others returned to the Choctaw Nation anticipating an easy 
ratification process in the General Council.
34
 
Despite electing Allen Wright to succeed Pitchlynn as Principal Chief, the 
Council expressed considerable reservations regarding both the treaty and the actions of 
the delegates.  Pitchlynn, Wright, Cooper, and Latrobe had written from Washington 
lauding the treaty as a savior for the nation, and praising their own accomplishments in 
negotiating “the best Indian treaty ever.”  The Council disagreed.  Sampson Folsom and 
others questioned the appropriation of funds, the value of additional attorneys, and 
actions of the delegates.  Another cause for reservation was the fact that the treaty 
closely resembled the unfavorable agreement negotiated at Fort Smith.  Choctaws were 
obligated to create an overlapping territorial legislature with other Indian tribes with an 
American official as its leader—something they had opposed in petitions to Congress 
almost every year since 1838.  Not only had the delegates gone against the Council’s 
wishes and accepted a territorialization stipulation, Allen Wright was even credited with 
suggesting the name Oklahoma—Choctaw for “Red People”—for the Indian 
Territory.
35
  Several other tenets that the delegates agreed to undermined the 
sovereignty of the Choctaw Nation and made the already weakened Choctaw Nation 
vulnerable to American colonial policies.  The treaty included several provisions 
pertaining to the freedmen, land sectioning, and railroad right-of-ways, which created 
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more issues than they solved.
36
  Rather than saving the nation as the self-interested 
delegates claimed, United States officials intended this treaty to slowly erode Choctaw 
National existence. 
For instance, the treaty required Choctaws to adopt their freedmen, providing 
full citizenship with all of the rights of other Choctaw citizens, including suffrage, equal 
protection under law, and rights before a jury.  In addition, the Choctaw Nation was 
required to provide each freedman with forty acres of land.  If the Council passed these 
provisions, the United States would pay $300,000 for the Leased District—a paltry sum 
of 2.5 cents per acre.  If they refused, after two years the United States was obligated to 
remove the freedmen to the Leased District while the Choctaws would forfeit the 
$300,000 as a penalty.  Latrobe was under the impression that the Choctaws had already 
planned to adopt their freedmen to serve as a small but controllable source of labor.  
Thus, he used freedmen’s rights as a bargaining chip to secure some money for the 
Leased District.  For Choctaws, either option, accepting freedmen citizenship or 
refusing it, had drawbacks.  Submitting to the United States’ demands regarding 
qualifications and nature of citizenship meant yielding to American colonial policies 
designed to undermine indigenous sovereignty and set a dangerous precedent.  
Furthermore, providing freedmen with individual land holdings meant that Choctaw 
communal lands would have to be sectioned.  This would also mean that freedmen 
would become independent land owners rather than a pool of labor for Choctaws.
37
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Logistical problems inherent in the proposed system for recognizing Choctaw 
freedmen presented myriad roadblocks.  For example, the system arbitrarily lumped 
together wide ranges of Choctaw freedmen into two categories—Choctaw or non-
Choctaw—based on their geographic location when the Fort Smith treaty was signed.  
Those who had fled the nation as refugees had only ninety days to return to the nation 
or forfeit their Choctaw citizens.  The treaty disregarded the racial and cultural diversity 
of slaves who had lived in the Choctaw Nation.  Many freedmen had lived among the 
Choctaws for decades, some traveling with them during Removal.  Several spoke the 
Choctaw language primarily, if not exclusively, cooked Choctaw dishes, and practiced 
traditional Choctaw medicine.  This cohort, including a number that belonged to Robert 
M. Jones, publically self-identified as Choctaws regardless of their blood.  On some of 
the same farms, Jones had purchased dozens of slaves from fleeing Southerners as late 
as 1865.  These freedmen had no connection to the Choctaws, except for happenstance 
of finishing the war under a Choctaw master.  Yet, according to this system, the 
Choctaws were obligated to regard both of these groups as identical Choctaw citizens 
with equal rights and privileges, while also possibly denying citizenship to freedmen 
who took refuge with or were moored by their masters outside the Nation when the Fort 
Smith agreement was signed.
38
   
Questions regarding freedmen marriages further complicated the issue.  Latrobe 
and others argued freedmen’s small numbers made their adoption no real threat without 
considering future spouses and children.  As Choctaw citizens, freedmen could 
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theoretically marry outsiders, providing access to Choctaw resources and influencing 
politics while side-stepping the nation’s authority.  Moreover, Americans living on their 
borders were unlikely to respect the practice of a black freedman possessing rights to 
cultivate land denied to a white man.  For these reasons, in 1866 both by popular vote 
and legislative action the Choctaws refused to grant freedmen citizenship and expected 
the federal government to arrange their removal after two years. 
The Choctaws also found several other aspects of the treaty to be problematic.  
Article 6, for instance, granted a right of way through Choctaw lands for two railroads, 
as well as the land “six miles on each side of said roads,” that railroad companies could 
pay for with stock options.
39
   Allen Wright believed that the railroads would bring 
greater commercial opportunities and voiced his support for this policy.  Even Jones, 
who was weary about white intrusion, likened the railroads to the earlier military roads 
which were “always crowded with travelers and there was never any objection.”  Yet, 
granting the railroad companies any land undermined the sanctity of the Choctaw’s land 
title and gave powerful financial interests one more reason to target Choctaw lands.  
Finally, Article 7 obligated the Choctaws to accept “legislation Congress and the 
President…may deem necessary for the better administration of justice and the 
protection of the rights of person and property within the Indian Territory.”  Though 
they promised to not “interfere with” or “annul present tribal organizations,” vague 
language implying justifiable American oversight represented a clear threat.  Seeing as 
American officials made the argument that the word “lease” meant “sale” only months 
before, accepting ambiguous power was a clear danger.  Essentially, the only gain to the 
Choctaws was a confirmation that the previous payments, including the net proceeds, 
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remained in effect.  Despite their objections, the Council had no real choice but to ratify 
the treaty which they did on December 21, 1866.
40
    
Yet, the Council made two huge mistakes in following ratification.  First, they 
issued a blanket endorsement approving “all the acts” of the delegation.  Admittedly, 
Allen Wright’s report to the Council neglected to mention the kick-back that he, 
Cooper, Pitchlynn, other delegates (minus Jones) had received from Latrobe’s legal fee.  
He later defended this omission by claiming that the financial “gift” was not a national 
matter, but a personal one.  The Council’s blanket endorsement also implicitly covered 
an imprecise contract made with Latrobe on May 16
th
 regarding his future services.  
Based on their oral agreements, Latrobe would receive a percentage of recovered back-
annuities owed to the Choctaw Nation; however, the language of the contract could be 
interpreted to include the nearly three million dollars of the net proceeds case.  
Approving this contract proved disastrous.  Second, Chief Allen Wright commissioned 
Peter Pitchlynn to return to Washington to work with Latrobe in securing the payment 
of net proceeds.  This action coincided with an open investigation against Cooper and 
Pitchlynn into misappropriation and possible embezzlement of $250,000 granted in 
1860 for the relief of starving Choctaws.  With Wright’s commission, Pitchlynn fled to 
Washington anticipating a straightforward congressional appropriation in 1867 and a 
large personal payday.  Despite the number of worrisome implications of the treaty, its 
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ratification still marked an official close to the conflict and the beginning of a rebuilding 
period in the Choctaw Nation.
41
   
 With the treaty resolved, the majority of Choctaws attempted to resume their 
lives as they had done before the war.  For Robert M. Jones, this meant restarting 
commercial activities, practicing local hospitality, spending money, and advancing a 
national education agenda.  He reopened several stores and planted new stores in towns 
with future commercial potential.  Not satisfied with mansions at Rose Hill and Lake 
West, he contracted with Choctaw freedmen, African Americans, and white laborers to 
construct another mansion near his business partner Charles Thebo in Paris, Texas.  
Called “Jones Place,” it was valued at over $35,000 and contained “all modern 
appliances for comfort and convenience—each room bring furnished with apparatus for 
the supply of both hot and cold water, a stone fire place in each room handsomely 
mounted with Italian Marble…a copious well ventilated cellar….and magnificent 
dining room.”  Jones quickly soured on this property and attempted to raffle it off in a 
well-publicized “gift concert” in 1872.   In addition to commerce, Jones took an active 
role in the General Council towards resuming education throughout the nation.
42
     
 While Jones returned to the affluent lifestyle he had known before the war, other 
less wealthy members of the Five Tribes worked to rebuild homes and barns, retrieve 
lost livestock, and repair damaged fields.  As J.W. Dunn, U.S. agent for the Creeks, 
reported in 1867, it was “a time of severe and necessary labor – a struggle for existence 
– and every energy of the people was directed to the cultivation of crops and the 
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building of houses.”43  Despite the severe loss of life and property that resulted from the 
war, Choctaws and citizens of the other Five Tribes actively worked to reconstruct their 
nations.  The Superintendent for the Southern Superintendency reported in 1867 that 
they had returned to “agricultural and other industrial pursuits of the greater number in 
all tribes…the reopening of schools and the general good attendance and the interest 
manifested by the pupils” and the “awakened interest in the various tribes on subjects of 
internal improvements.”44 
 As they had before the war, Choctaw officials viewed education as a top priority 
towards securing national interest.  Before departing for Washington D.C. in 1865, 
then-Chief Peter Pitchlynn directed three commissioners to investigate the conditions of 
each school and “devise and mature a plan of perfecting and establishing the system of 
education in this Nation on a permanent and enlarged basis.”  The next year, the House 
and Senate met together and devoted a full day of their limited schedule solely to the 
subject of considering the commission’s reports and incorporating their plans.  As a 
national initiative, the public was encouraged to attend and voice their opinions.  The 
Council appointed a Superintendent Trustee tasked with establishing and maintaining 
local schools in “each neighborhood of this Nation, where there are Choctaw children of 
proper age.”  Teachers were to be paid $2 per student from national funds while the 
community designated the school’s location.  This was a bold plan considering that 
owing to their own poverty Southern missionary societies could no longer effectively 
augment Choctaw education funds.  Yet, the resumption of annuity payments and the 
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hopes of a large payment in the net proceeds case fueled optimistic spending on what all 
agreed was a worthwhile endeavor.  By 1869, Superintendent of Schools Forbis Leflore 
reported sixty-nine functioning schools with a total of 1,847 students, and twenty-three 
men and women attending American colleges and seminaries as part of the “Forty 
Youth” fund.45 
Emphasizing local neighborhood schools over the formal academy model 
resulted in a higher percentage of Choctaw teachers, bilingual education, and less 
formal regulation.  These teachers normally possessed a superior connection to their 
communities, allowing them to more easily connect with their students.  Peter 
Pitchlynn’s daughter Rhoda, for instance, immediately understood why barefoot and 
frightened student Peter J. Hudson refused to state his name “like any good Choctaw.”  
She listed possible names until he nodded his head to the name Peter.  He then jokingly 
confirmed that his surname was Pitchlynn, to which the school “broke out in laughter.”  
This rapport often came with a price.  Several graduates from these common schools 
reported learning little English, leaving them ill-prepared to interact with the intruding 
American world.  Jones attempted to remedy this by creating a teaching and evaluation 
program for teachers, but made limited progress.  Subsequently, Forbis Leflore 
conceded in 1870 that several teachers were not fully qualified.
46
 
Lack of funding also severely inhibited the success of this program.  Citizens 
often petitioned for schools only to face overloaded classes once a school actually 
opened.  United States agent Martin Chollar proudly reported to his superiors that 
                                                 
45A. E. Perry, “Col. Forbis Leflore: Pioneer and Statesman,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 6 (Spring 
1928), 28; Debo, Rise and Fall, 90-91. 
46
 Peter J. Hudson, “Recollections of Peter Hudson” Chronicles of Oklahoma, 10 (Winter 1932), 
506, 507; James Morrison, Social History of the Choctaw Nation, 1865-1907 (Durant: Creative 
Informatics, 1987), 34. 
286 
 
Choctaw schools “are as largely attended as the generality of public schools in the most 
enlightened states;” however, he lamented that “their liberal system of education…will 
suffer unless the government hastily comes to their relief by paying their just claims, 
which for so many years have been delayed.”  Despite Chollar’s optimism, shortages of 
warm clothing in winter months and a lack of compulsory attendance laws limited 
attendance.  Several schools cut their sessions in half to five months as a way of saving 
money.  New Hope, Wheelock, and Spencer Academies reopened on a limited basis, 
but neighborhood schools struggled to find consistent funds resulting in a drop in their 
number to fifty-four by 1876.
47
   
Though missionary societies halted funding for academy schools, churches 
themselves continued to offer a venue for community gatherings and limited, literacy 
education.  Sabbath schools informally operated out of church buildings utilizing 
bilingual religious texts to provide basic literacy in Choctaw and/or English to whole 
neighborhoods.  Old guard missionaries like Cyrus Byington, Ebenezer Hotchkin, and 
Cyrus Kingsbury all survived the war and with their protégées recommenced providing 
services to local communities.  Byington again blew a cow horn to announce services 
and Kingsbury, affectionately called “limping wolf,” hobbled from town to town for 
regular services.  A member of the “American Bible Society” observed one of these 
services as a guest of Israel Folsom in 1867.  He was surprised to be in the presence of 
almost exclusively “full bloods, or ‘tubbies,’ as they are called,” and impressed at their 
large, but “much worn” collection of books belonging to the neighborhood.  Yet, he 
regretted that among the “tattered volumes…was not one Bible or Testament,” but 
instead bilingual books more practical towards teaching reading.  Choctaws and 
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missionaries alike touted the success of these Sabbath schools in frugally providing 
basic literacy.  Missionary John Edwards extolled this program in a lecture at University 
of California, claiming that “now hundreds, perhaps thousands, are acquainted with 
English books; and a large majority are able to read, and many of them to write and 
cipher in their own language.”  Thus, despite limited outside funding, Choctaw 
missionaries continued to play a role in advancing education in the post-Civil War 
period.
48
     
Regular interdenominational church meetings continued to be an important 
venue for community life.  Whole families, including their canines, attended camp 
meetings which often lasted for over a week.  Though designed to be religious in nature, 
many Choctaws were likely drawn by the promise of large quantities of food, pipe 
smoking, ball games, and dancing.  Many missionaries preached against these 
activities—especially the violent, traditional ball games—but lacked the power to curb 
their practice.  Missionaries openly joined in other Choctaw activities, including the 
funeral cry.  In 1885, J.J. Methvin, a white missionary seeking employment at New 
Hope Seminary shadowed “mixed-blood” minister Willis Folsom at a Christian funeral 
followed by a traditional funeral cry.  Methvin brashly questioned why Folsom would 
“encourage these superstitions by officiating at the funerals,” to which Folsom faked a 
smile and curtly replied “you don’t know the Indian.”  Through these activities, 
missions and missionaries remained an essential facet of post-Civil War national life.
49
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 Freedmen were largely excluded from these rebuilding efforts, community 
activities, and generally any benefit enjoyed by citizens.  Their overall quality of life 
greatly varied following the Civil War.  Emancipated slaves living on the Texas border 
risked being confused with a feared hoard of African American invaders and cattle 
thieves.  In 1866, vigilantes committees and patrols likened to the Ku Klux Klan 
regularly executed black men accused of stealing horses and cattle.  Simple acts of 
asserting their emancipated status could also lead to violent retaliation against 
freedmen.  Commissioner of Indian Affairs D. H. Cooley appointed Major General John 
Sanborn as a special commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau and instructed him to 
investigate claims of violence and continued slavery.  Sanburn admitted that conditions 
had not reached the levels reported, but nonetheless recommended placing a permanent 
military force “for the purpose of protecting freedmen” and extending the Homestead 
Act of 1862 onto Indian Territory all while increasing land allotments to 320 acres for 
each freedman.  Surrounding newspapers, including the Fort Smith New Era echoed 
reports of violence in Indian Territory as justification to take additional Indian land—on 
behalf of the freedmen, of course.  Less than one year into freedom, emancipated slaves 
had already become a wedge issue for Americans on the state and local level to 
conveniently intervene in Indian affairs in the name of justice.
50
     
 Though the American and Choctaw governments clearly viewed freedmen 
primarily through the strategic lens of pawns who could slay Indian land titles and 
sovereign governments, historian Barbara Krauthammer adeptly cautions historians 
from ignoring “ways black people were already working to liberate themselves and 
assert their own expectations of freedom.”  Emancipated Choctaw and Chickasaw 
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freedmen fully recognized their precarious position between Indian and American 
worlds, technically free but denied full and equal citizenship in either nation.  Though 
freedmen were divided over several issues, most recognized the need for formal 
citizenship, legal protections, land rights, and education for their children.  As such, one 
cohort formally met in response to the Choctaw/Chickasaws 1866 refusal to them grant 
citizenship with a request that the United States arrange for their removal and distribute 
the $300,000 from the Leased District towards their collective welfare.  Choctaws 
wholeheartedly agreed, but American agents took no action.  Undeterred, Choctaw and 
Chickasaw slaves opted to hold future meetings, elect representatives, and protest both 
American and Choctaw governments for redress.
51
    
 The two-year deadline to adopt the freedmen came and passed in 1868 without 
action from Americans or the General Council.  American agents conceded that they 
were obligated to remove the freedmen using funds from the Leased District, but 
conjured every imaginable excuse to avoid fulfilling this obligation.  First, they claimed 
that they had never appropriated the necessary $300,000 to carry out a removal.  
Second, members of Congress argued against removal because freedmen had made 
valuable improvements to the land and unjustly lost their rights.  Admirable in 
principle, the Choctaws certainly would have appreciated this sentiment thirty-eight 
years earlier as Congress debated the Indian Removal Act.  Regardless, the refusal of 
Congress to honor their treaty obligations relegated the freedmen to an indefinite sub-
citizen status subject to the interpretation of Choctaws.  This system advantaged both 
the Choctaws and Americans, but placed Choctaw freedmen in a liminal status.   
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Collective action was necessary to disrupt this system; as freedmen Richard Brashears 
later stated, “If we do not work for ourselves, who will?”52 
Pressed, freedmen strategically leveraged American’s political sentiments in 
order to obtain rights that the Choctaws refused to grant.  A large group gathered on 
June 10, 1869 at Boggy Depot, in the presence of Agent Chollar, to petition Congress to 
meet with their selected delegates in Washington.
53
  They likely requested a private 
venue to allow them to make their case without fear of reprisals from Choctaw 
observers.  For example, at a public meeting in 1869, Principal Chief Allen Wright 
requested freedmen emigrate to Liberia, noting that “every-body is against you” here.  
At a later meeting outside of Wright’s gaze, the same freedmen adopted resolutions 
stating their desire to remain on Choctaw and Chickasaw lands “as we can claim no 
other country” and the belief that they were “full citizens of those nations, and fully 
entitled to all of the rights, privileges, and benefits as such.”  To get the attention of 
Congress, they also stated their opinion in favor of sectioning and “opening this 
Territory to white immigration, and of selling to them, for the benefit of the whole 
people of these nations, our surplus lands.”  In exchange, freedmen asked for access to 
tribal education funds and official United States citizenship for their protection.  
Essentially, granting freedmen their petition would give Americans every needed 
justification to section the land, interfere in tribal governments, and open up homesteads 
for white families.
54
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In making these demands, freedmen were exercising what historian Michael 
Vorenberg defines as “affective citizenship,” equating their cultural, social, historical, 
and personal ties with Choctaws as grounds for joining their imagined community.  As 
freedmen Charlie Chatman later testified “I was a slave.  I belonged to Robert Jones…I 
am a Choctaw.”  The fact that the Choctaws refused to recognize freedmen as kin gave 
them sense of continued unjust subjugation and illegitimate ostracism which 
necessitated drastic actions.  Freedmen demonstrated that they would not be objects of 
oppression or the subservient pool of labor the Choctaws desired, but actors in obtaining 
what they believed to be their rights as Choctaws, including the right to control their 
own labor, a share of annuity funds, and access to tribal schools.
55
 
 Internal and external pressures began to fracture the national unity that 
Choctaws had fostered and preserved over the past four decades.  In addition to the 
ongoing freedmen issue, railroad companies continued to seek title to Indian lands and 
Congress persisted in angling for exploitative concessions.  Furthermore, limited 
funding for schools and personal greed from prominent Choctaw citizens compounded 
national dilemmas that threatened the Choctaw Nation during Reconstruction.  
Resolving these domestic and foreign threats fell to Principal Chief Allen Wright and 
members of the General Council.  Wright believed that like many times before, the 
Choctaws needed to accept certain unpleasant realities in order to protect what remained 
of their national identity.  In a message to the General Council he noted that “we are 
nearly surrounded with State and Territorial populations; we must bend to 
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circumstances, and meet them boldly with a firm and fixed resolve to sustain our name 
and place as a people, or break and be swept away.”  As such, he advanced a political 
platform that selectively resisted what he felt were the most detrimental aspects of 
American intrusion while making extraordinary concessions to outside interests.  
Wright’s program galvanized resistance from wide swaths of society, including 
traditional Choctaws opposed to sectioning of land, progressive Choctaws who felt 
Wright forfeited fundamental national rights, and white men and railroad interests eager 
to extinguish all Indian land titles
56
   
 Rather than fighting the railroads and their unnaturally-inflated interests in 
Congress, Wright attempted to harness the potential financial resources that came with 
controlling railroad development.  In his eyes, the coming of railroads was inevitable, 
but as a sovereign people, the Choctaws could decide which company gained admission 
and tax them accordingly.  Seizing the initiative, Wright pushed an act through a special 
session of the General Council granting charters to the Thirty-Fifth Parallel and the 
Central Choctaw and Chickasaw Rail Road in 1870.  The subsequent Council, as well 
as the Chickasaws and Secretary of the Interior voided these charters, leaving the power 
with the United States to decide which railroads won the title to Choctaw lands.
57
  
  In addition to this controversial railroad scheme, Wright gained little support in 
policies towards freedmen or white laborers, particularly those concerned with 
protecting Choctaw lands and resources.  By 1868, when it became clear that Congress 
had no intention of removing the freedmen, a small cohort including Sampson Folsom 
recommended adopting freedmen as a way of increasing Choctaw representation in any 
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future territorial government.  Peter Pitchlynn and national attorneys agreed that 
adoption might clear opposition in Congress to paying the net proceeds.  Others, like 
George Harkins, pressured Wright to push for removal out of fear of a possible alliance 
between traditional Choctaws and freedmen.  Wright chose a middle course, admitting 
that freedmen had a right to stay on Choctaw lands, but only as American citizens with 
no privileges of Choctaw citizenship.
58
   
Without slave labor to depend upon, affluent Choctaws increasingly turned to 
poor whites as a source of labor.  This transition created a wide-range of problems.  
Despite the numerous freedmen who remained on his properties, Robert Jones took full 
advantage of this policy.  Among many others, Jones hired Victor M. Locke, a white 
Confederate veteran who had fled Louisiana after killing a black man for being “mean 
and ‘sassy.’”  Locke clerked in Jones’ Shawneetown and Lukfata stores where he 
learned the language and stole another white man’s Choctaw wife.  He later became a 
powerful albeit-controversial figure in internal Choctaw affairs while his son became 
Principal Chief.  Locke’s example is indicative of the problems of using white labor to 
fill shortages—once whites entered Choctaw lands, they seldom left.59  White intrusion 
grew to such levels that in 1874 Principal Chief Coleman Cole protested, “For God 
sake, when we bought this country, we did not buy white man with it.”  Some whites 
went so far as to pay Choctaw proxies to provide free land for their cattle and export 
natural resources like coal and timber.  Efforts to halt or regulate this process were 
stymied by the federal government, who used Secretary of Indian Affairs Ely Parker to 
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explicate that Indian nations had no sovereignty and therefore lacked the right to 
regulate trade.
60
   
Worse still, given white intruders’ American citizenship, Choctaws lacked legal 
authority to prosecute crimes committed by whites in their territory.  If white men 
raised criminal charges against Choctaws, American federal courts claimed jurisdiction 
regardless of where the crime had been committed.  Unsurprisingly, these Arkansas 
courts, empaneled with all-white juries under the direction of “hanging judge” Isaac 
Parker, rarely ruled in favor of Choctaw interests.  The Council repeatedly allocated 
money for citizen’s legal fees while petitioning against intrusions from marshals and 
vigilantes, but often with limited success.
61
 
Wright’s agenda and apparent connections to corruption raised the ire of the 
Choctaw electorate who replaced both him and many of his supporters in the Council 
during the 1870 election.  More conservative Choctaws opposed to railroad interest took 
their place.  Past historians frequently represent this as a blood-based split between 
educated mixed-bloods encouraging progress and fearful full-bloods futilely resisting 
the inevitable.  Contemporary Choctaws knew better.  Israel Folsom, for instance, wrote 
to Peter Pitchlynn describing “unhappy actions” committed by “the full bloods as they 
are called” in resistance to sectioning the land, but conceded that this group had 
members of varying levels of blood.  Rather than blood, Pitchlynn’s paid lobbyist in the 
Council E.S. Mitchell characterized the divisions as “people want a change…and men 
that will not give their land away to railroads.”  The battle lines in domestic policy had 
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become clear by 1870—accepting white intrusion, sectioning of land, and railroads, or 
resisting in an effort to preserve Choctaws land base and national identity.
62
  
 Divisive domestic policies also corresponded with corruption and self-interest in 
foreign affairs.  Peter Pitchlynn, perhaps naively, anticipated quickly receiving a net-
proceeds payment from Congress as dictated by the 1866 treaty.  Instead, Pitchlynn, 
Cooper, and Latrobe encountered a large lobby intent on preventing such a large sum 
from arriving in Choctaw hands.  Using racial ideology as justification, Senator James 
McDougal expressed disgust upon meeting a Choctaw delegation wearing feathers: 
“We buy them those feathers, and we buy them their blankets…We do not owe them 
anything.  Why should we tax our farmers and laboring men, and our mechanics, to 
subsist the Indians?”  Other radical Republicans placed procedural road blocks to 
prevent disloyal Indians from receiving funds.  Strangely, though, the Choctaw cause 
was aided by radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens.  Stevens excused the Choctaws’ 
role in the Civil War because they agreed to abolish slavery before the 13
th
 Amendment 
was ratified.  He described the Choctaws as “civilized and as sober as this House, even 
with the aid of the Congressional temperance Society.”  Finally, he attacked the 
rationality of a procedural roadblock, asking “Is such logic as that to be used to 
influence the minds of sensible men?”  Even Stephens, joined by future president James 
A. Garfield, could not get the appropriation through Congress.
63
   
 Disgusted but not defeated, Pitchlynn attempted to cut Cooper and Latrobe out 
of the Choctaw claims while assembling a large, if not confused, team of supporters and 
lobbyists.  The result was years of complex alliances, backroom bargains, and corrupt 
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negotiations, something historian Clara Sue Kidwell aptly describes as “positively 
byzantine” in nature.  Pitchlynn vainly attempted year-after-year to force the net 
proceeds through congress.  Numerous lobbyists, federal officials, congressman, and 
attorneys all endeavored towards this goal once they were promised a kick-back for 
their troubles.  Even Albert Pike reappeared and claimed to be the sole attorney for the 
Choctaws upon hearing that he had been cut out of the net proceeds award.  This web of 
connections, revealed how personal interests further divided Choctaws and their allies, 
distracting them from addressing their national problems.  Cooper and Latrobe’s 
supporters in the Choctaw Nation succeeded in getting Pitchlynn’s credentials revoked 
by revealing Pitchlynn’s involvement in unauthorized financial transactions during the 
war, including literally burying the nation’s gold in New Hampshire.  Even Jones drew 
up papers to sue Pitchlynn for almost $10,000, an amount belonging to Jones that 
Pitchlynn had previously pocketed for himself.  Sampson Folsom, sent to replace 
Latrobe on resolving claims of “loyal Choctaws,” extorted upwards of $50,000 from 
Pitchlynn and another attorney simply for not derailing the negotiations.  Pitchlynn 
battled back by hiring his own lobby to keep the Council favorable towards his actions.  
When congress made a small appropriation, Pitchlynn’s opponents on the General 
Council prevented him from accepting the money.  Baffled members of Congress 
smelled corruption in the “Indian Ring” and collusion with former rebels, which they 
used to repeatedly justify withholding payment.
 64
 
 By 1872, Choctaws were divided on all levels.  Nearly every prominent political 
figure had been accused of corruption, bribery, or conspiracy to forfeit Choctaw lands.  
American newspapers, including the New York Herald and Chicago Daily Times, 
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lambasted Cooper, Latrobe, and the 1866 delegation—with the exception Robert M. 
Jones—as corrupt.  They warned that paying Choctaw claims would result in over 50% 
going to former rebels.  Local papers challenged these claims as simply political 
rhetoric to drum up support for Grant’s peace policy.  Rumors of completed territorial 
bills caused some opponents of territorialization to advocate sectioning the land to slow 
the government’s efforts.  Allen Wright instead advocated petitioning directly for 
statehood—something Wright believed would at least attract the right type of white 
person instead of simply outlaws.  The Atoka Vindicator, a propaganda newspaper 
called the “Cooper Party organ” by Chief William Bryant, echoed this idea while 
prognosticating imminent doom if Choctaws continued to resist land sectioning.
65
  
Principal Chief William Bryant informed Pitchlynn that there were at least three 
different parties, maybe more, conspiring against each other for control. 
 Within this chaos, Robert M. Jones was the one Choctaw who could appeal to 
every faction and perhaps resolve the conflict.  Jones was well-known for conditional 
support for railroads, which he compared to the military roads that he had grown-up 
around.  Yet, he rejected any attempt of railroads to own any of the Choctaw domain.  
Though he led the 1866 delegation, the fact that he left Washington before the crooked 
bargains with Cooper and Latrobe partially insulated him from accusations of 
corruption.  While recognized as a progressive Choctaw, he vehemently opposed 
sectioning land because he knew it to be against the interest and desires of the people.  
A lifetime advocate of education, with a daughter in Choctaw National schools whom 
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he funded himself despite offers for national funds, Jones could be trusted to not 
sacrifice the nation’s system of education for his own pecuniary gain.  He could connect 
to almost every party without being tinctured by corruption.  Undoubtedly, he was the 
man for the job.
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 Jones believed that he had found an opportunity to secure Choctaws’ financial 
interests while protecting their land in October of 1871.  Representative John P. Shanks, 
an up-and-coming member of the House of Representatives, friend of President Grant, 
and member of the Indian Affairs committee was tasked with investigating frauds 
among the Five Tribes.  Shanks sent an associate, M.S. Temple, under the auspices of 
making contact with leading Choctaws, while actually making an offer to Sampson 
Folsom.  Shanks proposed releasing $250,000 plus interest of the net proceeds fund 
immediately, but only on the basis that the full face value go towards Choctaw 
claimants and only interest be used to support attorneys.  Shanks would then 
recommend the release of the entire amount once it was established that it would 
actually go to the Choctaw people, minus his own fee.  Temple found Sampson Folsom 
near death from a sudden illness and unable to take any action.  Folsom suggested that 
Jones take his place in the Council and pass the bill.  If successful, Jones knew that the 
money from the net proceeds would fund domestic education efforts and provide a 
powerful ally in the federal government against forced territorialization.  Standing in his 
way was General Cooper and his ring of supporters, so-called “Cooperites,” including 
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former friends of Jones like Dr. Thomas Bond and John Turnbull, who had no intention 
of repudiating Latrobe’s contract.67 
  Jones convinced Chief Bryant to call a special session of the Council in March 
1872 for the purpose of passing the Jones’ bill, slammed by opponents as the “Brush 
bill” for the “clandestine manner” in which it appeared.  Jones lobbied members of the 
Council and close friends, arguing that Latrobe and Cooper had failed to gain any 
financial redress for over seven years and should not be profit half of what rightfully 
belongs to the Choctaws.  Besides, interest from the award plus the initial $100,000 
awarded to Latrobe would certainly cover his costs.  Cooper held mass meetings and 
rallied his supporters to defeat the bill while privately reaching out to Jones and offering 
“ample compensation” if he would withdraw his assault.  One Council member claimed 
the bill misspelled the word “Folsom” in an American fashion, convincing him that the 
bill came from American interests.  After a hellacious fight in the Council, in which 
Jones delayed the vote until he had sufficient support, the bill passed with only six out 
of thirty members opposed.
68
 
 With this victory, Jones believed that Cooper and his machinations had been 
permanently vanquished and the nation saved.  Peter Folsom described the event in 
military terms with “General R.M. Jones” firing the last shot to dissolve the “old gray 
fox party.”  Jones preferred spiritual language to describe defeating the “Coooperite 
devil” and stated that “God be praise that the source of justice and the poor Indian 
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prevails…and I hope that the court of claims will open and proceed to business 
promptly.”  Keeping with the agreement, as a good faith measure, Shanks also 
introduced a bill repealing all land grants to railroad companies in Indian Territory.  He 
then launched his investigation into Indian frauds, concluding with a scathing 793 page 
indictment against Cooper, Latrobe, and Allen Wright in late 1873.  Somehow Jones 
conveniently forgot to deliver subpoenas to most members of the Council who voted 
against his bill.  Shanks also celebrated 4
th
 of July with Choctaw freedmen and included 
an interview with Jones about the fine condition in which freedmen lived under US 
protection on Choctaw lands.  With this report to Congress and a clean bill authorizing 
Pitchlynn to distribute interest money and the Choctaws receiving full value, Jones was 
content overdue funds would soon arrive in Choctaw hands and factionalism would 
crumble.
69
 
 Jones’ victory proved to be short-lived.  Rather than breaking factionalism, 
Cooper and Wright struck back with vengeance.  Working the Choctaw court system, 
they had the “Brush Bill” ruled unconstitutional before Congress could vote to release 
any funds.  Wright and Cooper also distributed defamatory petitions right before 
Council elections accusing Jones of masterminding a plot to profit from tribal money.  
In October 1872, Jones replied with his own pamphlet, “A Reverend Libeler” which 
explained the charges as the efforts “of an imbecile attempting to slander and vilify 
honest citizens.”  Jones discussed his role in the negotiations, while reminding the 
reader that he “has never received one dollar of Choctaw money for services and 
mileage, but Allen Wright has.”  He also noted that Wright was a leading voice with 
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Cooper in favor of “sectionizing our nation and having a territorial government put over 
us,” giving them incentive to target Jones.  Shanks’ report was not yet available so 
Jones had nothing but logic and his word.  Nonetheless, Cooper and Wright’s charges 
stuck for one election cycle, with Jones informing Pitchlynn “we are the worst beaten 
set of men in this of any other nation.”  In their first meeting, Wright and Cooper 
attempted to re-establish their claims to Choctaw money and force a new vote on 
sectioning the land.  Fortuitously, railroad representatives petitioned for land rights 
within days of Cooper and Wright’s victory.70 
***** 
  Jones slipped into a depression, and “with a heavy heart” decided that he was 
done in politics.  He retired to Rose Hill intent on spending more time with his son, 
Robert M. Jones, Jr., daughter Mary, and wife Elizabeth.  This, however, did not last.  
In February of 1873, Jones suffered a severe illness.  His family summoned his doctor, 
Edward Bailey, who lived nearby.  Jones’ condition quickly deteriorated and he died on 
February 22, 1873.  His death was a great loss to the Choctaw Nation.  The Council’s 
Cooperite wing was eventually defeated in late 1873 after the Shanks Commission 
released their findings and the people again en mass rejected both the expansion of 
railroads and sectioning their lands.  Yet, even with Shanks’ assistance, Pitchlynn failed 
to secure the net proceeds payment.  Pitchlynn, Cooper, Wright, and Jones would all die 
before the Choctaws ever received their net proceeds payments.
71
 
                                                 
70
 Robert M. Jones to Peter Pitchlynn, November 7 1872, Box 4, Folder 60; Robert M. Jones to 
Peter Pitchlynn, October 27, 1872, Box 4, Folder 59, WHC; Robert M. Jones, A Reverend Libeler (Boggy 
Depot: Vindicator, 1872), 2-5. 
71
 Ibid., William Morrison, “Tragedy of Rose Hill,” William B. Morrison Collection, OHS; 
“Death of General Douglas H. Cooper,” The Star-Vindicator, May 10, 1879.  
302 
 
Factionalism and threats to the nation did not die with Cooper’s fall from grace, 
but rather accelerated in intensity after Jones’ death.  To meet these threats, Choctaws 
elected Coleman Cole chief in 1874.  Cole was a culturally-traditional, educated 
Choctaw who had the credentials of being an opponent of both Pitchlynn and Cooper in 
the past.  Most of his followers later called themselves the “Nationalists,” who stood in 
opposition to the “Progressives.”  The cognomens for each group are telling about the 
changes of Reconstruction—for all of Jones’ life, he had been a progressive nationalist, 
two attributes that was in no way contradictory. 
  Cole adamantly worked towards removing white intruders and preventing 
sectioning of land.  Yet, with the completion of the Missouri, Kansas, Texas railroad in 
1873, the task of keeping out unauthorized white men proved nearly impossible.  Still, 
Cole and future chiefs made extensive efforts to limit the number of white intrusion in 
their territory.  Cole attempted to place a tax on each white man occupying Indian 
Territory only to have the Secretary of the Interior strike down the law.  Even an 
eventual permit law was effectively resisted by the entrenched white invaders.  In 1881, 
Chief Jackson McCurtain called out a militia to seize the property of non-citizens 
surrounding Skullyville only to be met with substantial resistance.  White men, some 
good, most bad, were clearly on Choctaw lands to stay.
72
   
Choctaws weathered factional disputes in the past, the end of the Reconstruction 
era ushered in a new period of increased factional violence.  On multiple occasions, 
Nationalists and Progressives murdered one-another with impunity.  While Choctaws 
fought one another for the power to control their future, Americans fortified their 
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position to make a major push towards ending tribal governments and opening tribal 
lands.  Nearly every year a new territorial law appeared in Congress.   
Though they had survived the Civil War as a unified people, Reconstruction 
redefined Choctaw nationhood and fostered new and competing notions of Choctaw 
Nationalism that created political and social fissures.  After decades of national 
consensus among Choctaws, the struggle to stay united in the post-Civil War period 
made the indigenous nation increasingly vulnerable to U.S. colonial expansion and 
federal assimilation policy designed to dispossess them of their land and dissolve their 
political sovereignty.  The destruction of Reconstruction tore apart the popularly-
conceived national consensus, and ushered in a dark era for the Choctaw people.
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CONCLUSION: 
In the factionalism of Reconstruction, Robert M. Jones’ family also met 
economic strife and internal violence following his sudden death in 1873.  Jones 
completed a will only three months before his death and had it filed in both Choctaw 
and American nations to protect all of his property.  Yet, not anticipating his imminent 
demise, he failed to update his debts and debtors, leaving his wife Elizabeth, the 
executrix of the will, to make and defend against claims without adequate information.  
American and Choctaw former business partners, traders, customers, and companies 
took full advantage of Elizabeth’s lack of information.  She subsequently appeared 
regularly in Texas and Choctaw courts for more than a decade, disputing demands and 
paying hefty legal fees.
1
 
 More than just an inconvenience, Jones’ death and the distribution of his assets 
tore his family apart.  Frances Love, Robert’s daughter with second wife Susan Colbert 
Jones, filed suit for control of the estate in 1875 after her step-mother failed to set aside 
$10,000 for Susan’s two children as dictated in the will.  Five years later, Robert Jones 
Jr.—also known as “Robbie” or “little Bob” and Mary, Jones’ surviving children with 
Elizabeth, reported that their mother failed to disclose over $60,000 in insurance money 
she received from Jones’ death, from which she owed her children $10,000 according to 
the will.  This economic impropriety contributed to Robert’s suspicion that his father 
had been poisoned by his doctor, Samuel Bailey, who also happened to be witness to his 
will.  Elizabeth was also suspect given that she married Dr. Bailey very shortly after 
Jones died.
2
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 Tensions boiled over in 1882 when Robert Jr. and his nephew, Robert Love, 
confronted Bailey over the money they were owed and possibly leveled accusations of 
murder.  In a scuffle, Robert Jr. shot and killed Bailey and buried him at the mouth of 
Boggy River.  When Choctaw authorities took no action, Bailey’s former overseer and 
acting U.S. Marshall Tom Young was also killed by Robert Jr. in a failed apprehension 
attempt.  He then fled to Texas while his nephew, Robert Love was indicted as 
accomplice to murder.  A month later, Robert Jr. took his own life in St. Louis, 
Missouri.  This violence, while tragic, was indicative of the bloodshed that followed 
Reconstruction and the invasion of white outsiders.
3
 
***** 
For decades, a broad-based consensus on the primacy of nation had protected 
Choctaw sovereignty through crises like Removal, the 1850s Constitutional debates, 
and the Civil War.  This nationalism was predicated upon protecting a land base, 
balancing traditional and progressive values, promoting a national education system, 
and placing national priorities above factional divides.  In doing so, Choctaws like 
Jones had mastered using the tools of colonialism to protect rather than destroy 
sovereignty.  Divergent factions always existed, but in face of external threats the 
Choctaws had been unique in their ability to find a common course of action and 
effectively present a united front.  Reconstruction and the myriad dilemmas it 
accompanied destroyed that consensus and presented American forces with an 
opportunity to systematically extinguish Choctaw sovereignty. 
 Through the 1880s, factionalism intensified as “Progressives” and “Nationalists” 
vied for control of Choctaw political institutions.  Contemporaries and historians often 
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erroneously distinguished these groups by blood and level of acculturation, but this was 
not always the case.  “Mixed-bloods” and “full-bloods” joined the ranks of both parties.  
Many leading Progressives like Principal Chief Edmund McCurtain (1884-1886) spoke 
in favor of defending “our Nation and her government,” and passed laws limiting white 
rights within the Nation.  Likewise, Nationalists were not always the downtrodden, anti-
education, “full-bloods” depicted by their detractors.  To the contrary, they supported 
missionary education and often put their faith in educated, wealthy men, sometimes 
“mixed-blood” men like Principal Chief Benjamin F. Smallwood (1888-1890) who 
called for death to anyone who forfeited Choctaw land.  Before Reconstruction, both 
Progressive and Nationalist agendas could co-exist, as they did with Robert M. Jones.  
But with the threats of allotment and intrusion, both parties fervently believed their 
approaches to be the sole method of saving their iteration of the Choctaw Nation, 
making capitulation not an option.
4
 
 Growing economic stratification and heightened racial hierarchies further 
intensified political conflicts.  White men like J.J. McAlester drew the ire of 
Nationalists after making himself incredibly wealthy by exporting Choctaw coal, 
buying herds, fencing lands, and demanding Choctaws vacate “his” land.  Even Robber 
baron Jay Gould had his hands on Choctaw lands.  Progressives claimed to abhor this 
behavior from white men while obstructing most measures to prevent it.  White 
boomers, as many as 15,000 by 1889, flooded Choctaw lands looking for their own 
wealth.
5
  Added to this were freedmen, eventually made citizens but never regarded as 
racial equals, climbing economic ladders sometimes above impoverished Choctaws.  
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They attended schools at a higher rate than white children in Southern states and farmed 
large tracts of land.  As one traditional Choctaw later recounted, “I am a slave instead of 
the Negroes.”  Though economic stratification, often associated with the “mixed-
bloods,” had been a fixture of post-removal Choctaw life with limited antipathy, 
alarming increases in economic disparity augmented perceived connections between 
blood and oppression.
6
    
 Violence erupted following the disputed 1892 elections.  Progressive Wilson 
Jones—a rich, “mixed-blood,” with a deceased Chickasaw wife, mansion in Texas, and 
somehow completely unrelated to Robert M. Jones—almost certainly rigged the 
majority of elections Progressives’ favor.  A group of 16 Nationalists, called by one 
“the Last League of Choctaws,” led by former sheriff Silan Lewis, responded by 
engaging in a killing spree against local Progressives.  Their supporters numbered in the 
hundreds, at least.  After a failed cease fire agreement and fearing arrest, part of this 
group fled to the house of Victor M. Locke, the white former Confederate soldier who 
clerked for Robert M. Jones in 1867.  Locke, affectionately known as “Uncle Dick,” 
supported the Nationalist cause against allotment and offered to protect them until they 
could secure a fair trial.  However, Wilson Jones’ militia arrived, most members heavily 
intoxicated, and shot Locke and engaged in a prolonged standoff with the armed 
Nationalists.  Lewis and his followers’ violent actions were especially telling in that a 
law-abiding, informed, politically-active cohort reached the point of armed internal 
violence against leading men engaged in ending their sovereignty.
7
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   As these events transpired, both Choctaw factions continued the tradition of 
carefully cultivating their outside image as peaceful and relatively united to preempt 
any argument for American interventions.  Nonetheless, sensationalized accounts of 
brutality and corruption spread throughout the region, tarnishing the Choctaw’s 
standing for effective, “civilized” government.  Already in their reports Indian Affairs 
commissioners had begun qualifying the Five Tribes as “semi-civilized” in subtle 
attempts to undermine reputations.  Violence and disorder gave the American 
government all the justification they needed to send troops.  Attempting to win public 
opinion wars, Wilson Jones exceeded his authority and stayed the execution of all but 
Silan Lewis, who died an agonizing death from a misplaced gunshot wound before a 
large crowd and photographers.  Jones and others aptly pointed out that violence of this 
nature regularly occurred in the United States without calls for new governments, but 
failed to win support.
8
   
 By 1897, Progressive Chief Greenwood “Green” McCurtain recognized that the 
United States planned to implement allotment regardless of Choctaw resistance.  Thus, 
with the Council’s approval, he signed the Atoka Agreement which stipulated the 
abolishment of tribal laws and courts by 1906 and an agreement to allot Choctaw land.  
This concordat, later codified into the Curtis Act, effectively ended tribal sovereignty 
while facilitating land despoliation and statehood.  Future chiefs, a constantly-
weakening title, were selected by American presidents instead of Choctaw citizens.  On 
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paper, the famed Choctaw Nation—the proof of the possibilities for Indian 
government—ceased to exist.9 
Yet, the Choctaw spirit of nationalism survived statehood and even overcame 
federal termination attempts in the late 1940s.  As historian Valerie Lambert 
demonstrates, “Choctaw Nationalism served as a powerful tool of resistance for the 
youth organizers” who fought to reinstate the Choctaw Nation.  They succeeded in 1970 
and have been making strong strides since to augment and solidify their sovereign 
status.  Still, Lambert laments all that was lost during a time when the nation ceased to 
formally exist.  In her own words: 
Our tribe has come far in the struggle to rebuild our formal institutions, our 
polity, and our land base in the aftermath of allotment upheaval.  But we remain 
painfully aware of the fact that what we have accomplished thus far falls short of 
what we created and what constituted our land base in the days of our glory in 
the nineteenth century.  With respect to our nineteenth-century political and 
legal institutions, we fear that such potent expressions of our sovereignty may 
never again exist.
10
    
 
Today’s Choctaw Nation is the strongest that it has been since allotment.  In 
accessing the official Choctaw website, four consecutive tabs walk visitors through 
major pillars of the current Choctaw Nation: national history, education, internal 
economic development, and effective national government capable of defending 
sovereign rights.  Essentially, Choctaws today embrace the same national structures to 
recover what was lost in allotment that nineteenth-century Choctaws selectively adapted 
and adopted to build-up their nation after removal. 
***** 
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On a warm, Saturday afternoon in April of 1938 outside the town of Hugo, 
Oklahoma, a crowd of approximately one-hundred spectators gathered for the 
dedication of Rose Hill Cemetery, a project funded by the Works Progress 
Administration.  Jones’ mansion itself had been passed between family members after 
Elizabeth Jones (later Bailey, Moore, Earls) moved to Arkansas and Texas.  Elizabeth 
Randall, granddaughter of Robert M. Jones received the allotment for the land but only 
rarely stopped by.  Eventually, Rose Hill was used primarily for social functions; one 
man recalled, “The last time I was in this room, I danced with Belle Starr, she was a 
might bad woman, but sure a good dancer.”  In 1912, following a celebration of sorts, 
the mansion caught fire, taking untold numbers of historical documents including the 
vast majority of Jones’ correspondence and financial records with it.  Twenty-years 
later, using funds from the Works Progress Administration, the Oklahoma Historical 
Society constructed a large stone wall surrounding Jones’ cemetery, around 100 yards 
from where the estate had stood.
11
   
The well-choreographed proceedings on that 1937 day reveal the problems of 
classifying men like Robert M. Jones.  Robert L. Williams, President of the Oklahoma 
Historical Society and a man who had spent the better part of a decade tracking down 
documents on Jones, gave a hagiographic speech on Jones’ life and death.  William’s 
proclaimed that “perhaps the highest honor he received was that of representative from 
the Choctaw Nation to the Confederate congress.”  This was followed by speeches from 
the United Daughters of the Confederacy and brief remarks from two freedmen who 
still lived in the general vicinity.  Then, much to the delight of the crowd, the 
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freemasons laid the cornerstone for “Robert M. Jones Memorial: Representative in the 
Congress of the Confederate States of America.”  Somehow, one of the less significant 
actions of Jones’ life—a delegate post which he left during the war—was etched in 
stone above his grave.  In that moment, Jones’ cemetery became a shrine, not to the 
incredible sovereign nation to which he belonged, but rather an endorsement of the 
Confederate war effort and subsequent American colonial endeavors.  Jones was no 
longer a Choctaw Nationalist, at least not to those orchestrating the commemoration.
12
 
Colonial dominance, including that of memory and commemoration, have made 
understanding nineteenth century Choctaw Nation-building strategies especially 
difficult.  The late nineteenth-century “Progressive” vs. “Nationalist” struggle only 
further deludes the picture.  Yet, scratching beneath the surface reveals the potential for 
nationalist progressives—Choctaws who selectively embraced certain non-traditional 
structures on their own terms and with their own authority. 
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